

BREAKING UP IS HARD TO DO: SECESSION AND STATE FORMATION IN THE
INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM (1815 – 2010)

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by

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Abstract

by

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In my dissertation, entitled *Breaking-Up Is Hard To Do: Secession and State Formation (1815-2010)*, I ask: Why are some secessionist movements that fight for statehood are recognized as states while others are not? There are two prevalent explanations for this phenomenon. One takes a domestic perspective, arguing that successful secessions are determined by specific domestic factors inherent to the secessionist movement; geography, population, party systems, and economic prosperity. The second explanation argues from an international perspective, claiming that statehood is a product of external recognition that is determined by international relationships and not domestic conditions. In addition, this perspective views politically motivated self-interest by existing major powers in the international system as driving the recognition of seceding territories.

I argue that these prevalent explanations do not account for normative factors associated with democracy and material factors associated with great power

involvement. To test my argument, I utilize a mixed-methods approach consisting of quantitative and qualitative components. The quantitative component uses a large-n dataset consisting of secessionist conflicts that occurred from 1815-2010. The data comes from a variety of sources, which are listed in the appendix of my dissertation, but the majority of the data was collected from two sources; the Minorities at Risk data project and the Correlates of War data project. The qualitative component consists of case-studies from the break-up of Yugoslavia. These cases are selected to account for how (or if) norms diffuse in the international system over time. Selecting cases that are similar except for the variables of interest (norms of self-determination and liberal democracy, strength of secessionist movement, and proximity to major powers or contiguous rivals) allows me to explain in detail the causal mechanism that leads violent secessionist movements to become recognized as new states in the international system.

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Overview

In the period of 1816-2008 two hundred and sixteen new states entered the international system.¹ This sought after status of statehood was not obtained by a secessionist leader's pronouncements or by meeting a list of well-known and established criterion. Rather, secessionist territories only become states when recognized as such by existing states. Such recognition is not always granted or comes only from some states and not others. Why are some secessionist movements recognized while others are not? Why do existing states sometimes declare a secessionist territory to hold all the legal standing and privileges of sovereign statehood while refusing to grant similar status to other territories? My dissertation seeks to answer these questions. Specifically, I focus on why some secessionist movements are recognized as states while others are not, and I limit my analysis to cases where the secessionist movement engages in violence to achieve its territorial and political aspirations.

¹Singer and Small, *Correlates of War Inter-State War Data 4.0 (2011)* and *Correlates of War Civil*

There are two main explanations for recognition. The first emphasizes the role of normative factors in leading existing states to decide to recognize a secessionist movement. In comments addressing secession in the context of East Timor Bill Clinton stated, “Where there are dissatisfied groups in sections of countries, we should be looking for ways to satisfy anxieties and legitimate complaints without disintegration. That’s not to say that East Timor was wrong. If you look at what the people of East Timor had been through...it seems that [secession] was the right decision.”² Commenting on the secession of Kosovo in 2008, Spain’s foreign minister Miguel Angel Moratinos stated, “The Spanish government is not going to recognize the unilateral act proclaimed yesterday by the Kosovar assembly. We are not going to recognize it because we do not consider that it respects international law.”³ Serbia’s president at the time stated that Kosovo’s secession was “unilateral, illegal, and illegitimate”, which called into question the very nature of the international system.⁴ The attitude of Russia’s government regarding Kosovo echoed the Spanish sentiments when at the time

² Comments made on 10/8/99 by President Bill Clinton at Conference on Federalism (Mont Tremblant, Quebec) http://ideefederale.ca/wp/wp-content/uploads/2009/09/Speech_by_President_Bill_Clinton_on_federalism.pdf

³ Comments made on 2/18/08 by Miguel Angel Moratinos (Spanish Foreign Minister) <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/serbia-recalls-its-us-ambassador-as-bush-hails-kosovo-independence-784036.html>

⁴ Excerpt from news report 7/24/2010 by Boris Tadic (Serbian President) to UU General Assembly <http://edition.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/europe/07/22/kosovo.independence.court/index.html?hpt=T1#fbi d=-2WPJINwlsZ>

they requested an emergency UN Security Council meeting in order to have Kosovo's secession "annulled."⁵

These quotes illustrate how normative factors influence existing states in deciding whether or not to recognize a secessionist movement. Arguments focusing on normative explanations for recognition emphasize the influence that preexisting norms in the international system have on the causal process. However, when we examine the motivations for recognizing these newly emerging states explanations associated with normative factors do not adequately capture the causal process that induces existing states in the international system towards acknowledging new member states.

Accordingly, the second major explanation for recognition focuses on material factors such as internal control and domestic authority. France's recognition of the United States, the recognition of Egypt by the United Kingdom, and the United States' support for Panama's independence are good historical examples of how normative factors have taken a back seat to material interests in recognizing newly emerging states in the international system. Yet cases such as Taiwan, which would seem to fit every material criterion for recognition of its external sovereignty, indicate that neither do material factors alone explain recognition.

I argue that these explanations have not accounted for norms of liberal democracy and international material factors associated with existing security

⁵ Excerpt from news report on 2/18/2008
<<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1579069/Separatists-watch-Kosovo-gain-independence.html>> (accessed 4/21/10).

preferences of great powers. These factors influence not only which secessionist movements are recognized, but also which norms are most relevant to this process for existing states in the international system. In this sense, my argument addresses the process of how secessionist movements are recognized by existing states as well as accounting for how norms associated with national self-determination and democracy diffuse in the international system and influence existing members of the system to recognize movements trying to break away from their parent state.

This introductory chapter first provides a brief overview of the existing literature to frame the research question. Next, I lay out my argument concerning how the diffusion of norms associated with liberal democracy and the security concerns of powerful states influences which secessionist movements are recognized. Finally, I briefly outline the research design to be utilized and breakdown the chapters to follow.

1.2 Secession and the International System

The material explanation for recognition is the dominant one in international Relations scholarship. Secession has historically been viewed as a domestic issue that had very little impact on international politics. Scholars of international relations that theorize about the operation of the international system take as a starting point that the “state” is the primary actor of interest, and that all important behavior in international politics stems from the state as a unitary actor.⁶ In short, existing approaches to

⁶ See Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, New York: McGraw Hill (1979): 91-93,

international relations view states as exogenous to the international system, which overlooks the impact that processes of state formation can have on international politics.⁷ This is mostly because many IR scholars view the state formation process as an inherently domestic affair, neither impacting nor impacted by international politics. As Wendt states:

The issue of how states get constituted as the “people” of international society has been neglected in the state theory literature. This literature is oriented towards domestic politics where the agency of the state may be less apparent than its internal differentiation. But state agency also has been neglected in international relations.⁸

Widespread belief that state formation is governed by domestic material factors associated with authority and control has led IR scholarship to neglect this process. Simply stated, when a secessionist movement attempting to break away from its parent state achieves a certain degree of political authority over a specific population and control of a given territory it has met the prerequisites of statehood. The broad acceptance of this view in international relations literature is a legacy of the adoption of principles associated with the Treaty of Westphalia, holding domestic authority as a

Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press (2005): 18, and Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, New York: Cambridge University Press (1999): 193-195.

⁷ It should be noted that Wendt does critique the neo-realist and neo-liberal institutionalist approaches to IR that place the state as exogenous and the primary actor in international system. However, since his argument concerns the operation of the state system he concentrates on the state as the primary actor as well, (Wendt 1999: 195). Also, see Arnold Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics*, Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins Press (1962): 3-6, and Lars-Erik Cederman, *Emergent Actors in World Politics: How States and Nations Develop and Dissolve*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press (1997): 4-5.

⁸ See Wendt (1999): 195.

prerequisite to external sovereignty, and preventing any intervention within a state recognized as such.⁹ In this sense, explanations of how new states emerge from secession consist of a simple linear process where domestic challengers to state authority attempt to break away from their parent state, with success dependent on the level of material resources they accumulate to achieve authority and control over a given population and territory.

This view of the Westphalian system, leads scholars of state formation to focus on domestic material factors. These scholars argue that recognition is dependent on clearly defined geographical boundaries and a high degree of political authority over a given population. Krasner states, “that recognition is extended to entities with territory and formal judicial autonomy.”¹⁰ Von Glahn uses similar criteria when he noted that recognition results when there is, “a defined territory, an operating and effective government, and independence from outside control.”¹¹

The emphasis on material factors of authority and control over territory and population is not just confined to academic research, but seems to have an important influence on policy makers faced with the dilemma of whether to recognize newly

⁹ It should be noted that Krasner mentions three other types of sovereignty in addition to Westphalian Sovereignty (Domestic, International Legal, and Interdependence). See Stephen D. Krasner, *Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press (1999): 20-21. Also, some scholars have described domestic authority has a “monopoly of violence” associated with the need for taxation and centralization to conduct war, see Charles Tilly, “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime,” in *Bringing the State Back In*, ed. Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press (1985): 171-172.

¹⁰ See Krasner (1999): 14.

¹¹ See Gerhard Von Glahn, *Law Among Nations*, 4th edition New York, NY: Macmillan Publishing Co (1981): 91-92.

seceding territories. In November 1976, the United State's State Department released a statement regarding the criteria for recognition of new states by the US:

In the view of the United States, international law does not require a state to recognize another entity as a state; it is a matter for the judgment of each state whether an entity merits recognition as a state. In reaching this judgment, the United States has traditionally looked to the establishment of certain facts. These facts include effective control over a clearly-defined territory and population; an organized governmental administration of that territory; and a capacity to act effectively to conduct foreign relations and fulfill international obligations.¹²

I argue that this view is flawed because it relies on a specific interpretation of the principles contained within the Treaty of Westphalia without accounting for its enactment in the historical record. Some scholars have noted that the orthodox image of the Treaty of Westphalia overlooks the fact that guarantees of domestic sovereignty were religious, not secular, in nature. A ruler's domestic autonomy was confined to religious practice, and only states that were considered Christian were covered under the treaty.¹³ Also, the provisions regarding non-intervention were not stated in the original treaty, but were attributed to Westphalia in the 18th century when political philosophers and advocates of international law interpreted the treaty's original text to support protections regarding non-intervention.¹⁴

¹² See Eleanor C. McDowell, "Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law," *American Journal of International Law*, 71:2 (April 1977): 337 and Von Glahn (1981): 93.

¹³ See Raia Prokhovnik, *Sovereignities: Contemporary Theory and Practice*, New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan (2007): 62.

¹⁴ See Daniel Philpott, "Westphalia, Authority, and International Society," *Political Studies*, vol. 47 (1999): 582.

The standard interpretation of Westphalia leads the international relations literature to conceive of state emergence from secession as a clear-cut process: achievement of domestic authority (control over population and territory) confers external sovereignty. From this view, either a secession movement attains the material factors to beat the parent state, the parent state defeats the secessionist challengers, or both sides agree on a consensual separation. However, the historical record shows that these conflicts can be anything but decisive, and that material factors (associated with control over population and territory) are not always the most important factors in the recognition of new states.¹⁵

In addition, Westphalian principles do not account for normative factors that influence how existing states in the international system come to recognize newly seceding territories. Examining secessionist conflicts provides numerous examples of movements that did not achieve recognition despite having high amounts of domestic authority over the disputed territory and population. For example, Somaliland is not recognized despite having a functioning government and control over its territory. This example is especially strange since the government of Somalia that the territory belongs to has for all intents and purposes ceased to exist. In the Republic of Georgia, both South Ossetia and Abkhazia have achieved de-facto control over their respective territories and population, but these territories have only received the recognition of

¹⁵ See Bridget Coggins, "Secession, Recognition, & the International Politics of Statehood," (Ph.D. diss., Ohio State University, 2006): 6-7.

four UN member states (Russia, Nicaragua, Venezuela, and Nauru).¹⁶ There are numerous examples where normative factors seemed to matter more than material factors in recognizing those attempting to secede from their parent state. Croatia, Kosovo, and East Timor are good examples of wide-scale repression by a parent state impacting the pace and scope of recognition by existing states in the international system.

Thus, an alternative argument for recognition focuses on normative factors. Some international relations scholars argue that recognition is an important dynamic in state formation because of the existence of an “international society.”¹⁷ These scholars define international society as a system of states¹⁸ conscious of certain common interests and values where member-states perceive themselves as bound by a common set of rules in their interactions and share in operating common institutions.¹⁹ For these scholars recognition plays an important role for newly emerging states because societal acceptance denotes consciousness by an actor of certain common interests and values,

¹⁶ “Russia Welcomes Nicaragua’s Recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia,” *China View*, 6 September 2008, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-09/06/content_9808317.htm (Accessed: 1 July 2011).

¹⁷ See Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, New York, NY: Columbia University Press (1977), Barry Buzan, *From International to World Society: English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalization*, New York, NY: Cambridge University Press (2004), Martha Finnemore, *National Interests in International Society*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press (1996), Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” *International Organization*, 52: 4 (October 1998): 887-917, and Nicholas Onuf, “The Constitution of International Society,” *European Journal of International Law*, 5: 1 (1994): 1-19.

¹⁸ A system of states is defined as “where [two or more] states are in regular contact with one another, and where in addition there is interaction between them sufficient to make the behavior of each a necessary element in the calculations of the other,” (Bull 1977: 10 and Buzan 2004: 98).

¹⁹ See Bull (1977): 13 and Buzan (2004): 98.

which operationalizes a seceding territory's membership in the international society.

Coggins states that, "Societal acceptance [of seceding territories] is an important cause, rather than consequence, of statehood."²⁰ This would indicate that to some scholars recognition is an important social component for state formation because of the normative implications that acceptance carries for newly seceding territories.

Secessionist movements are recognized when existing states believe they will uphold the norms of the existing international society. Thus, secessionist movements must demonstrate not domestic control over their population, but behavior congruent with existing international norms that govern interactions between states in the international system.

In addition to membership in the international society, recognition also validates and legitimizes the structure of the system that a new seceding territory is trying to join.²¹ This is because the social process of acceptance is mutually reinforcing for both an aspiring state and the international society – seeking recognition affirms the existing international society by attempting to meet its standards.²²

²⁰ See Coggins (2006): 31.

²¹ See Bull (1977): 34-35 and Ian Clark, *Legitimacy in International Society*, New York, NY: Oxford University Press (2005): 5-7.

²² See Nicholas Onuf, "The Constitution of International Society," *European Journal of International Law*, vol. 5, no. 1 (1994): 17-18. It should be noted that Onuf makes the distinction between determining whether recognition is a "declaratory" or "constitutive" act with the former associated with material factors and the later normative behavior. His view is that "Recognition of and by states operationalizes sovereignty on both sides, [new territory and international order/society]." See Onuf (1994): 17.

However, despite these arguments and observations, the process by which recognition of newly forming states is impacted by material or normative factors is still unclear. One of the key points to take from this discussion is that despite the wide acceptance of explanations associated with normative or material factors, on closer examination, these arguments do not adequately explain the causal process that unfolds when a territory attempts to break away from its parent state and form a new one. A major focus of my argument is to provide an explanation for how material and normative factors interact to influence existing states in the international system towards recognition during violent secession attempts. Specifically, my discussion in the next section shows how existing material and normative explanations of recognition overlook the role of great power involvement and the norm of liberal democracy respectively.

1.3 My Argument

The previous discussion of well-known cases of secession demonstrates how reliance on existing explanations of normative or material factors provides an incomplete picture of what factors drive existing states to recognize a secessionist movement and the creation of a new state in the international system. In my dissertation, I extend the analysis of existing explanations of recognition to include normative factors associated with liberal democracy and international material factors associated with great powers and inter-state rivalry in the international system. This is

because secession involves political and social change on the domestic and international levels.

Change at the domestic level is governed by the relationship between the secessionist movement and its parent state. At the international level, changes come both in the potential new state, but also in the relations between existing states in the international system because of their security preferences regarding the territory attempting to secede. In short, I expand on current insights by identifying additional factors relevant to recognition and exploring the full range of interactions between norms and material factors leading to acceptance of new state-actors in the international system. This produces an argument of the type that Gourevitch labeled “the second image reversed” where international factors impact political and social developments at a domestic level.²³

It should be noted that I do not claim that international factors alone explain the recognition of newly seceding territories. Rather, I argue that most of the literature has viewed recognition of secession as a purely domestic affair that has little or no influence from international factors. However, conflicts over secession are inherently different from other types of intra-state violence, and that difference requires looking at causal factors at both the domestic and international levels of analysis. The end goal of a secessionist movement fighting to break away from its parent state is independence, which cannot be achieved without some sort of recognition or acknowledgement by

²³ Peter Gourevitch, “The Second Image Reversed: the International Sources of Domestic Politics,” *International Organization* 32:4 (1978): 881 – 882.

international actors. This leads to a situation where domestic factors of control over territory/population and conduct and capabilities of the participants in the secessionist conflict (secession movement and parent state) interact with the established preferences regarding sovereignty and security of existing states in the international system. Taking into account material factors at both levels of analysis (domestic and international) provides a more holistic explanation of the determinants of recognition during secessionist conflict. Specifically, I argue that great power involvement and inter-state rivalry can greatly impact the likelihood of recognition. This is because when seceding territories are recognized as states this can affect the security situation and alter the balance of power. Existing states are sensitive to these changes and take a keen interest in recognition because of the potential security ramifications

In addition, to examining material factors I also focus on expanding the role that relevant normative factors have on influencing recognition. Previous studies that have examined secession and recognition tended to concentrate on either domestic or international factors. From the domestic perspective, Sorens has argued that successful secessions are determined by specific domestic factors; geography, population, party systems, and economic prosperity. In addition, he argues that the socio-cultural factors of language, ethnicity, and cultural identity associated with the secessionist movement also play a role in determining the outcome of secession.²⁴ Sorens argument, while helpful in determining secession dynamics at the sub-state level and in advanced

²⁴ Jason Sorens, "The Cross-Sectional Determinants of Secessionism in Advanced Democracies," *Comparative Political Studies* 38:3 (April 2005): 308-313.

democracies, is limited in scope because he does not address the international dimension of secession. Specifically, how recognition is influenced by the security preferences of existing states and their disposition toward a newly seceding territory is missing from his analysis.

Other scholars have taken a more international perspective in trying to explain the relationship between secession and recognition. Coggins has argued that recognition is an important component of statehood that has been overlooked, and that explanations for why states recognize newly emerging states based on self-interest are under-specified. She frames her argument by showing, that in the context of state emergence, the most important dynamic is societal acceptance of external sovereignty rather than the internal/domestic political environment with regards to control over territory and population. In addition, Coggins makes specific arguments concerning what type of self-interest (domestic political considerations and external security) by existing states in the international system leads to recognition of seceding territories.²⁵ Coggins argument is a useful foundation for my project since it introduces the international component relevant to recognition of secession, but there are some key issues that were not addressed by either the domestic or international perspectives discussed. Specifically, the role normative factors has on inducing recognition has been largely left unexplored.

²⁵ See Coggins (2006): 62-65.

I argue that norms of national self-determination and democracy are important components that influences when and why existing states recognize seceding territories. It should be clear that I am not making an argument that consideration of normative factors is the sole factor that leads to recognition, but rather the norms of national self-determination and liberal democracy must be accounted for to generate an explanation for why states recognize seceding territories. Norms are defined as “standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations.”²⁶ The norm most relevant to the context of secession is national self-determination. Ever since Woodrow Wilson issued his Fourteen Points after WWI, this concept has been widely evoked when dealing with secession. However, the meaning and constitutive nature of this concept has not been clearly established in the literature. Specifically, there are two competing strands of thought on this subject; national self-determination as related to nationalism and the notion that every nation is entitled to a state. The other perspective acknowledges the democratic principles embedded within national self-determination as related to liberalism and democratic governance.²⁷ This implies that national self-determination is commonly conceptualized in a multi-dimensional approach. I argue that normative factors influencing recognition of secessionist movements is best viewed as being influenced by two separate norms; national self-determination and liberal

²⁶ See Keohane (2005): 57, Friedrich Kratochwil and John Gerard Ruggie, “International Organization: A State of the Art on an Art of the State,” *International Organization* 40:4 (1986): 769, and Buzan (2004): 163.

²⁷ Deon Geldenhuys, *Contested States in World Politics*, New York, NY: Palgrave MacMillan (2009): 29-31.

democracy. One of the main goals of this dissertation is to determine the impact these norms have on recognition (if any) and to test whether they operate as we would predict in the context of secession.

My argument not only concerns the conceptualization and empirical testing of national self-determination and liberal democracy in relation to secession, but also explores how norms (in this case rights and obligations associated with statehood and democratic governance) diffuse in the international system. Some have argued that norms associated with national self-determination have become embedded in social interactions between states and that over time these norms act as rules of appropriateness to pre- and proscribe behavior of existing states in the context of secession.²⁸ Others have argued that during specific periods of history norms regarding this concept underwent a cyclical process that saw the strength of its influence wax and wane.²⁹ I contend that norm diffusion related to national self-determination is influenced not only by norms associated with liberal democracy, but also material factors associated with how power is distributed in the international system. In this sense, my argument addresses the conceptualization and causal impact of national self-determination in relation to recognition of secession, but also examines what factors lead states to adopt behavior consistent with this norm.

²⁸ See Daniel Philpott, *Revolutions in Sovereignty: How Ideas Shape Modern International Relations*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press (2001): 69-70 and Wendt (1999): 176-178. It should be noted that Wendt does not make an explicit reference to norm development in the context of secession, but his discussion of social interaction and its ideational consequences is relevant to this discussion.

²⁹ Samuel J. Barkin and Bruce Cronin, "The State and the Nation: Changing Norms and the Rules of Sovereignty in International Relations," *International Organization* 48:1 (1994): 115-128.

1.4 Research Implications

My project contributes to the study of international relations in two important ways. First, the literature tends to view state formation as a purely domestic affair, which in turn ignores the impact that groups aspiring to statehood can have on the international system. One only needs to look at conflicts that occurred or are occurring in Palestine, N. Ireland, Kosovo, and Turkey to see how groups wanting their own state can significantly impact the international political and security environment. Exploring normative and material factors associated with recognition of secession enhances our understanding of how state formation can be a two-level game that involves both domestic and international characteristics.³⁰ This in turn not only provides an explanation for why states decide to recognize territories trying to secede, but also provides a foundation to explore ex ante state formation dynamics before joining the international system and how the formative process can lead to significant repercussions after statehood has been achieved.

In addition, my argument provides an explanation for how norms diffuse in the international system. How norms diffuse in the international system has been left largely unexplored. Risse and Sikkink state, “Scholars of international relations are increasingly interested in studying norms and ideas, but few have yet demonstrated the

³⁰ Robert Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: the Logic of Two-Level Games,” *International Organization* 42:3 (1988).

actual impact that international norms can have on domestic politics.”³¹ My argument contributes to our understanding of how norms spread by providing an explanation that combines both normative and material factors to determine how national self-determination and liberal democracy is internalized to reflect changes to state behavior, and tests to see whether it operates as predicted.

My project’s implications are not only confined to academic research, but also have useful insights for foreign policy formation. Recent developments in Libya have brought attention to the implications of recognition of groups in conflict with the central authority of their state. The recognition of the rebel-led National Transition Council as the legitimate government of Libya by the United States has illustrated serious disagreement within the Libya Contact Group (the thirty-two countries that have given political and material support to the rebels) regarding the international legality of this recognition.³² While my argument is focused on recognition in the context of secession understanding the dynamics of recognition in general is an important component to how states in the international system interact with each other.

My project also has implications for policies concerning civil war termination and counter-insurgency. Specifically, some scholars have recently begun to question the

³¹ Thomas Risse and Kathryn Sikkink, “The Socialization of International Human Rights Norms into Domestic Practice,” in *The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change*, ed. Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink, New York, NY: Cambridge University Press (1999): 2.

³² John B. Bellinger III, “U.S. Recognition of Libyan Rebels Raises Legal Questions,” *The Atlantic* (18 July 2011) < <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/07/us-recognition-of-libyan-rebels-raises-legal-questions/242120/> > [Accessed: 7/20/2011].

efficacy of a commitment to “winning hearts and minds” during civil wars.³³ In their view the term (winning hearts and minds) is interpreted in an ambiguous fashion, and leads military practitioners to draw the wrong conclusions regarding use of force and interaction with the civilian population. In short, some believe that the notoriety of the term has led to more normative approaches³⁴ in counter-insurgency doctrine that do not lead to better outcomes or the cessation of hostilities. By examining the empirical relationships associated with a normative concept like self-determination a better understanding of which factors drive specific conflict outcomes is useful to policy makers to determine decisions regarding intervention or escalation in the context of civil war. For these reasons a dissertation addressing this topic is useful and can make a knowledgeable contribution.

1.5 Outline and Organization of Chapters

In the chapter that follows, I focus on the existing literature regarding state formation, secession, recognition, and international law to show that current explanations based on normative or material factors do not capture the causal process that leads states to recognize seceding territories. I argue that recognition is dependent

³³ Paul Dixon, “Hearts and Minds: British Counter-Insurgency from Malaya to Iraq,” *Journal of Strategic Studies* 32:3 (June 2009): 353-381.

³⁴ A good example of a more normative approach to counter-insurgency doctrine is the creation of the human terrain teams by the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, which seeks to provide better socio-cultural understanding of local populations in civil conflicts, for more info see <http://hts.army.mil/>.

on both normative and material factors related to the external security environment of powerful states. Chapter 3 focuses on empirical testing and discusses the quantitative research design with descriptions of the data and coding procedures. In particular, the justification for the unit of observation (secessionist conflict), estimation procedures, and data sources are addressed in detail. In addition, the empirical findings from Chapter 3 highlight that three types of explanatory variables (domestic material, international material, and normative factors) exhibit significant impact on the likelihood of recognition and provide some understanding of their impact on great power recognition.

Chapters 4 and 5 are the qualitative case-study component of this study. Chapter 4 provides an introduction to the case selection method associated with the nested-analysis research design. Specifically, the results of the large-n analysis from Chapter 3 were used to focus the analysis on causal process observations in two case studies; Slovenia and Croatia during the breakup of Yugoslavia (discussed in Chapters 4 and 5 respectively). Using this research approach, these case studies trace the mechanisms that lead to great power recognition involving domestic and international material factors associated with secession group military strength, the presence of natural resources, great power involvement, and inter-state rivalry. In addition, I examine the degree of influence and acceptance that normative factors involving national self-determination and liberal democracy had on the likelihood of recognition by great powers during these instances of secession. Chapter 6 is the final chapter and conclusion of this study. It focuses on the summation of the arguments and findings

contained in the previous chapters as well as discussion concerning the theoretical implications and future research avenues regarding secession, recognition, and the state formation process.

CHAPTER 2: STATE, RECOGNITION, AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

2.1 Introduction

States are the primary actors in the international system. Wendt characterizes states as the “people” of the international system. Waltz argues: “States are not and never have been the only international actors. But then structures are defined not by all of the actors that flourish within them but by the major ones...States are the units whose interactions form the structure of international systems.”³⁵ Buzan describes those in the English School that take a state-centric approach as, “presupposing that states are de facto the dominant unit of human society,”³⁶ whereas Keohane describes neo-institutionalism viewing states as the most important actors in the international system.³⁷ In this sense, these different approaches to international relations view important developments in the international system as stemming directly from state

³⁵ See Waltz (1979): 93, 95.

³⁶ Buzan was describing English School theorists that took a pluralist approach in contrast to those who were considered of the solidarist approach. See Buzan (2004): 46-47, italics from original.

³⁷ See Keohane (2005): 18.

action. However, despite this consensus the criteria used to identify who these major actors are in international relations is underspecified. While statehood is dependent on recognition by other states in the system, we do not have a clear appreciation of its importance or understanding of the criteria by which recognition is conferred.

From an intuitive sense it would seem fairly straight-forward to determine which actors in the international system are considered states. States have armies, governments, and currencies. These intuitive indicators of statehood represent specific functions or capabilities associated with creating and operating political and economic institutions of governance. However, on closer examination, these commonly accepted elements of statehood do not seem applicable to determining the sovereign status of actors in the international system. For instance, military forces would seem to be a logical choice to indicate statehood since a standing army allows for the defense of territory and population from domestic and international challengers. Yet, there are numerous cases where this logic does not seem to apply. Costa Rica, despite a population of 4.5 million people and a landmass of about 51,000 sq km, has no military forces to speak of.³⁸ Alternatively, there are non-state actors whose military capabilities rival existing states in the international system. In comments addressing the military capabilities of the Lebanese militia Hezbollah, UN General Secretary Ban Ki Moon stated:

³⁸ See "Costa Rica" *CIA World Fact Book* < <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cs.html> > (5 August 2011).

[Hezbollah's military arsenal] remains distinct from and may exceed the capabilities of the Lebanese Armed Forces...[Hezbollah's military strength] creates an atmosphere of intimidation and poses a key challenge to the safety of Lebanese civilians and to the government's monopoly on the legitimate use of force.³⁹

Another assumption concerning the criteria for statehood is that states have governmental structures (either democratic or autocratic) that facilitate political, economic, and social policy formation and implementation, while also providing the parameters and scope for political contestation. In short, states should have institutions that pre- and proscribe behavior and that regulate social, economic, and political interactions for a given population and territory. However, when we examine states in the international system this assumption that states have governments does not seem to hold. A good illustration of this can be found in Somalia. Some have estimated that since 1991 more than forty armed groups challenging the central government have operated in and around the capital of Mogadishu, beginning in 2007 Ethiopian troops (now with an African Union military mission mandate) entered Somalia to forestall the takeover of the country by Islamic rebels, and since 2008 there have been three international naval task forces that have operated or are currently operating in and around Somalia's territorial waters to address increased incidences of maritime piracy.⁴⁰ These issues combine to make Somalia a poster-child for failed states, but it is not the

³⁹ "UN Worried by New Lebanese Tensions," *Aljazeera* (English Version) (19 October 2010) < <http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2010/10/2010101823502452594.html>> Accessed (5 August 2011)

⁴⁰ Martin N. Murphy, *Somalia: The New Barbary? Piracy and Islam in the Horn of Africa*, Columbia University Press: New York, NY (2011): 1-2, 129-134.

only one. In the 2011 rankings of the Failed State Index eleven countries are listed as critical, which indicates an occurring or likely vulnerability of collapse or large-scale internal conflict.⁴¹ However, despite the issues associated with lack of governance capacity there has been no change in the sovereign status of Somalia or any of the countries listed in the index. Conversely, when we examine Somaliland (the Northwest portion of Somalia that wishes to secede but has not received recognition of its sovereignty by any state in the international system) we see a completely different picture in regards to governance. Paquin commented on the governance capacity of Somaliland by noting:

Somaliland has functioning democratic institutions, including a judicial system and free press... Somalilanders also have a legitimate constitution, an army, and police forces. It also has the main attributes of statehood, including a flag and its own currency, passports, and license plates.⁴²

This situation presents a quandary for assumptions regarding government being a defining characteristic of statehood, since it would seem that neither the absence nor presence of effective governance capacity has any bearing on whether a non-state actor can transition into a recognized state.

This situation persists regarding economic characteristics that we usually associate with state actors in the international system. Currencies or the issuance of

⁴¹ The countries listed as critical are; Afghanistan, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Guinea, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Pakistan, Somalia, Sudan, and Zimbabwe. See "Failed State Index," (2011) *Foreign Policy* http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/06/17/2011_failed_states_index_interactive_map_and_rankings and the *Fund for Peace* <http://www.fundforpeace.org/global/?q=fsi-grid2011>.

⁴² Jonathan Paquin, *A Stability-Seeking Power: U.S. Foreign Policy and Secessionist Conflicts*, Montreal, CAN: McGill University Press (2010): 161-162.

monetary instruments are thought to be the exclusive domain of states since they alone have the resources to underpin and guarantee the market and financial activities that characterize economic interactions.⁴³ Recent trends would question this assumption. Currently a host of countries use either the U.S. dollar or Euro as legal tender, to peg their currencies to, or manage their exchange rates.⁴⁴ Also, the impact of the recent debt crisis in the EU is leading to growing support for a fiscal transfer union for the members of the euro. In addition, the rise and adoption of virtual currencies that are not backed by any state or governmental organization are good illustrations of how assumptions regarding the economic characteristics of state actors – namely that states and only states have currencies – does not seem to operate as predicted.⁴⁵

This discussion demonstrates that our assumptions regarding the defining characteristics and attributes of states in the international system are not as clear or developed as many believe them to be. As previously stated, this dissertation addresses the question of why some secessionist movements are recognized while others are not. The criteria used to identify state actors in the international system are important components to my project because the relationship between secession and recognition is a fundamental aspect of the state formation process. In the pages that follow, I make

⁴³ Peter North, *Money and Liberation: The Micro-Politics of Alternative Currency Movements*, Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press (2007): xi-xii.

⁴⁴ "Poor Dollar Standard," *The Economist* 400:8746 (13 August 2011): 71.

⁴⁵ The virtual currency in question is referred to as "Bitcoin," see "Bits and Bobs," *The Economist*, 399: 8738 (18-24 June): 83.

the argument that recognition of violent secession movements is attributable to material and normative factors that operate at the domestic and international levels.

Material factors are relevant to recognition of secessionist movements because existing states in the international system evaluate the political and military capacity of secessionist movements to gauge how much control and authority they exert over the population and territory they purportedly represent. Material factors relevant to secession provide information regarding the future governance capacity of the movement aspiring to statehood as well as the security ramifications that impact the preferences of great powers in the international system. I identify a number of material factors that I divide between those operating at the domestic and international levels. Material factors operating on the international level are associated with great powers and inter-state rivalry. Material factors operating at the domestic level focus on the military and economic capacity of the secessionist movement and the parent state it is attempting to break away from.

In addition to material factors, I argue that recognition of secessionist groups is also a function of normative factors. Specifically, norms of national self-determination and liberal democracy are important factors that decide whether existing states in the international system recognize seceding territories. The norm of national self-determination is commonly referred to in the context of secession, but the impact it has upon international recognition is open to debate. Some have argued that the norm of national self-determination has a destabilizing effect that can lead to the potential

breakup of most of the world's states.⁴⁶ Others have argued that the norm of national self-determination is a good barometer for whether an attempted secession should be considered just or legitimate.⁴⁷ I argue that the norm of national self-determination should not be evaluated as the sole causal factor determining whether secession movements become recognized, but rather national self-determination should be evaluated in conjunction with norms of liberal democracy and how they interact with the material factors previously mentioned. This is because the relationship between national self-determination and democracy shows some conceptual overlap because of a shared relationship based on autonomy between the right to secede and the right to govern.⁴⁸ In this sense, my argument not only addresses the question of why some secessionist movements are recognized and its empirical implications regarding material or normative factors, but also addresses how we conceptualize the norm of national self-determination in relation to democracy.

In the chapter that follows, I layout my argument in more detail by first drawing on the extant literature defining what a "state" is and the characteristics we use to identify the state-actors in the international system. Specifically, I present the origins of the state system and how ideas linked to the Treaty of Westphalia have influenced our

⁴⁶ Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press (1983): 43-45.

⁴⁷ Margaret Moore, "Introduction: The Self-Determination Principle and the Ethics of Secession," in *National Self-Determination and Secession*, ed. Margaret Moore, New York, NY: Oxford University Press (1998): 4-6 and Daniel Philpott, "Self-Determination in Practice," in *National Self-Determination and Secession*, ed. Margaret Moore, New York, NY: Oxford University Press (1998): 80-82.

⁴⁸ See Philpott (1998): 81-84.

understanding of the state formation process, giving particular focus to the role that recognition plays. A clear explanation of how we identify states in the international system is important since achieving statehood through international recognition, is a primary motivation for secessionist groups attempting to break away from their parent state.

Next, I discuss the relationship between recognition and secession and argue against viewing achievement of recognition as a domestic bottom-up process. Rather, recognition results from the interaction between material and normative factors on the domestic and international levels. In the discussion of material factors, I focus on the existing security preferences of great powers in the international system and the military and economic capacity of the secessionist movement and its parent state. These elements are important to account for as they provide information concerning the degree of internal control and authority a secessionist movement enjoys, as well as determine whether those same capabilities that allow it to consolidate power on the domestic level are considered a threat to existing state-actors in the international system. In addition to material factors, I closely examine the norms of national self-determination and liberal democracy in relation to secession. I do this by defining the standards of behavior that are relevant to secession and explain how states internalize the rights and obligations associated with national self-determination and liberal democracy that influences recognition.

In the second part of this chapter, I present my research design for the both the quantitative and qualitative portions of the dissertation. The quantitative portion of this

project is conducted in Chapter 3 using a dataset of secessionist conflicts that occurred from 1815-2010.⁴⁹ I use time-series analysis to determine whether the material and normative factors I have identified are operating as predicted in relation to recognition of secession. The qualitative portion, which begins in Chapter 4, examines cases from the breakup of Yugoslavia to track whether the causal process that leads to recognition is theoretically consistent with the argument I make. In addition, the case-study portion of the dissertation serves as a robustness check to ensure the validity of indicators for the relevant material and normative factors that lead to recognition.

2.2 States, Nations, and Nation-States

Before I can discuss the defining characteristics of state-actors in the international system some discussion on the terms state, nation, and nation-state is needed. Classical political philosophers have conceptualized states as a natural occurrence related to cooperation in a Hobbesian state of nature. Spinoza and Hobbes defined the state as an “act of will that served as a means to escape from an intolerable situation.”⁵⁰ More commonly, states are defined in relation to the monopoly of the legitimate use of force within given territorial boundaries.⁵¹ Weber defines a state as, “a

⁴⁹ Data is derived from Bridget Coggins, “Friends in High Places: International Politics and the Emergence of States from Secessionism,” *International Organization* 65:3 (Summer 2011): 433-467.

⁵⁰ Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis*, New York, NY: Columbia University Press (1954) [2001]: 167.

⁵¹ Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosburg, “Why Africa’s Weak States Persist: The Empirical and Juridical in Statehood,” *World Politics* 35:1 (October 1982): 2-3 and Gellner (1983): 3.

human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate forces within a given territory.”⁵² Tilly also conceptualizes the state in the context of coercion. He defines states, “as coercion-wielding organizations that are distinct from households and kinship groups and exercise clear priority in some respects over all other organizations within substantial territories.”⁵³ From this viewpoint, “states” serve as centralized coercion and control apparatuses organized around a given territory and population.

However, some view this conceptualization of the “state” as flawed since it applies only to a specific context or overlooks the socially constructed element of recognition. Herbst has argued that defining the state as a coercive apparatus tied to the monopoly of violence is a conceptualization that is derived from the European state formation context, and is inappropriate for the African context because of differences in topography and population densities.⁵⁴ Centeno saw similar problems in applying a conceptualization of the state based on coercive capacity in the Latin American context because inter-state violence was of a limited nature which hindered institutional consolidation and coercive capacity.⁵⁵ If conceptualizing the state based on coercive

⁵² Max Weber, “Politics as a Vocation,” reprinted in *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, ed. H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, New York, NY: Oxford University Press (1958): 78.

⁵³ Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, A.D. 990-1992*, Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing Inc. (1992): 1-2.

⁵⁴ Jeffrey Herbst, *States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press (2000): 20-21.

⁵⁵ Miguel Angel Centeno, *Blood and Debt: War and the Nation-State in Latin America*, University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press (2002): 20-26.

capacity is not relevant outside the European context than the possession of a monopoly on the legitimate use of force as a defining characteristic of states needs to be reevaluated.⁵⁶

In addition to issues associated with the European context, some scholars view defining the state as a centralized coercive apparatus overlooks the importance of socially constructed aspects that determine statehood. English School scholars view recognition as a defining characteristic of statehood by conferring membership in the prevailing international order/society.⁵⁷ This is because recognized states perceive themselves as bound by a common set of rules in their interactions and share in operating common institutions.⁵⁸ Constructivists also view recognition as an important factor in determining statehood. Coggins views statehood as “inherently social.” In her view, “Most states-to-be are socially promoted and accepted as full system members before their domestic-level conflicts have concluded. In any case, it is clear that aspiring states need a quorum of the world’s states to consecrate their legitimacy; they need friends in high places.”⁵⁹

⁵⁶ It should be noted that while the European state formation experience is not relevant to the Latin American and African contexts it has shown some relevance in other regions. Hui makes the argument that the European State formation experience is very relevant to state formation in Ancient China, and that state formation in Europe and China followed very similar formative experiences but diverged in long-term political and institutional development, Victoria Tin-bor Hui, *War and State Formation in Ancient China and Early Modern Europe*, New York, NY: Cambridge University Press (2005): 8-10.

⁵⁷ Bull (1977): 34-35 and Clark (2005): 5-7.

⁵⁸ Bull (1977): 13 and Buzan (2004): 98.

⁵⁹ Coggins (2011): 435.

Reference to recognition as defining statehood also has roots in customary practice. Former British Prime Minister George Canning (1770-1826) defined statehood as:

[a potential state having] shown itself substantially capable of maintaining an independent existence, of carrying on a government of its own, of controlling its own military forces, and of being responsible to other nations for the observance of international laws and the discharge of international duties.⁶⁰

More recently the customary practice determining statehood became codified in international law through the Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States (1933). This agreement stipulated that as a matter of international law statehood required a permanent population, defined geographic boundaries, government, and the capacity to enter into relations with other states.⁶¹

Other scholars have expanded on the theme of recognition to include ideational characteristics to define the state. Migdal defines the state as “a field of power marked by the use and threat of violence and shaped by (1) the image of a coherent, controlling organization in a territory, which is a representation of the people bounded by that territory, and (2) the actual practices of its multiple parts.”⁶² Regardless whether one emphasizes image or recognition when conceptualizing the state, these scholars view

⁶⁰ Personal correspondence of George Canning (26 September 1826), quoted in Mikulas Fabry, *Recognizing States: International Society and the Establishment of New States since 1776*, New York, NY: Oxford University Press (2010): 9.

⁶¹ Deon Geldenhuys, *Contested States in World Politics*, New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan (2009): 8.

⁶² Emphasis from original, See Joel S. Migdal, *State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute One Another*, New York, NY: Cambridge University Press (2001) [2007]: 15-16.

social processes as an important element in defining the state. Despite some differences, these definitions of the state indicate two characteristics being of primary importance; the coercive capacity of the state and the social aspect of recognition or image.

When we examine how the term “nation” is defined we also see differences of opinion on what constitutes the “nation.” There are two schools of thought on the conceptualization of the “nation”. One school of thought defines the nation from objective criteria. According to this view, attributes associated with language, ethnicity, religion, and territory determine nationhood.⁶³ Stalin described this definition of the nation by stating, “A nation is a historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in common culture.”⁶⁴ The other school of thought defines the nation from a subjective perspective that emphasizes shared consciousness, convictions, and loyalties.⁶⁵ Anderson defined the nation as “an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign.”⁶⁶

⁶³ Anthony D. Smith, *Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, and History*, Malden, MA: Polity Press (2001). [2006]: 11.

⁶⁴ Joseph Stalin, “The Nation” in *Marxism and the National Question*, reprinted in *The Essential Stalin: Major Theoretical Writings*, ed. Bruce Franklin, London, UK: Croom Helm (1973): 61.

⁶⁵ Gellner (1983): 6-7, 55.

⁶⁶ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism*, revised edition, New York, NY: Verso (1983) [2006].

Despite the differences between how scholars define “state” and “nation” some similarities exist. Specifically, the conceptualization of both the “state” and “nation” emphasizes material capability and social processes. For the definitions of the “state” the factors of coercive capability and recognition or image fit this conceptual pattern, while for the “nation” it is language, ethnicity, or religion representing material factors and shared consciousness providing the social element. These definitions of the “state” and “nation” provide a conceptual framework where they are defined by institutions and community respectively. If this conceptualization of the “state” and “nation” is correct than we would expect to define the “nation-state” in reference to institutional coercive capacity and communal consciousness of a shared centralizing identity. This is illustrated in using a three-level framework for latent concepts in the following figure:




Figure 2.1: Predicted Three-Level Framework of the Nation-State⁶⁷

⁶⁷ Gary Goertz, *Social Science Concepts: A User's Guide*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press (2006): 50-53.

However, some have argued that the use of the “nation-state” as a latent concept is altogether a failed exercise because of issues with validity and weighting.⁶⁸ Validity issues concern the common use of “nation-state” to denote the degree that the borders of the “nation” and “state” coincide. This is problematic since this does not reflect the constitutive factors that underpin its conceptualization namely; social processes associated with recognition and shared community and material qualities of coercive capacity and ethno-linguistic traits. In addition, Smith has questioned the conceptual weighting of this term since it conflates the dimensions of state and nation. He states, “Too often, theorists see the state as dominant, with the nation as a kind of junior partner or qualifying adjective. Little attention is then given to the dynamics of the nation.”⁶⁹

These issues indicate the problems associated with the using the term “nation-state.” For the remainder of the study I refer solely to actors who achieve statehood as states, defined as achieving international recognition of their independence. This definition clearly identifies the two actors of interest to this study; existing states in the international system and the non-state actors trying to break away from them (referred to as secessionist movements for the remainder of the study). It also highlights the relationship of interest of this study; the processes by which existing states in the

⁶⁸ Walker Connor, “Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying?” *World Politics* 24:3 (April 1972): 333-334.

⁶⁹ Smith (2001) [2006]: 16-17.

international system recognize secessionist movements. This study does not focus on the “nation,” but I should note that the defining characteristics of nations are relevant. In short, though I do not focus on how secessionist movements become nations, I do include in my study the ways in which different levels of ethno-linguistic traits and perceptions of shared community influences recognition.

2.3 Secession, Statehood, and the Legacy of Westphalia

States are the most important political actors in the international system, and it is statehood that secessionist movements aspire to attain. Prominent international relations theorists start with the state as the basic unit of analysis when investigating international politics because state actors initiate and arbitrate all important developments in the international system. This is largely a function of the anarchic structure of the international system. Waltz states:

The units of an anarchic system are functionally undifferentiated. The units of such an order are then distinguished primarily by their greater or lesser capabilities for performing similar tasks...In defining international political structures we take states with whatever traditions, habits, objectives, desires, and forms of government they may have.⁷⁰

Anarchy pushes states to the forefront of all important actions and developments in the international system because of the absence of a supra-national authority. Simply stated, since the international system is a “self-help” system there is no entity or authority that can arbitrate or dictate state behavior. This leads to a

⁷⁰ See Waltz (1979): 97, 99.

situation where existing approaches to international relations view states as exogenous to the international system, which overlooks the impact the processes of state formation can have on international politics.⁷¹ This is mostly because many international relations scholars view the state formation process as an inherently domestic affair, neither impacting nor impacted by international politics. The broad acceptance of this view in the international relations literature is a legacy of the adoption of principles associated with the Treaty of Westphalia regarding domestic authority being a prerequisite to external sovereignty.⁷² In this sense, explanations of how new states emerge from secession consist of a simple linear process where domestic challengers to state authority attempt to break away from their parent state, with success dependent on the level of material resources they accumulate to achieve authority and control over a given population and territory.

International relations scholars usually view the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) as ushering in the modern state-system in international politics.⁷³ On the face of it, this treaty served to broker peace between combatants involved in the Thirty Year's War associated with the Holy Roman Empire and the violence stemming from the Dutch

⁷¹ Wendt (1999): 195, Wolfers (1962): 3-6, and Cederman (1997): 4-5.

⁷² Krasner (1999): 20-21.

⁷³ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, (Brief Edition) revised by Kenneth W. Thompson, Boston, MA: McGraw Hill (1948) [1993]: 254, David Boucher, *Political Theories of International Relations: From Thucydides to the Present*, New York, NY: Oxford University Press (1998): 289, and Philpott (2001): 82-84.

insurrection against Spain.⁷⁴ However, the implication of this settlement was the emergence of a state system that emphasized two primary factors that characterized statehood; domestic authority and autonomy/non-interference.⁷⁵

Domestic authority deals with how political power is exercised over a given population or territory. Authority is conferred when a political actor (this can be an individual or group) maintains a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence in a given territory. Domestic authority is exercised by those with primary and exclusive responsibility for governance activities over a given population and territory. From this viewpoint, Westphalia's emphasis on domestic authority coincides with previously mentioned definitions of the state that focus on centralized coercive capacity illustrated by Weber's description of the state as, "a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate forces within a given territory."⁷⁶ According to Westphalia, autonomy/non-interference is another important determinant of statehood. Autonomy/non-interference refers to the capability of domestic authorities to exercise independent action without influence or coercion from other peer states. It operates by conditioning existing states in the international system to refrain from

⁷⁴ Adam Watson, *The Evolution of International Society: A Comparative Historical Analysis*, New York, NY: Routledge (1992): 182 – 197 and Matthew S. Weinert, *Democratic Sovereignty: Authority, Legitimacy, and State in a Globalizing Age*, New York, NY: University College London Press (2007): 20-22.

⁷⁵ See Krasner (1999): 20, Philpott (2001): 30-33, and Prokhovnik (2007): 60-61.

⁷⁶ It should be noted that Krasner's discussion of domestic sovereignty fits the definition of domestic authority as well, see Krasner (1999): 11-12 and Max Weber, "Politics as a Vocation," reprinted in *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishers [1919 org.] (2004).

interfering in the domestic politics of another state because of the risk of undermining domestic authority.

This legacy of Westphalia has created an orthodox view in international relations, which enshrines the attainment of domestic authority and non-interference as defining characteristics of statehood. I argue that this view is flawed because it relies on a specific interpretation of the principles contained within the Treaty of Westphalia without accounting for its enactment in the historical record. One issue that has been problematic is to what degree the treaty enshrined rights and obligations regarding domestic sovereignty. A common refrain when referencing the treaty is that it enshrined autonomy of action for rulers in the domestic context. However, some scholars have noted that the broad acceptance of the orthodox image of the Treaty of Westphalia overlooks the fact that guarantees associated with domestic sovereignty were religious, not secular, in nature. In particular, the domestic autonomy that rulers enjoyed was confined to religious practice, and only states that were considered Christian were covered under the treaty.⁷⁷ Some would take this critique far enough to debate whether Westphalia is the basis for the modern-state system itself. Keating states:

...neither the Treaty of Munster or that of Osnabruck contains any reference to sovereignty or to anything like the sovereign state... [Westphalia] did provide for the “nationalization” of religion as a way of coping with a problem that had threatened public order over the previous hundred years...[Westphalia] did not establish the present system of European states, and indeed the only state which still has its 1648 borders is Portugal.⁷⁸

⁷⁷ Prokhovnik (2007): 62.

⁷⁸ Michael Keating, “Sovereignty and Plurinational Democracy: Problems in Political Science,” in *Sovereignty in Transition: Essays in European Law* ed. Neil Walker, Portland, OR: Hart Publishing (2003):

Also, the provisions of the treaty regarding non-interference were not stated in the original treaty, but were attributed to Westphalia in the 18th century when political philosophers and advocates of international law interpreted the treaty's original text to support protections regarding non-intervention.⁷⁹ Examining the historical record shows that in the century after the treaty's signing (1648-1748) three major European wars occurred that violated the supposed provision of non-interference since they were fought over who would be the legitimate domestic authority in Spain, Poland, and Austria.⁸⁰ The violation of non-interference is not confined to the outbreak of war alone, but can also occur in a more clandestine manner. Krasner notes, "A political entity can be formally independent but de facto deeply penetrated. A state might claim to be the only legitimate enforcer of rules within its own territory, but the rules it enforces might not be of its own making."⁸¹ An important implication of this discussion is that the violation of non-interference is a tool of statecraft that is not confined to pre-

194. Teschke also makes this argument that Westphalia as the beginning of the modern-state system is a myth that has no basis in the historical record, but is rather an intellectual construction of general IR theorists. See Benno Teschke, *The Myth of 1648: Class, Geopolitics, and the Making of the Modern International Relations*, London, UK: Verso Publishing (2003): 2.

⁷⁹ See Daniel Philpott, "Westphalia, Authority, and International Society," *Political Studies*, vol. 47 (1999): 582.

⁸⁰ The conflicts that undermine the provision of non-interference in chronological order are; the War of Spanish Secession (1697-1702), the War of Polish Secession (1733-1738), and the War of Austrian Secession (1740-1748). McKay and Scott note that even less than a decade after the treaty of Westphalia was signed that the provision of non-intervention was obsolete because of French claims to the Spanish throne thru the marriage of Louis XIV of France to Maria Theresa of Spain (Peace of the Pyrenees – 1659). See Derek McKay and H.M. Scott, *The Rise of Great Powers: 1648-1815*, New York, NY: Longman Group Ltd (1983): 6-8.

⁸¹ Stephen Krasner, "Problematic Sovereignty," in *Problematic Sovereignty: Contested Rules and Political Possibilities*, ed. Stephen Krasner, New York, NY: Columbia University Press (2001): 2.

Napoleonic Europe but continues in contemporary times, calling into question the orthodox view of state formation as rooted in Westphalian principles of domestic authority and non-interference.

Another reason to reject the orthodox view of Westphalia that emphasizes domestic authority and non-interference in defining statehood is because it overlooks the social processes associated with recognition and the influence it can have on determining statehood in the international system.⁸² Ashley states:

The historically testable hypothesis that the state-as-actor construct [based on domestic authority and non-interference] might be not a first-order given of international political life but part of a historical justificatory framework by which dominant coalitions legitimize and secure consent for their precarious conditions of rule.⁸³

Others have argued that recognition is important to account for because the development and changes in important ideas related to sovereignty has a major impact on defining statehood and international politics.⁸⁴

One implication of this discussion is that the legacy of Westphalia created both system and states through a process that operationalized sovereignty for both sides.⁸⁵ In short, states did not exist prior to Westphalia, so the social element of recognition is an

⁸² Nicholas Onuf, "The Constitution of International Society," *European Journal of International Law* 5:1 (1994): 16-18.

⁸³ Richard K. Ashley, "The Poverty of Neo-Realism," *International Organization* 38:2 (Spring 1984): 239.

⁸⁴ Some of the ideas that led to "revolutions in sovereignty" include non-interference, minority rights, and supra-national organizations like the EU, see Philpott (2001).

⁸⁵ Onuf (1994): 17.

important component of statehood because of the legitimizing mechanism it provides. Applying this logic to the context of secession would indicate that secessionist movements view recognition as an important achievement since it legitimizes the break away from their parent state and facilitates the consolidation of authority to enhance their standing as a member-state in the international system. This makes the relationship between secession and recognition an important focus of this study.

2.4 Recognition and Secession in the International System

Recognition is an important goal to secessionist movements trying to break away from their parent state.⁸⁶ Previous discussions regarding domestic authority and non-interference as determinants of statehood illustrated that the process for secessionist movements to transform into states must account for the underlying socially constructed aspects of membership in the international system. More specifically, recognition provides the social basis for determining statehood, and grants secessionist movements a measure of legitimacy that allows them to consolidate domestic authority and initiate or maintain external relations with other state actors in the international system. Strang notes:

States are not individually empowered sovereign actors, however, who then establish relations with each other. Rather, notions of sovereignty imply a

⁸⁶ James Crawford, *The Creation of States in International Law*, Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press (1979): 248.

state society founded on mutual recognition. The status of each State is thus tied up with that of the others in a continuing process of mutual legitimation.⁸⁷

If recognition is a key factor in determining how secessionist movements become states than an understanding of its constitutive factors and how they operate is needed. On first glance, identifying what “recognition” is seems straightforward; existing states in the international system acknowledging an actor’s statehood and the rights and obligations that accompany such a status.⁸⁸ Bull states, “If states today form an international society, this is because, recognizing certain common interests and perhaps some common values, they regard themselves bound by certain rules in their dealings with one another.”⁸⁹ However, on closer examination recognition is a more nuanced endeavor than first believed.

For instance, in examining the 212 delegations at the Westphalia conference I find three distinctive actors in attendance whose recognition was not considered equal. First were the established monarchies of Europe who were first among equals. Next, the principalities and free imperial cities that included among their ranks the powerful electors of Bavaria, Brandenburg, and Saxony. Finally, were the polities and less-centralized city-states and principalities such as Piedmont, Southern Netherlands, and the overseas colonies of the established European monarchies. Watson notes that

⁸⁷ David Strang, “Anomaly and Commonplace in European Political Expansion: Realist and Institutional Accounts,” *International Organization* 45:2 (Spring 1991): 148. Emphasis in original.

⁸⁸ Buzan (2004): 98.

⁸⁹ Bull (1977): 13.

mutual recognition only occurred between the first two attendees described, and that an important contention of debate was what type of recognized status specific territories and political units would enjoy that resided in the latter two classifications above.⁹⁰ Others have viewed recognition as occurring along civilizational fault lines in three distinct categories; plenary political recognition, partial political recognition, and natural human recognition, each of which corresponded to different conceptualizations of culture; civilized humanity, barbarous humanity, and savage humanity respectively.⁹¹ More commonly, scholars refer to two competing schools of thought on recognition; declaratory and constitutive.⁹²

Those holding to the declaratory school view recognition as a diplomatic formality. James notes, “recognition presupposes a state’s existence; it does not create it...state sovereignty is a factual matter...it cannot, once obtained, be affected by anything which is said by outsiders.”⁹³ To declarative theorists, statehood is not a

⁹⁰ Adam Watson, *The Evolution of International Society: A Comparative Historical Analysis*, New York, NY: Routledge (1992): 186-189.

⁹¹ James Lorimer, *The Institutes of the Law of Nations: A Treatise of the Jural Relations of Separate Political Communities* vol. 1, London, UK: William Blackwood and Sons (1883): 101-103.

⁹² There are many solid sources of this debate in international law. See Brunson MacChesney, “Recognition of States and Governments,” *International Law Studies (U.S. Naval War College)*, 62:2 (1980): 690-700, Morton A. Kaplan and Nicholas Katzenbach, *The Political Foundations of International Law*, New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons Inc. (1961), Thomas Grant, *The Recognition of States*, Westport, CT: Praeger (1999), Deon Geldenhuys, *Contested States in World Politics*, New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan (2009): 20-23, and Hurst Lauterpacht, *Recognition in International Law*, Cambridge, UK: University Press (1947). In addition, the terms de facto and de jure are commonly referenced in debates concerning recognition. However, the use of these terms is commonly associated with the recognition of governments rather than states. Given that this project is concerned with state formation in the context of secession and not regime dynamics I exclude these terms from my analysis. See MacChesney (1980): 691-692 and Fabry (2010): 9-14.

⁹³ Alan James, *Sovereign Statehood: Basis of International Society*, London, UK: Allen & Unwin

function of any social process inherent in mutual recognition but rather a function of already achieved facts on the ground; the entity aspiring to statehood achieves a level of effective authority over a given geographic area or defined population.⁹⁴ This is because domestic authority provides a platform to engage in bilateral relations which, according to these scholars, is an indicator of independence.⁹⁵ The international legal scholar Ti-Chang Chen has noted, "It is generally agreed that the conclusion of bilateral treaties constitutes recognition."⁹⁶ Also, scholars of this perspective see recognition as an obligation existing states have based on norms associated with external sovereignty that dictate mutual recognition when specific criteria of statehood have been met.⁹⁷ The declaratory school of thought attempts to make recognition wholly legalistic and obligatory upon an actor's achievement of a certain standard of domestic authority and control. One implication of this view is that declaratory scholars have tried to articulate a set of universal legal conditions under which recognition is appropriate or even required of existing states in the international community. The main rationale behind creation of international legal standards being that a list of criteria for recognition would allow legal theory to distinguish between legitimate (meets legal criteria) and illegitimate (legal requirements not met) uses of recognition.

(1986); 147, 152-153.

⁹⁴ MacChesney (1980): 690-692.

⁹⁵ Ian Brownlie, *Principles of Public International Law* 5th ed. Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press (1998): 71.

⁹⁶ Ti-Chiang Chen, *The International Law of Recognition*, London, UK: Stevens & Sons (1951): 192.

⁹⁷ Krasner (1999): 3.

The legal criteria declaratory scholars use to determine legitimate recognition is contained in Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States.⁹⁸ The criteria contained in the treaty suggests that recognition is dependent on having a permanent population, occupation of a permanently defined territory, possession of an effective government, and the ability to engage in diplomatic relations with other states. This viewpoint is aligned with previous definitions of the state that used coercive capacity and non-interference as the prime identifying factors, and views recognition as a consequence rather than causal factor in achievement of statehood. This leads to a simple narrative of how secession movements become states; a movement needs to simply achieve military victory and consolidate authority and expect recognition to follow in response to already achieved facts on the ground. Other scholars dispute the declaratory strand of recognition and embrace a more constitutive conceptualization.⁹⁹ Adherents to this school of thought believe that issues concerning legitimate domestic authority and state capacity are relevant factors in determining statehood, but pale in comparison to the importance of the social act of recognition. Without recognized status the attributes and capabilities of a non-state actor lack a measure of legitimacy to wield effectively in the international system. In a decision regarding the secession of Quebec, the Canadian Supreme Court noted, “the

⁹⁸ For copy of the text of the treaty see Montevideo Convention (December 26, 1933) <http://www.cfr.org/sovereignty/montevideo-convention-rights-duties-states/p15897> (Accessed 8/15/2011).

⁹⁹ M.J. Peterson, *Recognition of Governments: Legal Doctrine and State Practice, 1815-1995*, New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press (1997): 28-33.

viability of a would-be state in the international community depends, as a practical matter, upon the recognition by other states.”¹⁰⁰ In short, external sovereignty is a requirement to conduct normal affairs in the international system. In addition, in contrast to the declaratory conceptualization of recognition, constitutive theories suggest recognition should be the unique prerogative of the recognizing state. From this perspective a state may decide unilaterally to recognize a secessionist movement without reference to other states or the new state’s capacity for governance and authority. Conversely, a state may choose to recognize in concert with other states on the condition that a viable central authority exists.¹⁰¹ One implication of the constitutive school of thought is that leaders are reluctant to bind their hands with legalistic criteria or obligations when it comes to recognition.¹⁰²

It should be noted that some have taken issue with the constitutive conceptualization of recognition. These scholars view this school of thought as too subjective and political since recognition becomes the tool of statesman who utilizes the status of statehood to leverage their political goals. Grant states:

The constitutive doctrine, casting recognition as a device of statecraft, a tool of Realpolitik, available to forge States out of communities at the will of the recognizing State, provides no apparent means to regulate State conduct and, in any event, no apparent code of conduct.¹⁰³

¹⁰⁰ Peter Radan, “Secession: Can it be a Legal Act?” in *Identity, Self-Determination, and Secession*, ed. Igor Primoratz and Aleksandar Pavkovic, Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing (2006): 167.

¹⁰¹ Fabry (2010): 7.

¹⁰² Grant (1999): 22-23.

¹⁰³ Ibid: 3.

This would indicate that, from a constitutive viewpoint, recognition is not a function of legal and objective criteria that can be adjudicated, but rather the product of political convenience which is more subjectively based. In short, these scholars would reject the constitutive strand of recognition because it promotes an amoral perspective that views political preference rather than legal precedent as the defining criteria for recognition of new states in the international system.

Despite this criticism concerning the constitutive school I argue that it provides a good conceptual starting point to explore the relationship between recognition and secession. As the discussion above illustrates, objective criteria (domestic authority and non-interference) for determining statehood varies considerably in actual practice.¹⁰⁴ Furthermore, according to a 1994 report by the Council of Europe's Committee of Legal Advisors on Public International Law regarding state practices leading to recognition of new states, the empirical evidence would suggest that recognition of secession inevitably tends to always involve political preferences rather than legal precedents. The report found that out of the 16 countries reporting:

both the scope and the origins of submitted practice diverged widely...the Council of Europe's Member States were expected to submit materials drawn from the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government, it turned out that most materials concern[ing] relevant action [was] taken by the executive.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰⁴ Morton H. Halperin and David J. Scheffer (with Patricia L. Small), *Self-Determination in the New World Order*, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (1992): 45-46.

¹⁰⁵ The sixteen countries that reported were Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Slovak Republic, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. See Jan Klabbbers, et al. *State Practice Regarding State Secession and Issues of*

In addition to the report, some scholars have found that the self-interested behavior at the international level can have a significant impact on recognition of newly seceding territories.¹⁰⁶ For these reasons I utilize the constitutive conceptualization of recognition in my study to focus on the relationship of interest between secession and recognition. However, before I can present my argument concerning recognition of secession some discussion on the benefits of recognition and potential pitfalls associated with non-recognition is needed.

A secessionist movement that becomes a recognized state enjoys significant benefits. Some have argued that recognition facilitates contracting, which increases the chances of military alliances and membership in economic and political institutions.¹⁰⁷ Others have taken a more holistic perspective and view recognition of statehood granting multiple benefits. Kaplan and Katzenbach note:

Recognition normally results in increased prestige and stability at home; access to state funds on deposit in other states; access to private and governmental loans because of legal ability to pledge the state's credit, diplomatic and consular status for its agents in the recognizing entity; access to foreign courts and immunity from foreign process; establishment of normal trade relations; a capacity to request assistance from the recognizing government in the form of financial assistance, supplies, and even military

Recognition: Boston, MA: Kluwer Law International (1999): 14-16.

¹⁰⁶ Coggins (2011): 435-436, Kaplan and Katzenbach (1961): 120-121, and JES Fawcett, *The Law of Nations*, London, UK: Allen Lane (1968): 41.

¹⁰⁷ Krasner (2001): 9-11 and James Fearon, 'Separatist Wars, Partition, and World Order,' *Security Studies* 13:4 (Summer 2004): 402-403. It should be noted that while Krasner sees specific benefits stemming from recognition he does not view non-recognition preventing a non-state actor from conducting normal business in the international system.

aid; respect in other states for its laws and decrees; and benefits of existing treaty arrangements.¹⁰⁸

Conversely, there are those who see grave dangers stemming from non-recognition. These can include; the denial of normal diplomatic exchanges and treaty making, lack of formal trade and economic relations, and the inability to join international institutions. More seriously, those without recognized status of statehood in the international system risk being forcibly displaced from the territory and population under their authority.¹⁰⁹ Kurtulus sums up the predicament of non-recognized entities in the international system by noting, “[non-recognized states] have a legal status that is uncertain, an international standing that is indefinite, a legal existence that is often relative, and a security situation that is at times precarious”.¹¹⁰ This discussion provides a clear illustration of the benefits and pitfalls associated with recognition. In addition, it provides the rationale for why secessionist movements strive for recognition of their independence; to induce existing states to recognize their independence to ensure their security and continued existence.

¹⁰⁸ Kaplan and Katzenbach (1961): 121.

¹⁰⁹ Fabry (2010): 7-9.

¹¹⁰ Ersun N. Kurtulus, *State Sovereignty: Concept, Phenomenon, and Ramifications*, New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan (2005): 125.

2.5 Theory of Recognition of Secession

This discussion of the literature concerning the definition of the state, nation, and recognition brings us no closer to identifying and understanding the determining factors that induce states to recognize secessionist movements. In Chapter 1, I discussed previous studies that addressed this topic from either a domestic or international perspective. According to the domestic perspective, successful secessions are determined by specific domestic factors inherent to the secessionist movement; geography, population, party systems, and economic prosperity. In addition, socio-cultural factors of language, ethnicity, and shared cultural identity also play a role in determining the outcome of secession.¹¹¹ Conversely, the international perspective takes a more top-down approach and views recognition as an important component of statehood that has been overlooked in the state formation literature. This is because, in the context of state emergence, the most important dynamic is societal acceptance of external sovereignty rather than the internal/domestic political environment with regards to control over territory and population. In addition, this perspective views politically motivated self-interest by existing major powers in the international system as driving the recognition of seceding territories.¹¹²

These approaches provide a useful foundation to increase our understanding of the dynamics of recognizing seceding territories, but they exclude a key factor in the

¹¹¹ Sorens (2005).

¹¹² Coggins (2011).

causal process that leads to recognition. Specifically, normative factors associated with national self-determination and liberal democracy, and how they interact with material factors related to domestic authority/control and geo-politics. I argue that recognition of secessionist movements is attributable to both material and normative factors that operate at the domestic and international levels. Before detailing the specific elements of my argument some discussion is needed concerning the core concepts of secession and recognition.

In its most basic form recognition is the acknowledgement or perception of an object, occurrence, or phenomenon. In the international context, recognition is thought of in either a declaratory or constitutive framework. However, these definitions do not provide an understanding of how recognition operates in practice. Commonly, the terms *de facto* or *de jure* status is utilized in reference to recognition. However, these terms are of little use to this study since these conditions are associated with the recognition of governments rather than states. Others have employed terms like “tacit” and “express” recognition in order to ascertain the different practices existing states utilize when confronted with a potential new state.¹¹³ These terms have also been referred to as “implied” or “explicit” with the former representing a perceived acknowledgement based on actions taken or predisposition, while the latter requires a formal declaration of recognition of the emerging state.¹¹⁴ I utilize the formal explicit practice of

¹¹³ Peterson (1997): 86-92.

¹¹⁴ Coggins (2006): 51-52. It should also be noted that some scholars have argued that “conditional recognition” can be granted to potential states. However, I avoid its discussion in this study

recognition that occurs through either a public statement or transfer of official documents/credentials to operationalize recognition in this study. This provides a clear indicator for whether recognition has occurred and eliminates some of the subjective ambiguity associated with implicit models.

Another important component associated with recognition is distinguishing who is undertaking this action. Recognizing states may undertake this action unilaterally or in concert with other states in the international system. Unilateral recognition is discouraged by international law since it violates another state's territorial integrity and endows statehood based on subjective political considerations rather than objective legal precepts. From a practical sense, unilateral recognition is also a dangerous proposition for the recognizing states since it carries risks of severed diplomatic ties and even war.¹¹⁵ However, in practice unilateral recognition is not uncommon. The recognition of Biafra during the 1960's, Bangladesh after its war of independence, Northern Cyprus after the Turkish intervention, Croatia and Slovenia during the break-up of the former Yugoslavia, and the Georgian break-away republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia are just a few examples of unilateral recognition being undertaken by existing states in the international system. More importantly, unilateral recognition has the

because it does not provide much analytical leverage since it describes the cases of interest in their original state; unrecognized non-state actors in the international system. See Richard Caplan, *Europe and the Recognition of New States in Yugoslavia*, New York, NY: Cambridge University Press (2005): 6-8.

¹¹⁵ Paquin (2010): 18, Coggins (2011): 452, and Fabry (2010): 6.

most impact on statehood when undertaken by great powers in the international system. Fabry notes:

Claims of statehood have had a propensity to enmesh themselves with questions of wider international order, and questions of international order in turn have been a special preserve of the great powers. Recognition by the great powers has normally preceded, and carried far more weight than, recognition by other states. Indeed, the latter have normally looked to the former for direction, where they did not, their expeditiousness was likely of little import.¹¹⁶

This quote is not meant to be interpreted as saying that collective recognition from international or regional organizations does not matter. My view is that collective recognition by international institutions can provide a legitimizing mechanism not available to great powers' unilateral recognition, but this legitimacy effect should be viewed as limited and prone to the political preferences of great powers in the international system. I argue that we should not view recognition as a dichotomous outcome that is determined solely by which side the great powers line up behind, but rather view it as a continuous outcome that is influenced by different combinations of normative and material factors operating in the context of secession. The figure below provides a visual illustration of the conceptualization of recognition I utilize for my argument.

¹¹⁶ Fabry (2010): 8. See also Coggins (2011).




Figure 2.2: Recognition as a Continuous Outcome

In addition to recognition, the use of secession is another concept that needs some clarification. Some have described secession as being determined by the following factors; declared independence, possession of a national flag, and claims to a specific territory and population.¹¹⁷ This definition of secession does provide some useful criteria to identify secessionists from other types of civil war combatants, but it does not distinguish between groups that have a viable potential for their own state versus those

¹¹⁷ Coggins (2011): 454.

that have unrealistic aspirations. The membership of the Unrepresented Peoples and Nations Organization alone has over fifty groups that would fit this description.¹¹⁸

Buchanan argues that secessionists have more limited goals than other violent domestic challengers to the state. He notes:

The secessionist's primary goal is not to overthrow existing government, nor to make fundamental constitutional, economic, or socio-political changes within the existing state. Instead, [they] wish to restrict the jurisdiction of the state in question so as not to include [their] own group and the territory it occupies.¹¹⁹

Using this definition to help distinguish between viable and fanciful hopes for secession, I limit my analysis to groups that enter into conflict with their parent state to secure their independence. This is a useful criterion since groups that challenge the state have amassed and mobilized enough resources to challenge the state's monopoly of violence in a given area.¹²⁰ In addition, secessionist groups that do not engage in violence do not have as much impact on the international system since they do not amass military resources that could challenge and threaten the security of existing states in the international system. The major implication of this discussion is my universe of cases consists of secession movements that engage in violent conflict with their parent state to secure their independence. Secessionist movements are defined

¹¹⁸ "Member-States" *Unrepresented Peoples and Nations Organization*, <http://www.unpo.org/members.php> (Accessed 8/14/2011).

¹¹⁹ Allen Buchanan, *Secession: The Morality of Political Divorce from Fort Sumter to Lithuania and Quebec*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press (1991): 10.

¹²⁰ Bard E. O'Neill, *Insurgency & Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse*, 2nd ed. Washington, DC: Potomac Books Inc. (2005): 24-26.

using the criteria above; declared independence, claims to a specific territory and population (over 100km in size), and engages in violent conflict with their parent state that last at least one month and involves at least twenty-five casualties for each combatant.¹²¹

2.6 Material Factors Relevant to Recognition

The discussion of recognition and secession provides a useful starting point for discussing the causal factors that lead to secessionist movements being recognized as new states. I make the argument that recognition of secession movements is attributable to both material and normative factors that operate at the domestic and international levels. Material factors are relevant to recognition of secessionist movements because existing states in the international system evaluate the political and military capacity of secession movements to gauge how much control and authority they exert over the population and territory they purportedly represent. Material factors relevant to secession provide information regarding the future governance capacity of the secessionist movement aspiring to statehood as well as the security ramifications that impact the preferences of great powers in the international system. I identify a number of material factors that I divide between those operating at the domestic and international levels.

¹²¹ Correlates of War dataset, <http://www.correlatesofwar.org/>.

2.6.1 Domestic Level Material Factors

The material factors operating at the domestic level need to be evaluated differently in secessionist conflicts. This is because in secessionist conflicts the dyadic relationship between the group trying to secede and the parent state is the research focus. This implies that the factors influencing recognition in this context are determined by behavioral and material characteristics associated with both actors in the dyadic relationship. Simply stated, the indicators of interest in determining recognition will involve actions and attributes associated with both sides in the conflict; secessionist movement and parent state.

I identify the following material factors at the domestic level relevant to recognition; state capacity of parent state, military strength of the secessionist movement, geography, and the level of economic resources available to the secession movement. The state capacity of the parent state is an important factor in determining recognition during secession. This is because state capacity is directly related to the ability of the parent state to withstand violent internal challenges to its authority. Fearon notes, "Most important for the prospects of a nascent insurgency, however, are the government's police and military capabilities and the reach of government institutions."¹²² State capacity provides a useful proxy for understanding the military

¹²² James Fearon and David D. Latin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War," *American Political Science Review* 97:1 (2003): 80. Italics in original.

capabilities of the parent state. However, state capacity also provides an understanding of the non-violent means the state has at its disposal to quell internal challengers since the state's economic or social resources can be marshaled to placate the portion of the population advocating secession. Simply stated, state capacity allows us to determine the efficacy of the parent state's ability to either militarily defeat secessionist challengers or buy them off.

State capacity provides not only an understanding of a parent state's military and economic strength, but also signals to international actors the current level of political authority wielded by the parent state. If a secessionist movement is attempting to break-away from a failed state, its desire for recognition is received more favorably by international actors because the institutions of the state no longer operate. Since there is a strong adherence to the norm of territorial integrity in the international system, existing states are more inclined to recognize secessionists when the state has ceased to exist. In short, seceding from failed states increases the chances of recognition since the prevailing conditions of domestic anarchy make violating another state's territorial integrity less difficult.¹²³ This discussion leads to the first hypotheses to

test:

Hyp. 1: Secessionist movements attempting to break away from a parent state with high military and economic capacity are less likely to be recognized.

¹²³ Nelson Kasfir, "Domestic Anarchy, Security Dilemmas, and Violent Predation," in *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences*, ed. Robert I. Rotberg, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press (2004): 57-59.

Hyp. 1a: Secessionist movements attempting to break away from a parent state that is considered a failed state are more likely to be recognized.

Conversely, the military strength of the secessionist movement also is an important factor to account for in determining whether a secessionist movement is recognized. The military capability of secessionist movements is important to determine since this can lead to direct military victory over the parent state. Downes observes that decisive military victory is often the most stable form of settlement for ethnic conflicts involving secession.¹²⁴ This would predict that secessionist movements that accumulate enough military strength are in a position to militarily defeat their parent state and achieve a high degree of independence, which makes recognition more likely since existing states are merely acknowledging the facts on the ground.

Also, the military capacity of secessionist movements can serve as an information mechanism that attracts international support for independence. Fearon argues that secessionist movements make a specific calculation to increase their military strength to attract international support, intervention, or recognition.¹²⁵ This is because increasing levels of violence is associated with enhanced military capability which attracts international attention and mediation. Also, the military capability of the secessionist movement provides information to existing states about the potential

¹²⁴ Alexander B. Downes, "The Problem with Negotiated Settlements to Ethnic Civil Wars," *Security Studies* 13:4 (Summer 2004): 234.

¹²⁵ Fearon notes that this was the exact strategy that ethnic Albanians of the Kosovo Liberation Army followed to induce NATO to intervene, see Fearon (2004): 406.

security implications of recognizing the secession movement as a new state. This leads to the next hypotheses to test:

Hyp. 2: Secessionist movements with high levels of military capability are more likely to be recognized.

Hyp. 2a: Secessionist movements with low levels of military capability are less likely to be recognized.

Another domestic level material factor relevant to recognition of secessionist movements is geography. Numerous scholars have identified geography has playing an important role in civil wars. It is commonly argued that insurgency and secession are more common in rural, mountainous or otherwise inaccessible terrain since these topographic areas make it more difficult for the state to project its authority and militarily defeat internal challengers.¹²⁶ In addition to rural or mountainous topography, scholars have included population density as a geographic/demographic factor relevant to secession.¹²⁷ Toft notes that attempts to secede that are centered on an urban population are more likely to fail. She states:

[Urbanized secessionist movements] are often recent arrivals who, unlike concentrated majorities and minorities, lack a strong sense of attachment to

¹²⁶ Fearon and Latin (2003): 88, Monica Duffy Toft, "Indivisible Territory, Geographic Concentration, and Ethnic War," *Security Studies* 12:2 (2002-2003): 92-93, Matthew Kocher, *The Human Ecology of Civil War*, Ph.D. Diss., University of Chicago (2004): 24-26, and Stathis N. Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*, New York, NY: Cambridge University Press (2006): 133.

¹²⁷ Monica Duffy Toft, *The Geography of Ethnic Violence: Identity, Interests, and Indivisible Territory*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press (2003): 21-26 and John Coakley, "Introduction: The Territorial Management of Ethnic Conflict," in *The Territorial Management of Ethnic Conflict*, ed. John Coakley, Portland, OR: Frank Cass (1993): 7-12.

the land they occupy. Urbanites who are passionately attached to a homeland are most likely attached to a distant land, rather than to the city in which they currently reside.¹²⁸

However, more recently, the disadvantage that secession attempts suffer in urbanized locales has been questioned. Staniland argues that failure of secessionist movements in urban settings is not because of topography or population density, but is rather a function of state policy.¹²⁹ From this discussion it is clear that geography and population density have a significant impact on secession and needs to be accounted for to determine the likelihood of recognition. The hypotheses associated with geography and population density can be stated as:

Hyp. 3: Secessionist movements that claim territory that is mostly rural or mountainous are more likely to be recognized.

Hyp. 3a: Secessionist movements that claim territory that is mostly urban are less likely to be recognized.

The last domestic level material factor to discuss is the level of economic resources or activity in the territory trying to secede. Many have argued that the presence of lootable or extractable resources affect the occurrence, intensity, or prolongation of civil wars.¹³⁰ The presence of lootable or extractable resources impacts

¹²⁸ Toft (2002-2003): 92-93.

¹²⁹ Paul Staniland, "Cities on Fire: Social Mobilization, State Policy, and Urban Insurgency," *Comparative Political Studies* 43:12 (2010): 1625.

¹³⁰ This topic has had extensive coverage in the civil war literature, some excellent works include S. Brock Blomberg and Gregory D. Hess, "The Temporal Links Between Conflict and Economic Activity," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46:1 (February 2002): 74-90, Jean-Paul Azam, "Looting and Conflict Between

recognition of secessionist movements in two ways. First, whether a seceding territory has an abundance of economic resources at its disposal affects recognition by providing some idea of the long-term economic viability of the territory post-independence. This is a concern to recognizing states since they do not want to be placed in a position where they become economically responsible for the newly recognized state either through foreign aid or fiscal transfer. In short, states want some assurance that recognition will not entail burdensome economic responsibilities and that the new state can stand on its own. Additionally, the presence of lootable or extractable resources may induce states to recognize secessionist movements because of the economic opportunities that accompany independence through investment or other beneficial trade relationships/arrangements.¹³¹ Simply stated, recognition is a function of the opportunity and beneficial access to exploit economic resources in the newly independent state. The hypotheses associated with economic resources can be stated as:

Hyp. 4: Secessionist movements that inhabit a territory with a high level of extractable or lootable resources are more likely to be recognized.

Ethno-Regional Groups: Lessons for State Formation in Africa," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46:1 (February 2002): 131-153, Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "Greed and Grievance in Civil War," *Oxford Economic Papers* 56:4 (2006): 563-595, James Ron, "Paradigm in Distress?: Primary Commodities and Civil War," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49:4 (2005): 443-450, James Fearon, "Primary Commodity Exports and Civil War," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49:4 (2005): 483-507, Macartan Humphreys, "Natural Resources, Conflict, and Conflict Resolution: Uncovering the Mechanisms," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49:4 (2005): 508-537, Michael Ross, "A Closer Look at Oil, Diamonds, and Civil War," *Annual Review of Political Science* vol. 9 (June 2006): 265-300.

¹³¹ David Carment and Patrick James, "Third-Party States in Ethnic Conflict: Identifying the Domestic Determinants of Intervention," in *Ethnic Conflict and International Politics: Explaining Diffusion and Escalation*, ed. Steven E. Lobell and Phillip Mauceri, New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan (2004): 12-13.

2.6.2 International Level Material Factors

Material factors operating at the international level are also important to whether secessionist movements are recognized. Scholars that study the relationship between secession/ethnic violence and international politics note that existing states have very compelling reasons to support and recognize secessionist movements in other states. While some scholars have identified ethnic ties as a motivating factor, I argue that political self-interest associated with security competition better explains why international politics matters to recognition.¹³² Political self-interest of existing states impacts recognition because the emergence of a new state from a secessionist movement alters the status-quo of the international security environment. Newly emerging states impact the international order and can alter the security environment since they can ally with known/potential adversaries or provide sanctuary to domestic challengers that undermine the security of a neighboring state. Any of these situations can lead to a range of consequences like continual internal conflict, arms racing, or inter-state war.¹³³ Byman notes that existing states sometimes utilize secessionist

¹³² Ibid: 11-13.

¹³³ Stephen Van Evera, "Hypotheses on Nationalism and War," in *Theories of War and Peace*, ed. Michael E. Brown, et al. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press (1998): 262-264 and Fabry (2010): 8 and Idean Salehyan, *Rebels Without Borders: Transnational Insurgencies in World Politics*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press (2009): 51-53.

movements to achieve specific security goals such as destabilizing neighbors, increasing regional influence, or promote regime change.¹³⁴

The material factors operating at the international level that are relevant to explain how international politics affects recognition deal with inter-state rivalry and great power involvement. Existing conflictual relationships between a recognizing state and the parent state suffering secessionist conflict can induce recognition. The rationale could be based on a simple logic of payback or it could be an attempt to balance against a perceived threat.¹³⁵ Salehyan notes that recognition of a secessionist movement in a parent state is a signal of existing rivalries or conflicts with existing states. Some have taken this argument further by providing empirical evidence that existing or enduring rivalries can impact whether great powers in the international system recognize secessionist movements.¹³⁶ Coggins states, “When powerful states become involved in secession...dangerous international instability and violence becomes more likely.”¹³⁷ This discussion of existing rivalry or conflict between recognizing states and a parent state undergoing secessionist conflict leads to the following hypotheses:

¹³⁴ Daniel Byman, et al. *Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND (2001): 23-34.

¹³⁵ Stephen M. Saideman, *The Ties That Divide: Ethnic Politics, Foreign Policy, and International Conflict*, New York, NY: Columbia University Press (2001): 18-22 and Byman (2001): 34.

¹³⁶ Salehyan (2009): 53. For more on dyadic conflict due to rivalry see Michael P. Colaresi and William R. Thompson, “Hot Spots or Hot Hands? Serial Crisis Behavior, Escalating Risks, and Rivalry,” *Journal of Politics* 64:4 (2002): 1175-1198, Paul Diehl and Gary Goertz, *War and Peace in International Rivalry*, Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press (2000), and William R. Thompson, “Identifying Rivals and Rivalries in World Politics,” *International Studies Quarterly* 45:4 (2001): 557-586.

¹³⁷ Coggins (2011): 453.

Hyp. 5: Secessionist movements whose parent state has an existing rivalry or conflict with a great power are more likely to be recognized.

Related to this is the geographic proximity of secessionist conflict to certain types of actors in the international system; great powers and contiguous rivals. Proximity to a great power is relevant because territorial developments that occur on the periphery of their borders alter their security environment. Saideman notes, "That states will be more likely to support secession in their neighbors than elsewhere."¹³⁸ I argue that this situation is especially apt to secessionist movements breaking away from a parent state contiguous to a great power. This is because potential recognizing states will view this as an opportunity to gain influence at the expense of the great power without directly challenging it within its sphere of influence and running the risks of escalation. This could be because the great power is either concerned with maintaining a specific buffer zone that is considered of vital strategic importance or of fears of diffusion effects that facilitates the conflict to spread further in its territory.¹³⁹ In short, great powers are extremely concerned with the secession attempts that occur on their borders because of the security implications involved.

In addition to being contiguous to great powers, I argue that recognition is also influenced by secessionist movements being contiguous to rivals who share a border.

¹³⁸ Saideman (2001): 19.

¹³⁹ Fazal (2007): 190-193.

This is because the secessionist movement becomes a useful proxy to attain political or security related goals for one of the states to pressure their rival. One major implication of this discussion is that international support matters since great powers are better positioned to cut-off secessionist movements from international support because of fears of retaliation and the possibility that contiguous rivals will utilize secessionists as proxies to enhance their security at their neighbor's expense. This leads to the next hypotheses to test, which can be stated as:

Hyp. 6: Secessionist movements that are contiguous to a great power are more likely to be recognized.

Hyp. 6a: Secessionist movements whose parent states are part of a contiguous rivalry are more likely to be recognized.

The final material factor at the international level to discuss is the direct involvement of a great power in a secessionist conflict. Specifically, this variable is concerned with secessionist conflicts occurring within the borders of a great power. Existing states have noted the pitfalls in recognition of secession since it may facilitate the continued "Balkanization" of other states and lead to endless attempts at secession and recognition.¹⁴⁰ This happens because potential secessionist movements can learn lessons and perfect best practices from previous secession attempts that occur in the international system. This leads to a situation where existing states in the international system are hesitant to recognize secession attempts from great powers since the

¹⁴⁰ Fabry (2010): 12.

potential state to be formed is well-positioned to exploit exposed vulnerabilities in existing states since a high level of military mobilization is needed to challenge a great power.¹⁴¹

The motivations for recognition of a secessionist movement attempting to break away from a great power can also be a function of kinship or ethnic ties. In this view a state's preferences for recognition of a secessionist attempt from a great power is related to the perception of shared ethnic or cultural ties with the secessionist movement. An example of this can be seen in Russia's opposition to Kosovo's independence because of their ethnic ties to the Serbs.¹⁴² However, the most likely motivation for recognition of attempts to break away from a great power is strategic rivalry. This is because it allows a state to weaken a potential powerful adversary while maintaining a degree of plausible deniability that allows it to avoid direct military retaliation for challenging the territorial integrity and security of a great power. An example of this can be seen during the 1956 Hungarian Revolution. Soviet authorities were extremely afraid that allowing Hungary to secede from the Warsaw Pact union would invite more aggressive attempts by Western Powers to peel off states in the

¹⁴¹ Stephen M. Saideman, "Is Pandora's Box Half Empty or Half Full? The Limited Virulence of Secessionism and Domestic Sources of Disintegration," in *The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Diffusion, and Escalation*, ed. David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press (1998): 128-132.

¹⁴² Rodolfo Stavenhagen, *Ethnic Conflicts and the Nation-State*, New York, NY: St. Martin's Press (1996): 214-215, Steven E. Lobell and Philip Mauceri, "Diffusion and Escalation of Ethnic Conflict," in *Ethnic Conflict and International Politics: Explaining Diffusion and Escalation*, ed. Steven E. Lobell and Phillip Mauceri, New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan (2004): 5, and Carment and

Soviet sphere of influence.¹⁴³ Plokhy notes that during the Yalta conference in 1945 Stalin was the most ardently attuned to the strategic possibilities that secession provided. He states:

On the surface there was no more devoted supporter of Woodrow Wilson's principle of national "self-determination" than Joseph Stalin, who justified the annexation of new territories in the course of the Second World War in terms of self-determination of national minorities in Eastern Europe.¹⁴⁴

This discussion leads to the last hypothesis associated with international material factors to test:

Hyp. 7: Secessionist movements attempting to break away from a great power are less likely to be recognized.

2.7 Normative Factors Associated with Recognition

In addition to material factors, I argue that recognition of secessionist groups is also a function of normative factors. Specifically, I take the position that norms of national self-determination and liberal democracy are important factors that decide whether existing states in the international system recognize seceding territories. The norm of national self-determination is commonly referred to in the context of secession, but the impact it has upon international recognition is open to debate. I argue that the

¹⁴³ "Working Notes and Attached Extract from the Minutes of the CPSU CC Presidium Meeting, 31 October 1956, Document no. 53" quoted in Csba Bekes, Malcolm Byrne, and Janos M. Rainer, *The 1956 Hungarian Revolution: A History in Documents, a National Security Archive Cold War Reader*, New York, NY: Central European University Press (2002): 307-310 and Fazal (2007): 191-193.

¹⁴⁴ S.M. Plokhy, *Yalta: The Price of Peace*, New York, NY: Viking Penguin (2010): 62-63.

norm of national self-determination should not be evaluated as the only normative influence determining whether secession movements become recognized, but rather national self-determination should be evaluated in conjunction with normative factors associated with liberal democracy and how they interact with the material factors previously mentioned. This is because the relationship between national self-determination and democracy show some conceptual overlap because of a shared relationship between the right to secede and the right to govern.¹⁴⁵

Norms in the international system are tied to perceptions of legitimacy. Norms provide a reference or focal point to frame the behavior of an actor or action to determine its legitimacy.¹⁴⁶ Some scholars have referred to two types of norms in the international system; regulative and constitutive. Regulative norms refer to socialized customs or practices that have causal effects. Constitutive norms are conceptualized in a more descriptive manner and are commonly used to refer to the nature of an object.¹⁴⁷ Wendt argues that this distinction between regulative and constitutive norms is misleading since “they vary in their balance of causal and constitutive effects.”¹⁴⁸ |

¹⁴⁵ See Philpott (1998): 81-84.

¹⁴⁶ Ian Clark, *Legitimacy in International Society*, New York, NY: Oxford University Press (2005): 3-4, Ian Hurd, “Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics,” *International Organization* 53:2 (Spring 1999): 381, Ian Hurd, *After Anarchy: Legitimacy and Power in the United Nations Security Council*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press (2007): 76, and Christian Reus-Smit, “International Crises of Legitimacy,” *International Politics* vol. 44 (2007): 160.

¹⁴⁷ Anthony Giddens, *Central Problems in Social Theory*, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press (1979): 66-67 and Nicholas Onuf, *World of Our Making*, Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press (1989): 51-52.

¹⁴⁸ Wendt (1999): 165.

follow Wendt's prescription to adopt a more holistic conceptualization and define norms as "standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations."¹⁴⁹ This definition covers both the constitutive and causal effects that we would expect socialized custom to have in the international system by spelling out which rights define a particular identity and accounting for obligations that lead to specific causal outcomes. In the context of recognition, the previous discussion touched upon how this social process shapes perceptions of the identity associated with statehood. Understanding how norms of national self-determination and liberal democracy impact secession provides an explanation for how existing states take into account normative factors that determines recognition of violent secessionist movements.

Norms do not exist *ex ante*, but rather evolve over time. This implies that there is a process of internalization that occurs that legitimates specific norms as they diffuse in the international system. Hurd states:

The operative process in legitimacy is the internalization by the actor of an external standard. Internalization takes place when the actor's sense of its own interests is partly constituted by a force outside itself—in this case, by the standards, laws, rules, and norms that exist in the community.¹⁵⁰

However, actors in the international system do not internalize norms uniformly. This leads to a situation where actors follow different patterns of internalization that may actually lead to preferences stemming from internalization that come to reject or ignore

¹⁴⁹ See Keohane (2005): 57, Friedrich Kratochwil and John Gerard Ruggie, "International Organization: A State of the Art on an Art of the State," *International Organization* 40:4 (1986): 769, and Buzan (2004): 163.

¹⁵⁰ Hurd (2007): 31.

the norm in question.¹⁵¹ Also, though norms are tied to perceptions of legitimacy they do not arbitrate morality in the international system. Simply put, norms can be viewed as good or bad, either prescribing or proscribing specific behavior.¹⁵²

It should be clear that I am not making an argument that norms are the sole or most important factor that leads to recognition, but rather that normative factors associated with self-determination and liberal democracy must be accounted for to generate an explanation for why states recognize seceding territories. This is because of the inherent and embedded social element associated with recognition. Blumer notes:

[a] gratuitous acceptance of the concepts of norms, values, social rules and the like should not blind the social scientist to the fact that any one of them is subtended by a process of social interaction – a process that is necessary not only for change but equally well for their retention in a fixed form.¹⁵³

This discussion concerning norms and social process illustrates that to determine the casual effects that norms are having in the international system they need to be evaluated in relation to a social process such as recognition. The next sections present how normative factors associated with national self-determination and liberal democracy impact the likelihood of recognition of secession movements.

¹⁵¹ Wendt (1999): 250.

¹⁵² Nina Tannenwald, "Dogs That Don't Bark: The United States, the Role of Norms, and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons since 1945," *unpublished Ph.D. Diss.*, Cornell University (1996): 48.

¹⁵³ Herbert Blumer, "The Methodological Position of Symbolic Interactionism," in *Symbolic Interactionism: Perspective and Method*, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall Publishing (1969): 19.

2.7.1 Norm of National Self-Determination

The norm of national self-determination is commonly referred to in the context of secession, but the impact it has upon international recognition is open to debate.

Burgess notes:

It is implicitly understood that any state formation is based on a principle which guarantees the legitimacy of the state – in other words, a principle independent of time and space, a principle which extends beyond the concrete context in which the state was grounded.¹⁵⁴

Some scholars have argued that the founding principle that Burgess refers to is the norm of national self-determination. This claim is not without controversy since some have observed that the norm of national self-determination has a destabilizing effect that can lead to the potential breakup of a majority of the world's states.¹⁵⁵ Others have argued that the norm of national self-determination is a good barometer for whether an attempted secession should be considered just or legitimate.¹⁵⁶ However, before we can determine the causal effect it has on recognition of secessionist movements a better understanding of what national self-determination is and how it operates is needed.

National self-determination is commonly referenced when discussing the recognition of secessionist movements, but despite this prominence many scholars have

¹⁵⁴ J. Peter Burgess, *Culture and Rationality: European Frameworks of Norwegian Identity*, Kristiansand, Norway: Hoyskoleforlaget AS (2001): 30. (Italics in original).

¹⁵⁵ Gellner (1983): 43-45.

¹⁵⁶ Moore (1998): 4-6 and Philpott, (1998): 80-82.

a difficult time defining, conceptualizing, and understanding the impact national self-determination has on secession. Simpson notes:

The elasticity of self-determination has, throughout history, both ensured its longevity and diminished its legitimacy...the principle has evolved into a highly manipulable [sic] and indiscriminately employed slogan. It vests those who use it with a tainted respectability but is at the same time deprived of clarity and the possibility of legal content or persuasive force.¹⁵⁷

This elasticity of national self-determination is largely due to the differing use of the term to reflect political outcomes that are far removed from attaining one's own independent state. Some of these outcomes include; securing cultural rights related to language, achievement of federal or consociational arrangements, or granting of a large-degree of autonomy over political and economic affairs.¹⁵⁸ While these outcomes are relevant to the probability a state will face secessionist challengers they are less relevant to the relationship between recognition and secession since they do not address the attainment of independence. For this reason I confine my conceptualization and operationalization of national self-determination to pertain to attempts to completely sever a secessionist movement from its parent state in order to achieve recognized independence.

¹⁵⁷ Gerry J. Simpson, "The Diffusion of Sovereignty: Self-Determination in the Post-Colonial Age," in *The New World Order: Sovereignty, Human Rights, and the Self-Determination of Peoples*, ed. Mortimer Sellers, Washington, DC: Berg Publishing (1996): 36.

¹⁵⁸ Buchanan (1991): 50, Clyde Eagleton, "The Excesses of Self-Determination," *Foreign Affairs* 31:4 (1953): 594, and Hurst Hannum, "Self-Determination in the Twenty-First Century," in *Negotiating Self-Determination*, ed. Hurst Hannum, Eileen F. Babbitt, Oxford, UK: Lexington Books (2006): 69-70, and Goldenhuys (2009): 35.

The origins of the concept of national-self-determination have their foundations in the Enlightenment. Specifically, the notion of “popular sovereignty” is thought to be the conceptual basis for national self-determination. However, most scholars view national self-determination in its modern or contemporary form through the prism of Woodrow Wilson and his Fourteen Points after World War I.¹⁵⁹ Wilson understood that nationalism could be an extremely dangerous, destabilizing factor in the wake of the collapse of the Russian, Ottoman, and Austro-Hungarian empires and he believed upholding a right or norm of national self-determination would mitigate this threat.¹⁶⁰ Some have viewed the norm of national self-determination as either a “negative or positive” right. Negative rights refer to claims “to secured space in which subjects might pursue their own concerns without interference,” while positive rights refer to claims that require “that the space be filled with something.”¹⁶¹ This implies that national self-determination conceptualized as negative right would see states only needing to not-

¹⁵⁹ Maria T. Camilleri, “The Challenges of Sovereign Borders in the Post Cold War Era’s Refugee and Humanitarian Crises,” in *Sovereignty and the Global Community: The Quest for Order in the International System*, ed. Howard M. Hensel, Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company (2004): 84, Viva Ona Bartkus, *The Dynamic of Secession*, New York, NY: Cambridge University Press (1999): 104-109, Geldenhuys (2009): 29-30, Lee C. Buchheit, *Secession: The Legitimacy of Self-Determination*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press (1978): 3-4, Erin Jenne, “National Self-Determination: A Deadly Mobilization Device,” in *Negotiating Self-Determination*, ed. Hurst Hannum and Eileen F. Babbitt, Oxford, UK: Lexington Books (2006): 8-11.

¹⁶⁰ Tony Smith, *America’s Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press (1994): 3-13 and Lloyd E. Ambrosius, *Wilsonianism: Woodrow Wilson and His Legacy in American Foreign Policy*, New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan (2002): 125-130.

¹⁶¹ R.J. Vincent, *Human Rights and International Relations*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1986): 8 and Fabry (2010): 10-14.

interfere with a potential “nation” or “peoples” that was attempting to secede.¹⁶² Also, national self-determination as a negative right tends to minimize territorial changes since secession induces change within borders rather than creating new ones.¹⁶³ Conversely, if viewed as a positive right, than states are expected to pro-actively facilitate the attempted secession. Barkin and Cronin have argued that the strength of sovereignty and national self-determination have waxed and waned over time, which makes determining which conceptualization is the most appropriate difficult.¹⁶⁴

Definitions of national self-determination have many sources. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1514 describes it as “all peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural development.”¹⁶⁵ Others define national self-determination from a context of freedom from oppression, ethnic separatism, or class conflict.¹⁶⁶ More commonly, scholars allude to socially constructed elements of national consciousness when defining national self-determination, Fabry states:

¹⁶² Add Walzer citation

¹⁶³ Bartkus (1999): 71.

¹⁶⁴ Samuel J. Barkin and Bruce Cronin, “The State and the Nation: Changing Norms and the Rules of Sovereignty in International Relations,” *International Organization* 48:1 (1994): 107-130.

¹⁶⁵ Buchanan (1991): 48 and Bartkus (1999): 69-70.

¹⁶⁶ Philpott (2001): 254, Camilleri, (2004): 84, and Berch Berberoglu, *Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict: Class, State, and Nation in the Age of Globalization*, Oxford, UK: Roman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. (2004): 22-23. (sources listed respectively to the definitions).

[national self-determination] was rooted in the proposition that a group of people sharing certain distinct social bonds vis-à-vis other groups of people has a right to establish, whether within or outside of the borders of the country in which it finds itself, alone or in union with other peoples, its own government.¹⁶⁷

These definitions highlight two inherent aspects in the norm of national self-determination associated with the nation/national identity and representative government/right to self-rule.

The national component of self-determination is important because it denotes who is attempting to create their own state. Commonly, the criteria considered in determining a “nation” or “national peoples” is the possession of different ethnic-linguistic traits from their parent state. German Foreign Minister Gustav Stresemann, speaking in 1929, noted:

The greater the respect and protection accorded to men and women in their exercise of their inalienable right to preserve and use their mother-tongue, develop their civilization and practice their religion irrespective of political frontiers, the less likely is it that international peace will be disturbed. No one can, by defending this idea, lay himself open to the charge of bringing about the disintegration of the state.¹⁶⁸

This quote illustrates that to most casual observers the national component of self-determination was provided by the degree of variation in ethno-linguistic traits and religious beliefs between the populations of the parent state and potential secessionist

¹⁶⁷ Fabry (2010): 9. See also, Gledenhuis (2009): 29, Lloyd E. Ambrosius, “Democracy, Peace, and World Order,” in *Reconsidering Woodrow Wilson: Progressivism, Internationalism, War, and Peace*, ed. John Milton Cooper Jr., Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press (2008): 234, and Alfred Cobban, *The Nation-State and National Self-Determination*, London, UK: Collins (1969): 104.

¹⁶⁸ Gustav Stresemann (1929), quoted in Lawrence T. Farley, *Plebiscites and Sovereignty: The Crisis of Political Illegitimacy*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press (1986): 6.

movement. In particular, strong sentiments for shared culture can be a catalyst for secessionist movements to mobilize.¹⁶⁹ This leads to the first hypothesis associated with national self-determination to be tested:

Hyp. 8: Secessionist movements are more likely to be recognized as the norm of national self-determination strengthens.

Ethnicity is a common factor that is examined during secession, and it is expected that many cases of secession involve groups whose ethno-linguistic characteristics are distinctive from the majority of the population in their parent state. However, despite ethnic grievance being a common refrain during secessionist conflicts Woodrow Wilson did not rely solely on ethno-linguistic traits to determine whether a secessionist movement embodied a potential nation when conceiving of national self-determination. He viewed shared historical traditions as an important element to facilitate the awakening of national consciousness. Ambrosius notes:

Wilson regarded language as only one factor, and not the controlling one, in defining a nation. Nor was race or ethnicity the determining factor in national identity to him...Instead of attributing primacy to ethno-cultural factors, he understood nationalism as a consequence of historical development.¹⁷⁰

Scholars of secession have noted that shared histories that facilitate the emergence and strengthening of national identity can be fostered through political sub-unit arrangements. Historically many former empires such as the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian arranged their political sub-units on the basis of ethnicity or religion. This

¹⁶⁹ Buchanan (1991): 52.

¹⁷⁰ Ambrosius (2002): 127.

leads to a higher probability that the inhabitants of that administrative unit will develop stronger sentiments towards fostering a national identity through historical tradition or indigenouness.¹⁷¹ An example of this can be seen in the statements made by former Bosnian Serb military commander Ratko Mladic concerning how historic tradition or ties to the land can generate more robust attitudes regarding national identity. He states:

We just want the international community, if the Muslims and Croats are given the right to [create a] federation or confederation, to recognize the same right of the Serb people to be on our own land with our own people. We are not creating a country in Asia, America, or Africa; we're just doing so on our ancestors' land.¹⁷²

This discussion indicates that pre-existing sub-unit boundaries within the parent state may act as a catalyst for secessionist challengers because a shared sense of identity is forged along sub-unit boundaries that coincide with existing ethnic or cultural cleavages within the parent state. This leads to the next hypothesis to test associated with national self-determination:

Hyp. 8a: Secessionist movements who claim territory that corresponds to existing sub-unit boundaries are more likely to be recognized.

2.7.2 Norm of Liberal Democracy

According to the definition of national self-determination previously discussed representative government or the right to self-rule is another constitutive factor of this

¹⁷¹ Margaret Moore, "The Territorial Dimension of Self-Determination," in *National Self-Determination and Secession*, ed. Margaret Moore, New York, NY: Oxford University Press (1998): 137-145.

¹⁷² Comments made by General Ratko Mladic, quoted in Jenne (2006): 14.

norm that needs discussion. Many scholars commonly refer to national self-determination having embedded elements associated with representative government and democracy.¹⁷³ E.H. Carr states:

National self-determination and democracy [go] hand in hand. Self-determination might indeed be regarded as implicit in the idea of democracy; for if every man's right is recognized to be consulted about the affairs of the political unit to which he belongs, he may be assumed to have an equal right to be consulted about the form and extent of the unit.¹⁷⁴

Carr's quote represents one school of thought associated with democracy and self-determination leading to recognition. This strand of thought is commonly referred to as the plebiscitary right to secede. This refers to a right for a majority of the population in any portion of a state to unilaterally decide it to create a new state even over the opposition from the majority of the population in the state as a whole. From this perspective secession and democracy can be seen to be closely related. Democracy pertains to the degree of inclusiveness and contestation in a given political unit, while secession determines the institutional scaffolding or framework in which these attributes of democracy operate. Philpott argues that endorsing a plebiscitary or majoritarian right to secede can lead to the promotion of democratic values and decrease the likelihood for conflict since allowing people with a shared consciousness

¹⁷³ Christopher Heath Wellman, *A Theory of Secession: The Case for Political Self-Determination*, New York, NY: Cambridge University Press (2005): 36, 162, Allen Buchanan, *Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination: Moral Foundations of International Law*, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press (2004): 370, Saideman (2001): 126, Anbrosius (2002): 134, Geldenhuys (2009):

¹⁷⁴ Edward Hallet Carr, *Conditions of Peace*, New York, NY: Macmillan Press (1942): 39.

and values to form their own state allows them to govern themselves in a manner that respects their ethno-cultural heritage and political rights to self-government.¹⁷⁵

It should be noted that this interpretation of the representation element inherent in national self-determination does not go unchallenged. This is because if any majority group (ethnic differentiated or otherwise) in a portion of state could decide to unilaterally secede than the resultant cleavages only promote increased homogeneity of ideology and belief, not the representation of a stateless people or nation.¹⁷⁶ In short, the attendant results of this interpretation leads to the violation of the democratic rights of the minority in the territory trying to secede and the majority of the population of the state as a whole who both oppose secession.

In addition to the plebiscitary/majoritarian right to secede, other scholars advocate a remedial right to secede. Pavkovic notes:

[Some scholars] of the right to self-determination of national minorities believe that liberal democratic principles should be sufficient to establish the right to political self-determination of stateless national groups without any reference to the principle nationalist thesis or any of its corollaries. In particular, they argue, that the principle of liberal equality...should be sufficient to establish stateless national groups have at least a restricted right to self-determination.¹⁷⁷

¹⁷⁵ Philpott recognizes that an untrammled right to secede can cause some serious issues regarding regime stability and territorial integrity. However, he believes that if one truly espouses democratic principles than denial of the right to secede is hypocritical. See Daniel J. Philpott, "In Defense of Self-Determination," *Ethics* 101:2 (January 1995): 355-359.

¹⁷⁶ Buchanan (1998): 16-24.

¹⁷⁷ Aleksandar Pavkovic, "Self-Determination, National Minorities, and the Liberal Principle of Equality," in *Identity, Self-Determination and Secession*, ed. Igor Primoratz and Aleksandar Pavkovic, Burlington, VT: Ashgate (2006): 125.

This quote provides the view point that the right to secession needs to be qualified and restricted to avoid violation of territorial integrity by illegitimate groups trying to break-away from their parent state.¹⁷⁸ This would imply that secession is a response to grievance, and secession movements trying to break away because of grievance are viewed as more legitimate and are more likely to be recognized. Possible grievances that justify secession include but are not limited too; reclaiming territory that was unjustly taken (either through invasion, occupation, or annexation) and mass violations of human rights (either through discriminatory practices or violent repression).¹⁷⁹

This discussion shows that whether advocating for the plebiscitary or remedial right to secede, scholars from both camps view the norm of national self-determination as having embedded principles of democracy as one of its constitutive factors. Disagreement tends to revolve around the implications of this conceptualization regarding recognition and legitimacy rather than a refutation of democracy's association with national self-determination. This implies that national self-determination is commonly conceptualized as a multi-dimensional with reference to the nation and democracy as its constitutive components.

I argue that the constitutive element of democracy embedded in national self-determination should not be viewed as one of its conceptual dimensions, but rather as a

¹⁷⁸ Alan James, *Sovereign Statehood: The Basis of International Society*, London, UK: Allen & Unwin (1986): 157 and Buchanan (1991): 20.

¹⁷⁹ Allen Buchanan, "A Principled International Legal Response to Demands for Self-Determination," in *Identity, Self-Determination and Secession*, ed. Igor Primoratz and Aleksandar Pavkovic, Burlington, VT: Ashgate (2006): 140.

separate norm associated with liberal democracy. One reason for this re-conceptualization of national self-determination is because there is an incompatibility between the constitutive components that represent the nationalistic and democratic elements.¹⁸⁰ Yack states: “[N]ationalism threatens liberal democratic political principles and practices primarily by the way in which it connects political rights and privileges to relatively exclusive understandings of cultural community.”¹⁸¹ Scholars of democracy and democratization support this interpretation of the inherent tensions between the nationalistic and democratic elements of national self-determination by emphasizing that the “democratic process presupposes the righteousness of the unit itself,” implying that if the legitimacy of the unit (new state formed through secession) is questioned than the democratic underpinning of the process should be questioned as well.¹⁸² Simply stated, groups of peoples with a shared national consciousness have a right to form their own state through secession. However, that act of secession based on the “nation” element of national self-determination undermines the “democracy” component by depriving those in the state opposed to secession of the deliberative process inherent in representative government.

Another reason to re-conceptualize national self-determination is because democratic principles associated with it were only to be applied in a very narrow scope

¹⁸⁰ Sabrina P. Ramet, *The Three Yugoslavias: State-Building and Legitimation, 1918-2005*, Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press (2006): 35-36 and Ambrosius (2002): 134.

¹⁸¹ Bernard Yack, “Popular Sovereignty and Nationalism,” *Political Theory* 29:4 (August 2001): 530.

¹⁸² Robert A. Dahl,

and context. Specifically, the democratic elements associated with national self-determination were meant to be evaluated solely from the perspective of decolonization. This was because national self-determination of colonial peoples offered a democratic solution to indigenous peoples who were forcefully incorporated into colonial governance structures, but was not applied to territories and existing states that lacked a colonial legacy.¹⁸³ Some have referred to this bounded application of national self-determination as the “salt water” test.¹⁸⁴ For instance, Philpott notes that United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1541 (adopted one day after Resolution 1514, which enshrined the right to self-determination) specifically stipulated that the right of national self-determination was only to be enjoyed by territories known to have been colonies.¹⁸⁵

More recently, despite trends to include the gross abuse of human rights as a basis for secession, the expansion of the right to national self-determination to territories without a colonial legacy is highly contentious.¹⁸⁶ In fact, some have gone as far as to argue that international institutions are predisposed to uphold territorial integrity at all costs despite any notions of democratic principles with the implication that secession is always prohibited. Batkus states:

¹⁸³ Buchanan (2006): 149.

¹⁸⁴ James (1986): 121 and Wellman (2005): 157-159.

¹⁸⁵ Philpott (2001): 156.

¹⁸⁶ Fabry (2010): 163-166 and Geldenhuys (2009): 31-34.

A discriminating scrutiny of international documents, including the United Nations Charter and resolutions, the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the Organization of African Unity Charter and resolutions, gauges the attitude of the international community toward secession. By restricting the application of the principle of self-determination, and by raising territorial integrity to the level of a near absolute principle, the international system has implicitly condemned secession. Indeed, on several occasions the international community has made this implicit condemnation explicit.¹⁸⁷

This discussion illustrates that the democratic principles associated with national self-determination only applied to the narrow cases of colonies, and that the international system is predisposed to uphold the territorial status quo of existing states regardless of whether it coincides with the democratic aspirations of secessionist movements. Given that colonialism violates the norm of liberal democracy because of its lack of representative government the first hypothesis to test associated with liberal democracy is:

Hyp 9: Secessionist movements coming out of former colonies are more likely to be recognized.

The final rationale for why normative factors associated with liberal democracy should be evaluated separately from the norm of national self-determination focuses upon the origins of the latter concept. Woodrow Wilson is considered the architect for the creation and promotion of the norm of national self-determination, but his rationale for its promulgation was based on security reasons rather than aspirations for stateless ethnic groups to be recognized and enjoy self-government. This was because one of

¹⁸⁷ Bartkus (1999): 53.

Wilson's main goals following World War I was to inaugurate a new world order, the stability of which would be based on collective security.¹⁸⁸ Krasner states:

At Versailles, Woodrow Wilson championed a second rationale for the international protection of minority rights. Wilson's vision of a new world order in 1918 was collective security: peace-loving states would join together to resist attacks by any aggressor. Only democratic states would make such commitments. The first guarantee of democracy was self-determination.¹⁸⁹

Wilson's preferences for the structure of the future international security environment were at the forefront of his thoughts when he conceptualized national self-determination. I argue that a major implication of this is the democratic component of the norm of national self-determination was not focused on the granting of states to groups with a national consciousness. Rather, it served as a mechanism to evaluate the identity of actors with ideological similarity in order to increase the number of democracies in the international system to enact a collective security system based on trust and respect.

Wilson wanted to increase the number of democracies because he believed only democracies would commitment to collective security. His rationale was that democracies valued the characteristics associated with representation, public consent, and respect for individual rights.¹⁹⁰ This is because the democratic attributes of public

¹⁸⁸ Ambrosius (2008): 234-235 and Stephen Krasner, "Explaining Variation: Defaults, Coercion, and Commitments," in *Problematic Sovereignty: Contested Rules and Political Possibilities*, ed. Stephen D. Krasner, New York, NY: Columbia University Press (2001): 331.

¹⁸⁹ Krasner (1999): 93.

¹⁹⁰ Michael Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Policy," in *Debating the Democratic Peace*, ed. Michael E. Brown et al. Cambridge, MA: MIT University Press (1996): 5-6, Bruce Russett, "Why Democratic Peace," in *Debating the Democratic Peace*, ed. Michael E. Brown et al. Cambridge, MA: MIT

consent and respect for individual rights are key factors in determining legitimacy. Regimes that lack these democratic attributes in exercising domestic political power signal to other actors a lack of public respect. This lack of public respect is interpreted by other actors as a signal of aggressive or adversarial intentions. This leads to the determination that actors lacking the democratic attributes of consent and respect for individual rights are likely to infringe on the individual rights of other actors in the international system. As a consequence these actors are not respected by other democratic actors and are considered illegitimate because they are likely to act aggressively since they repress their own citizens and deny them representation.¹⁹¹ In short, this perspective sees the relationship between public respect and democratic attributes determining the probability of recognizing a secessionist movement.

I should note that during secession the democratic attributes of both the parent state and secessionist movement is evaluated. This would imply that we expect that a parent state that engages in high levels of repression will be viewed poorly by other democracies for violating principles associated with public consent, representation, and respect for human rights. However, similar evaluations should be expected of a

University Press (1996): 92-94, John M. Owen, "How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace," in *Debating the Democratic Peace*, ed. Michael E. Brown et al. Cambridge, MA: MIT University Press (1996): 122-124, John H. Schaar, *Legitimacy in Modern State*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, (1981): 16-17, Jean-Marc Coicaud, Translated by David Ames Curtis. *Legitimacy and Politics: A Contribution to the Study of Political Right and Political Responsibility*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press (2002): 10-12, Ruda Sil and Cheng Chen. "Legitimacy and the (In)significance of Democracy in Post Communist Russia," *Europe-Asia Studies* vol. 56, no. 3 (May 2004): 348-349, and Bruce Gilley, "Meaning and Measure of Legitimacy: Results for 72 Countries," *European Journal of Political Research*, no. 45 (2006): 500-501.

¹⁹¹ Doyle (1996): 32-33, Owen (1996): 125, Sebastian Rosato, "The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory." *American Political Science Association* vol. 97, no. 3 (November 2003): 586.

secessionist movement that engages in illegitimate action. Specifically, secessionist movements that engage in terrorism are also viewed poorly since they target civilians and engage in the indiscriminate use of violence.¹⁹² In addition, parent states wish to have their domestic challengers and their goals viewed as illegitimate by other actors in the international system, and hope that accusations of using terrorism by the secessionist movement decreases their international support. This discussion leads to the final hypotheses to test:

Hyp. 9a: Secessionist movements in democracies are less likely to be recognized.

Hyp. 9b: Secessionist movements that engage in terrorism are less likely to be recognized.

2.8 Research Design and Analysis

For the quantitative section of the project I utilize a large-n dataset consisting of secessionist conflicts that occurred from 1815-2010. The data comes from a variety of sources, which are listed in the next chapter, but the majority of the data was collected from two sources; the Correlates of War data project and the secession dataset contained in Coggins (2011). The dependent variable in this section is the whether or not a secessionist movement received great power recognition. I use a continuous measure of this variable in line with the previous discussion on the conceptualization of recognition. The main explanatory variables include indicators for normative and material factors. The normative factors to be operationalized are indicators associated

¹⁹² Farley (1986): 14 and Hannum (2006): 69.

with national self-determination and liberal democracy. Material factors are tested with emphasis on the indicators for military strength of the secessionist movement and proximity as well as involvement of great powers and contiguous rivals. Utilizing these indicators I test my argument using an ordered logistic regression estimator. The ordered logit estimator is appropriate given the nature of the dependent variable (ordinal with three discrete values).

The qualitative component begins in Chapter 4 and consists of case-studies from the breakup of Yugoslavia utilizing a nested-analysis research design. This design advocates that the results of the large-n analysis should inform the case selection process. Using this method, I selected two cases; Slovenia and Croatia. These cases trace the operation of the causal mechanisms of the explanatory variables of interest; norms of self-determination and liberal democracy, strength of secessionist movement, and proximity to great powers or contiguous rivals. This approach to my research design allows me to control for possible confounding factors as well as evaluate elements of dyadic or strategic interaction that affects the likelihood of recognition.

Another benefit to the nested-analysis research is the leverage it provides on expanding the observable implications of the internalization mechanism that is associated with normative factors associated with national self-determination and liberal democracy. Specifically, by looking at multiple decisions regarding recognition in the same time period we can have more confidence that the evaluation made towards the determinants of recognition are not an isolated occurrence or outlying case but showed patterns of regularity with respect to the causal processes of interest. Finally,

examination of the cases allows for the evaluation of the causal mechanism in more detail to determine the causal weighting of all the explanatory variables of interest; domestic material, international material, and normative factors. In short, the qualitative case-study component allows for verification that actual operation of the mechanisms associated with the explanatory variables of interest conforms to the predicted impact of their indicators from the quantitative empirical testing. The next chapter provides an introduction to the qualitative research design for this study, and a detailed examination of the international recognition of Slovenia.

CHAPTER 3:
QUANTITATIVE RESEARCH DESIGN AND TESTING

3.1 Introduction

This chapter focuses on empirically testing my argument that international material factors and norms of democracy are important components in explaining why some cases of violent secession are recognized as a new states in the international system. In addition, I also test existing arguments focused on domestic material factors associated with state capacity and norms associated with national self-determination. The empirical testing conducted in this chapter concentrates on determining the impact of the relevant material and normative factors (operating at both the domestic and international levels) that influence recognition of seceding territories by great powers in the international system.

In general, I find strong empirical support for my argument that international material factors and norms of democracy increase the likelihood that great powers will recognize cases of secession. Specifically, the direct involvement of a great power during the secession attempt (a secession attempt located in or contiguous to a great power) is an important influence on the likelihood of recognition. The evidence also identifies inter-state rivalry as another important international material factor to account for

regarding recognition. Broadly, my empirical analysis finds secession attempts associated with rival pairs/adversaries (a secession attempt located in or contiguous to a rival adversary) is a significant factor that affects the potential of great power recognition. Furthermore, I also find that normative factors associated with liberal democracy are important to consider in determining the relevant causal factors related to great power recognition. The results indicate that the regime type of the parent state and the utilization of terrorism by a secessionist group are important considerations that impact the likelihood of the acceptance of a seceding territory as a new state in the international system.

In addition, I find evidence that state capacity and normative factors associated with national self-determination influence the recognition of secession. Specifically, I find that varying levels of military strength of the parent state and secession group are relevant domestic level material factors that induce great power recognition. Also, I find evidence that as the norm of national self-determination diffuses in the international system, considerations regarding the right to self-rule influence whether great powers extend recognition to newly seceding territories. These results indicate that domestic material factors associated with state capacity, as it relates to authority and control, and normative factors associated with national self-determination need to be accounted for when generating an explanation of the dynamics of great power recognition.

These results have two implications for understanding the dynamics of recognition of secession. First, the impact of material factors indicates that the process of how seceding territories are accepted as new states in the international system has

both domestic and international components. The domestic component is focused on the dynamics of the fight between parent state and secessionist group, while the international component is centered on the preferences of great powers in the international system. One theoretical implication of my project is that recognition of secession is not just a function of state formation, but also a tool of inter-state rivalry wielded by states in the international system to achieve their security goals.

Additionally, these findings increase our understanding of how existing states in the international system consider normative factors when extending recognition in the cases of violent secession. Previous norm-based explanations tend to gravitate towards the right of self-rule or national self-determination. However, my findings indicate that liberal democratic norms also influence the likelihood of great power recognition. This indicates that not only do we need to evaluate the impact of national self-determination and liberal democracy independently within the context of violent secession, but also pay more theoretical attention to the conceptual overlap of those norms that impact the perceived legitimacy of claims to statehood in the international system.

Before I discuss these implications and results in more detail I must elaborate on my quantitative research design. To do so, I first discuss the benefits and trade-offs associated with the large-n analysis and provide a summary of the hypotheses to be tested. Next, I describe the data that is used for the large-n analysis. Specifically, I discuss the sources of the data, the unit of observation/universe of cases, and the model estimator. Then, I go into detail concerning the coding of the dependent, explanatory, and control variables of interest. Finally, I discuss the finding and results from the large-

n analysis and what bearing they have on my argument. In particular, I discuss how my findings associated with great power involvement and inter-state rivalry are significant factors in influencing recognition of secessions by existing great powers. In addition, I go into detail regarding the impact of factors associated with norms of democracy (regime type of parent state and utilization of terrorism by secessionist group) and national self-determination.

3.2 Large-N Analysis: Rationale and Benefits

Including a quantitative element¹⁹³ to empirically test my argument concerning the recognition of violent secession provides several benefits in evaluating the causal process that leads great powers to accept new states in the international system. Some of these benefits include a wider range of cases to discern which explanatory factors (material or normative) lead to the causal outcome of interest. In particular, specific patterns or combinations of relevant explanatory variables can be identified and generalized to a larger set of cases to determine the causal impact on the dynamics of recognition. In addition, utilizing a quantitative test facilitates the investigation of a

¹⁹³ This project utilizes a nested analysis research design (Coppedge 1999, and Liberman 2005) which includes a qualitative portion that is formulated based on the quantitative analysis. More information on this design and how it is utilized in conjunction with the quantitative results can be found in the introduction to Chapter 4.

broader set of observable implications with regards to my argument concerning the recognition of secession having an explicit international dimension.¹⁹⁴

Another benefit of quantitative analysis is the ability to examine and evaluate a larger set of causal factors operating at both the domestic and international level. Secessionist conflicts have an international component related to state formation that warrants investigation independent of other civil war types. The outcome of secessionist conflicts has international repercussions that impact the sovereignty (potential or existing) of the relevant actors involved; the secessionist group and parent state respectively. This is because the parent state is fighting to maintain sovereignty over its territory, while the secessionist group has aspirations for recognition and acceptance of their sovereignty by existing states in the international system. Focusing on violent secession attempts or secessionist conflicts is appropriate since groups that have marshaled enough resources to challenge the state tend to mobilize varying levels of popular support. This can allow a group to claim a mantle of popular and perceived legitimacy associated with their secessionist claim based on its broader base of support.

The mobilization of military and economic resources to mount a secessionist challenge also has international repercussions that warrant a focus on violent secession attempts since emergence of a new state from a secessionist movement alters the status-quo of the international security environment. Specifically, newly emerging states

¹⁹⁴ KKV (1994): 3-4, 23-27 and David Collier, Jason Seawright, and Gerardo L. Munck, "The Quest for Standards: King, Keohane, and Verba's Designing Social Inquiry," in *Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards*, ed. Henry E. Brady and David Collier Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. (2004): 37-40.

impact the international order and can alter the security environment since they can ally with known/potential adversaries or provide sanctuary to domestic challengers that undermine the security of a neighboring state. Any of these situations can lead to a range of consequences like continual internal conflict, arms racing, or inter-state war.¹⁹⁵ Byman notes that existing states sometimes utilize secessionist movements to achieve specific security goals such as destabilizing neighbors, increasing regional influence, or promote regime change.¹⁹⁶

My project also furthers our empirical understanding of secession and recognition by expanding the quantitative analysis to include historical cases of violent secession attempts dating to 1815. This is important since many large-n studies associated with intra-state violence are confined to the temporal period after 1945, where the distribution of power in the international system is static.¹⁹⁷ Investigating civil wars only in the period after 1945 confines our analysis of geo-political influences on the dynamics of secession to a bounded context. Specifically, it truncates the analysis to the stable bi-polar distribution of power that emerged after World War II between the United States and U.S.S.R. However, prominent international relations theorists have

¹⁹⁵ Van Evera (1998): 262-264, Fabry (2010): 8, and Salehyan (2009): 51-53.

¹⁹⁶ Byman (2001): 23-34.

¹⁹⁷ Examples of these studies include but are not limited to the following; James Fearon and David A. Latin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War," *American Political Science Review* 97:1 (February 2003): 75-90, Nicolas Sambanis, "Do Ethnic and Non-Ethnic Civil Wars Have the Same Causes?" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45:4 (2001): 259-282, Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "Greed and Grievance in Civil War," *Oxford Economic Papers* 56:4 (2004): 563-595, Michael Ross, "A Closer Look at Oil, Diamonds, and Civil War," *Annual Review of Political Science* 9 (June 2006): 265-300.

noted that a multi-polar distribution of power can lead to increased levels of tensions or the outbreak of war between great powers in the system.¹⁹⁸ Given that one of the theoretical implications of my argument is that the recognition of secessionist conflicts is a tool of inter-state rivalry than it would be prudent to investigate cases of secession when the configuration of the international system is conducive to heightened tensions and security competition between great powers. My inclusion of historical cases of violent secessions (from 1815) in the quantitative empirical test addresses this important theoretical perspective.

Another benefit arising from my inclusion of historical cases of violent secessions is that it allows me to test the assumptions associated with the relevant normative and material factors (national self-determination & democracy and international & domestic respectively) that impacts the likelihood of recognition. Specifically, the impact and efficacy of these factors in relation to recognition can be evaluated over time and across a wider-set of cases. This is especially helpful in trying to determine the scope of how the normative factors associated with national self-determination and liberal democracy diffuse and become more widely accepted in the international system.

These factors associated with the uniqueness of secessionist conflicts and time-series analysis in conjunction with the previously mentioned issues regarding generalizability provide solid justification for the quantitative element of my research

¹⁹⁸ Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," *World Politics* 30:2 (January 1978): 167-214, Waltz (1979), and Mearsheimer (2001).

design. The next section examines the data collected in more detail and coding of relevant dependent, explanatory, and control variables.

3.3 Data Description and Coding of Variables

This section provides an overview of the quantitative evidence utilized to test my argument. Before I describe the data used for the empirical analysis the hypotheses to be tested are grouped into three different categories for analysis. The hypotheses are listed below and correspond to those introduced in Chapter 2:

Hypotheses Associated with Domestic Material Factors:

- Hyp. 1: Secessionist movements attempting to break away from a parent state with high military and economic capacity are less likely to be recognized.
- Hyp. 1a: Secessionist movements attempting to break away from a failed state are more likely to be recognized.
- Hyp. 2: Secessionist movements with high levels of military capability are more likely to be recognized.
- Hyp. 3: Secessionist movements that claim territory that is mostly rural or mountainous are more likely to be recognized.
- Hyp. 3a: Secessionist movements that claim territory that is mostly urban are less likely to be recognized.
- Hyp. 4: Secessionist movements that inhabit a territory with a high level of extractable or lootable resources are more likely to be recognized.

Hypotheses Associated with International Material Factors:

- Hyp. 5: Secessionist movements whose parent state has an existing rivalry or conflict with a great power are more likely to be recognized.
- Hyp. 6: Secessionist movements that are contiguous to a great power are more likely to be recognized.
- Hyp. 6a: Secessionist movements whose parent states are part of a contiguous rivalry are more likely to be recognized.
- Hyp. 7: Secessionist movements attempting to break away from a great power are less likely to be recognized.

Hypotheses Associated with Normative Factors:

- Hyp. 8: Secessionist movements are more likely to be recognized as the norm of national self-determination strengthens.
- Hyp. 8a: Secessionist movements who claim territory that corresponds to existing sub-unit boundaries are more likely to be recognized.
- Hyp. 9: Secessionist movements coming out of former colonies are more likely to be recognized.
- Hyp. 9a: Secessionist movements in democracies are less likely to be recognized.
- Hyp. 9b: Secessionist movements that engage in terrorism are less likely to be recognized.

In addition, as stated previously, this project focuses on great power recognition so Table 3.1 contains the list of the great powers identified in the international system from 1815-2010.¹⁹⁹

¹⁹⁹ List is generated from Mearsheimer (2001): 404. It should be noted that some have argued that it is inappropriate to consider China and Russia after 1990 as great powers. However, I argue that Mearsheimer's comments concerning their possession of nuclear weapons and economic size warrant their inclusion.

TABLE 3.1:

GREAT POWERS IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM (1815 – 2010)

Austria/Austria-Hungary	1792-1918
China	2000-present
France	1792-1940
Prussia/Germany	1792-1945
Italy	1861-1943
Japan	1895-1945
Russia/Soviet Union/Russia	1792-present
United Kingdom	1792-1945
United States	1898-present

The empirical testing conducted for this study consisted of analysis of a dataset containing 121 secessionist conflicts from the 1815-2010. The primary sources for the coding of this dataset were derived from the following:

- Bridgett Coggins, "Friends in High Places: International Politics and the Emergence of States from Secessionism," *International Organization* 65:3 (July 2011): 433-67.
- Meredith Reid Sarkees and Frank Whelon Wayman, *Resort To War, 1816-2007*, Washington, DC: CQ Press (2010).

Focusing the quantitative analysis on secessionist conflicts, as the universe of cases, is warranted since secession is a unique subset of civil war that has not been evaluated systematically and independent of other types of civil wars. This is important because secessionist conflicts have inherent state formation components that make this sub-type of civil war unique. One of these components involves ethnic tensions and cleavages within a state. Some scholars have argued that barriers to social and economic advancement that are ethnically motivated lead to secessionist conflict.

Fearon notes, "Separatist national movements...arise out of ascriptive barriers to

upward mobility imposed by the state or majority cultural group.”²⁰⁰ Others view the relationship between ethnic cleavage and separatist violence as a function of perceptions of loyalty to the nation-state and collective group identity/self-defense.

Kauffman argues:

What can finally eliminate identity choice altogether is fear of genocide. The hyper-nationalist rhetoric used for group mobilization often includes images of the enemy group as a threat to the physical existence of a nation, in turn justifying unlimited violence against the ethnic enemy; this threatening discourse can usually be observed by members of the target group. Even worse are actual massacres of civilians, especially when condoned by leaders of the perpetrating group, which are virtually certain to convince the members of the targeted group that group defense is their only option.²⁰¹

The association of ethnic grievance or cleavage to secessionist violence is further illustrated by Table 2 below. This table indicates that 95% of the secessionist conflicts contained in the Ethnic Armed Conflict dataset have an explicit underlying ethnic grievance. I should note that I am not claiming that ethnic cleavages are a necessary condition for a violent secession, but rather there is a high correlation between violent secession attempts and underlying ethnic tension in the parent state that influence the state formation dynamics associated with this type of intra-state violence.²⁰² I argue that it is not only the ethnic grievance component that makes secession conflicts unique

²⁰⁰ James Fearon, “Separatist Wars, Partition, and World Order,” *Security Studies*, 13:4 (2004): 400.

²⁰¹ Chaim Kaufmann, “Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars,” *International Security* 20:4 (Spring 1996): 144.

²⁰² Donald Horowitz, “Self-Determination: Politics, Philosophy, and Law,” in *Ethnicity and Group Rights*, ed. Ian Shapiro and Will Kymlicka, New York, NY: New York University Press (1997): 428-432.

and of particular interest for study, but also the international dimension that is influenced by powerful actors in the international system.

TABLE 3.2:

SECESSIONIST CONFLICT BREAKDOWN: ETHNIC ARMED CONFLICT DATASETS²⁰³

	Ethnic Conflicts	Non-Ethnic Conflict	Total Conflicts
Secessionist	57	3	60
Non-Secessionist	53	102	155
Total	110	105	215

Given that secession conflicts have unique aspects that warrant further investigation independent of other types of civil wars, the composition and breakdown of the dataset was seventy-one conflicts spanning the years 1931-2010 derived from Coggins (2011). Another fifty conflicts were coded from 1815-1930 with the Sarkees and Wayman (2010) as the primary source.²⁰⁴ This makes the unit of observation a secessionist conflict-year, and the following criteria were used for inclusion in the universe of cases:

- Formal declaration of independence associated with secessionist movement.
- Defined territory and population associated with the claim of independence.

²⁰³ Erik Lars Cedarman, et al., *Ethnic Armed Conflict Dataset* - <http://dvn.ig.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/epr/faces/study/StudyPage.xhtml?studyId=36583> (August 2008).

²⁰⁴ Additional sources used for the time frame 1815-1930 included: Hew Strachan, et al. *The Oxford Companion to Military History*, New York, NY: Oxford University Press (2001), and George C. Kohn, *Dictionary of Wars* 3rd ed. New York, NY: Facts-on-File/Checkmark Books (2007). A complete listing and of all conflicts included in the dataset can be found in Appendix B.

- Secessionist movement lasted at least one month, had 100 individuals, and claimed 100 sqkm.
- Conflict needs to meet Armed Conflict Dataset thresholds.²⁰⁵

Using these criteria the total number of observations for the dataset equal (nt = 1295). The estimator used for this analysis was an ordered logit. The choice of estimator is appropriate given that the dependent variable of interest (great power recognition) has three discrete values.²⁰⁶ This reflects my conceptualization of recognition as a continuous rather than a dichotomous outcome, as previously discussed (Chapter 2, pg. 28). The regression analysis was reported with clustered standard errors with random effects and a lagged dependent variable added to account for omitted variable bias and auto-correlation respectively.²⁰⁷

3.3.1 Dependent Variable

The dependent variable and outcome of interest in this study is great power recognition. This variable is coded using three values (0 = little or no recognition, 1 = one GP recognizes, and 2 = two or more GP recognize). This variable was coded using the

²⁰⁵ Conflict involves two parties (with one being the government) that are in violent conflict over the state or territory with the level of violence reaching 25 battle-related deaths in a year. See <http://www.prio.no/CSCW/Datasets/Armed-Conflict/UCDP-PRIO/> (Mar. 15, 2012).

²⁰⁶ Christopher Winship and Robert D. Mare, "Regression Models With Ordinal Variables," *American Sociological Review* 49:4 (August 1984): 512-525 and Jeffrey M. Wooldridge, *Introductory Econometrics: A Modern Approach*, Mason, OH: Thomson*Southwestern (2006): 241-243.

²⁰⁷ Larry M. Bartels, "Pooling Disparate Observations," *American Journal of Political Science* 40:3 (August 1996): 905-42, Cheng Hsiao, *The Analysis of Panel Data*, 2nd Ed. New York: Cambridge University Press (2002), Jeffrey M. Wooldridge, *Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data*, Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press. (2002).

criteria that recognition occurred if any formal political or commercial agreement was entered into with the seceding state, a de facto recognition statement was issued, or a de jure statement was extended. Great power recognition after 1931 is coded from the dataset contained in Coggins (2011). This source coded great power recognition of secessionist movements (violent and non-violent) from 1931-2006. Volumes from the following sources were utilized to code this variable for the periods before 1931:

- Foreign Relations of the US
- Documents on British Foreign Policy
- Diplomatic Exchanges of French Foreign Ministry
- Proceedings of the League of Nations
- League of Nations Statistical and Disarmament Documents
- Annual Review of UN Affairs²⁰⁸

²⁰⁸ While some print volumes were used many of the sources consulted were part of digital archives. These archives include but are not limited to the following digital archives at Northwestern, the University of Wisconsin-Madison, Tulane University, and the Gale Digital Collections, respective websites below:

<http://digital.library.northwestern.edu/league/>, <http://uwdc.library.wisc.edu/collections/FRUS>, http://library.tulane.edu/collections/digital_collections#HistoricalGovernmentDocuments, and <http://gdc.gale.com/nineteenth-century-collections-online/asia-and-the-west/>. Valuable print sources included; Jules Cambon, et al. *The Foreign Policy of the Powers*, New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations (1935) and Irby C. Nichols, Jr. *The European Pentarchy and the Congress of Verona, 1822*, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff (1971).

3.3.2 Explanatory Variables

This section examines the explanatory variables of interest. The following are the explanatory variables included in this study with their associated respective abbreviated hypotheses:

- Hyp. 1: Parent state military/economic level

This variable `ps_military` was coded using three values (1 = low military capacity, 2 = moderate, and 3 = high). This ordinal variable was created by averaging the composite indicator of national capabilities (CINC) score of the Great Powers for the relevant temporal period and creating an average CINC score for that great power period. Parent state military capacity was coded based on its CINC score in relation to the computed average (based on percentage quartiles). The source for this data was the “National Material Capability Index, V.4,” from the Correlates of War dataset. The variable `ps_economic` is coded using three values (1 = low economic capacity, 2 = moderate, and 3 = high). This ordinal variable was created by averaging the primary energy consumption, iron & steel production, and urban populations scores from the National Materials Capability (NMC) index of the Great Powers for the relevant temporal periods and creating an average Economic Capacity score for that great power period. Parent state economic capacity was coded based on its combined score of these three elements score in relation to the computed average (based on percentage quartiles). The source for this data was also the “National Material Capability Index, V.4,” from the

Correlates of War dataset. An ordinal variable with discrete values was used since it provided a more meaningful and theoretically relevant comparison of the countries contained in the sample. In short, I argue that claims based on a comparative metric of low, medium, or high military and economic power are more meaningful than describing a percentage change in the CINC or NMC score for a given unit.

- Hyp. 2: Secession movement military strength

This variable `group_military` was coded using three values (1 = low military capacity, 2 = moderate, and 3 = high). This ordinal variable was based on the number of active combatants a secessionist group had under arms. Low capacity equaled 0-1,000 fighters, moderate equaled 1,000-10,000 fighters, and high equaled more than 10,000 fighters. This variable used a variety of sources for coding. For the period from 1815-1945 the primary coding sources consisted of Sarkees and Waymann (2010), Strachan, et. al (2001), Kohn (2007), and Coggins (2011). For the period after 1945 the coding was derived from the following sources: UCDP/PRIO, Armed Conflict Dataset v. 4-2011, 1946-2010, Barbara Walter, Civil War Resolution dataset (2002), Coggins (2011), and Sarkees and Wayman (2010).

- Hyp. 5: Great power conflict

This variable `gp_conflict` was coded as a dummy (0 = no previous conflict with Great Power in last five years, 1 = conflict with Great Power in last five years). Previous adversarial relationship was determined by the presence of either an inter-state war or militarized inter-state dispute between parent state and GP. The source of this data was

Ghosn, et. al, Militarized Inter-State Dispute dataset, v.3.1 (2004) and Sarkees and Wayman (2010).

- Hyp. 6: Great power proximity

This variable `gp_proximity` was coded as a dummy (0 = secession is not contiguous to a GP, 1 = secession is contiguous to a GP) if the secessionist movement was located in a neighboring state that is contiguous to a great power.²⁰⁹

- Hyp. 6a: Rivals

This variable `rivals` was coded as a dummy (0 = secession is not contiguous to a rival dyad, 1 = secession is contiguous to a rival dyad). Rival dyads were determined by whether an inter-state dispute had occurred between two contiguous states within the last five years. The source of this data also utilized Ghosn, et. al, Militarized Inter-State Dispute dataset, v.3.1 (2004) and Sarkees and Wayman (2010).

- Hyp. 7: Great power secession

This variable `gp_secession` was coded as a dummy (0 = group is not attempting to secede from GP, 1 = secession attempt from GP) and indicates whether the secessionist movement is attempting to break away from a great power.

- Hyp. 8: National self-determination

This variable `self-determination` was coded using four values (0 = norm of self-determination not present, 1 = norm is weak, 2 = norm is moderate, 3 = norm is

²⁰⁹ All variables regarding geography or topography were coded using the following two sources; *CIA World Factbook* (<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/>) and the *World Atlas* (<http://www.worldatlas.com/aatlas/world.htm>).

strongest). The values are determined by specific time periods (1815-1918 = 0, 1919-1945 = 1, 1946-1990 = 2, and 1990-present = 3). This coding is similar to the coding of eras of states vs. nations contained in Barkin and Cohen (1994) and Coggin (2011).

- Hyp 9: Colonies

This variable colonial was coded as a dummy (0 = territory attempting to secede is not a former colonial possession, 1 = territory is former colony) and indicates whether the secessionist movement was associated with a former colony/colonial possession. A territory was considered a former colony if it experienced any form of colonial administration.

- Hyp. 9a: Democratic regime type

This variable polity_iv was coded on 20 values (-10 to 10) and represents the polity score for the regime in question. A value of (10) signifies fully democratic, while a value of (-10) denotes fully autocratic. This measure was derived from the Polity IV dataset (Jagers, et al. 2010). In addition, a dichotomous measure of democracy (Przeworski, et al. 2000) is included in the analysis to account for the results being biased based on a specific indicator of democracy.

- Hyp. 9b: Terrorism

This variable terrorism was coded as a dummy (0 = secession group does not engage in terrorism, 1 = secession group utilizes terrorism). This variable was coded using the following definition of terrorism from the United States Penal Code, Section 2656 (d): "Terrorism is the use of premeditated, politically motivated violence against noncombatant targets by sub-national or clandestine agents, usually intended to

influence an audience.” Secession groups that engaged in conduct that fits this description were coded as using terrorism.

3.3.3 Control Variables

In addition to these explanatory factors, I include a number of control variables in my analysis to account for other factors that are known to influence intra-state conflict. Numerous scholars have identified the topography of the conflict zone playing an important role in civil wars. It is commonly argued that insurgency and secession are more common in rural, mountainous or otherwise inaccessible terrain since these topographic areas make it more difficult for the state to project its authority and militarily defeat internal challengers.²¹⁰ In addition to rural or mountainous topography, scholars have included population density as a geographic/demographic factor relevant to secession.²¹¹ Toft notes that attempts to secede that are centered on an urban population are more likely to fail. She states:

[Urbanized secessionist movements] are often recent arrivals who, unlike concentrated majorities and minorities, lack a strong sense of attachment to the land they occupy. Urbanites who are passionately attached to a

²¹⁰ Fearon and Latin (2003): 88, Monica Duffy Toft, “Indivisible Territory, Geographic Concentration, and Ethnic War,” *Security Studies* 12:2 (2002-2003): 92-93, Matthew Kocher, *The Human Ecology of Civil War*, Ph.D. Diss., University of Chicago (2004): 24-26, and Stathis N. Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*, New York, NY: Cambridge University Press (2006): 133.

²¹¹ Monica Duffy Toft, *The Geography of Ethnic Violence: Identity, Interests, and Indivisible Territory*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press (2003): 21-26 and John Coakley, “Introduction: The Territorial Management of Ethnic Conflict,” in *The Territorial Management of Ethnic Conflict*, ed. John Coakley, Portland, OR: Frank Cass (1993): 7-12.

homeland are most likely attached to a distant land, rather than to the city in which they currently reside.²¹²

However, more recently, the disadvantage that secession attempts suffer in urbanized locales has been questioned. Staniland argues that failure of secessionist movements in urban settings is not because of topography or population density, but is rather a function of state policy.²¹³ From this discussion it is clear that geography and population have a significant impact on secession and need to be accounted for in determining the likelihood of recognition. The hypothesis and variable coding associated with topography is listed below:

- Hyp. 3: Mountainous/Rural
- Hyp. 3a: Urban

The variables `mountain_jungle` was coded as a dummy variable (0 = normal terrain, 1 = mountainous or jungle terrain) and was determined by asking what are the major topological and geologic features prevalent in the territory attempting to secede. The variable `urban` was coded as a dummy variable (0 = rural, 1 = urban) and was based on whether the secession attempt was focused solely on a specific urban area or population.

In addition to topography, many have argued that the presence of lootable or extractable resources affect the occurrence, intensity, or prolongation of civil wars.²¹⁴

²¹² Toft (2002-2003): 92-93.

²¹³ Paul Staniland, "Cities on Fire: Social Mobilization, State Policy, and Urban Insurgency," *Comparative Political Studies* 43:12 (2010): 1625.

²¹⁴ This topic has had extensive coverage in the civil war literature, some excellent works include

The presence of lootable or extractable resources impacts the recognition of secessionist movements in two ways. First, a seceding territory that has an abundance of economic resources at its disposal is more likely to be recognized, as this provides some idea of the long-term economic viability of the territory post-independence. This is a concern to recognizing states since they do not want to be placed in the position of becoming economically responsible for the newly recognized state either through foreign aid or fiscal transfer. In short, states want some assurance that recognition will not entail burdensome economic responsibilities and that the new state can stand on its own. Additionally, the presence of lootable or extractable resources may induce states to recognize secessionist movements because of the economic opportunities that accompany independence through investment or other beneficial trade relationships/arrangements.²¹⁵ Simply stated, recognition is a function of the opportunity and beneficial access to exploit economic resources in the newly independent state. The hypothesis and variable coding associated with lootable resources is listed below:

S. Brock Blomberg and Gregory D. Hess, "The Temporal Links Between Conflict and Economic Activity," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46:1 (February 2002): 74-90, Jean-Paul Azam, "Looting and Conflict Between Ethnoregional Groups: Lessons for State Formation in Africa," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46:1 (February 2002): 131-153, Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "Greed and Grievance in Civil War," *Oxford Economic Papers* 56:4 (2006): 563-595, James Ron, "Paradigm in Distress?: Primary Commodities and Civil War," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49:4 (2005): 443-450, James Fearon, "Primary Commodity Exports and Civil War," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49:4 (2005): 483-507, Macartan Humphreys, "Natural Resources, Conflict, and Conflict Resolution: Uncovering the Mechanisms," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49:4 (2005): 508-537, Michael Ross, "A Closer Look at Oil, Diamonds, and Civil War," *Annual Review of Political Science* vol. 9 (June 2006): 265-300.

²¹⁵ David Carment and Patrick James, "Third-Party States in Ethnic Conflict: Identifying the Domestic Determinants of Intervention," in *Ethnic Conflict and International Politics: Explaining Diffusion and Escalation*, ed. Steven E. Lobell and Phillip Mauceri, New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan (2004): 12-13.

- Hyp. 4: Lootable Resources

The variable lootable was coded as a dummy (0 = no lootable resources, 1 = lootable resources present). The lootable resources identified included three types; petroleum, mineral (diamonds and mining), and timber. Data on lootable resources was derived from Ross (2006) and Collier and Hoeffler (2004).

Finally, the presence of the United Nations operating in a conflict zone also needs to be considered. The presence of a UN peacekeeping force or brokered cease-fire can lend a measure of collective recognition due to the high-profile nature of the conflict having drawn the attention of important international actors. In short, the involvement of the United Nations in a peace-keeping or settlement capacity provides a legitimating mechanism by indicating that a secessionist movement has legitimate grievances associated with their attempts at secession. The variable UN_involvement was coded as a dummy (0 = no UN presence, 1 = UN active in conflict). The criteria to determine UN participation in the conflict was the presence of a UN mediation or peacekeeping mission.²¹⁶ The next section details the findings and results from the empirical tests involving the dependent, explanatory, and control variables described.

²¹⁶ Data for United Nations involvement is derived from Virginia Page Fortina, “Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace After Civil War” *International Studies Quarterly* 48:2 (2004): 269–292 and Bumba Mukherjee, “Does Third-Party Enforcement or Domestic Institutions Promote Enduring Peace After Civil Wars? Policy Lessons From an Empirical Test,” *Foreign Policy Analysis* 2:4 (2006): 405–430.

3.4 Data Results and Findings

This section discusses the results from the ordered logistical regression model regarding the relationship between material and normative factors operating during secessionist conflicts. Table 3 provides the coefficients and standard errors using an ordered logit estimator with reported clustered standard errors. The model also included random effects and a lagged dependent variable to handle omitted variable bias and auto-correlation respectively. In addition, the model was subjected to a post-regression diagnostic (Brant test) to determine whether the proportional odds assumption had been violated. The χ^2 results from the Brant test were near equal to the χ^2 from the ordered logit model, which is an indicator that the assumption had not been violated and the model is correctly specified.²¹⁷

I concentrate my analysis on the explanatory variables that exhibited statistical significance, and grouped those indicators into three categories for discussion. In the following sections, I first discuss the indicators associated with domestic material factors and how they affect the probability of recognition. Next, I evaluate my claims concerning international material factors having a significant impact on the motivation of existing states to recognize violent secession attempts. The final group of indicators to discuss relate to normative factors associated with national self-determination and democracy. The result from the ordered logit regression is listed in Table 3.3 below. For

²¹⁷ Rollin Brant, "Assessing Proportionality in the Proportional Odds Model for Ordinal Logistic Regression," *Biometrics* 46 (December 1990): 1171-1178.

ease of identification, the coefficients and standard errors associated with the indicators for domestic and international material factors are highlighted in yellow and green respectively. Those in blue represent the estimates of the normative factors associated with national self-determination and liberal democracy. Results discussed in the proceeding sections refer to Model 3.

TABLE 3.3:
ORDERED LOGIT ANALYSIS²¹⁸

	(Model 1)	(Model 2)	(Model 3)
	Int. Politics	Democracy	Combined
ps military	-1.814***	-0.953*	-2.665***
	-[0.437]	-[0.551]	-[0.462]
ps economic	-0.109	-0.620	0.113
	[0.305]	[0.636]	[0.329]
group military	1.050***	1.011***	1.176***
	[0.148]	[0.134]	[0.156]
lootable	-0.938***	-2.079***	-1.484***
	[0.151]	[0.149]	[0.157]
un involvement	0.513	1.140***	1.174***
	[0.385]	[0.370]	[0.430]
gp proximity	1.440***		1.011***
	[0.216]		[0.283]
gp secession	-1.570***		-1.781***
	[0.250]		[0.203]
rivals	1.763***		2.253***
	[0.312]		[0.397]
self determination		0.315**	0.452***
		[0.123]	[0.159]
polity iv	0.013	0.022	0.022
	[0.013]	[0.015]	[0.015]
colonial		0.033	1.913***
		[0.327]	[0.410]
terrorism		-1.650***	-1.887***
		[0.223]	[0.316]
mountain jungle	2.171***	1.857***	2.521***
	[0.367]	[0.275]	[0.408]
gp conflict	-0.231		-0.204
	[0.350]		[0.421]
sub unit		0.131	-0.190
		[0.298]	[0.394]
lagged dv	9.543***	6.977***	11.851***
	[0.764]	[0.652]	[1.192]
_cut1	5.916***	4.676***	7.002***
	[0.665]	[0.618]	[1.082]
_cut2	7.865***	5.542***	10.059***
	[0.681]	[0.616]	[1.103]
Observations	1286	1287	1286

Standard errors in brackets, ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

²¹⁸ Model 1 and 2 do not include the indicators for normative and international material factors, respectively.

3.4.1 Domestic Material Factors and Recognition

This section discusses the statistically significant variables associated with domestic material factors included in the ordered logit regression. Specifically, I discuss how recognition is influenced by the indicators for secession group military and economic strength as well as the impact of United Nations peacekeeping or mediation during a secessionist conflict. The indicator for secession group military strength (*group_military*) is statistically significant at the 1% level, and exhibits a positive relationship, which would indicate that as the military strength of the secession group increases its chances for recognition by a great power also increase. This finding is consistent with existing explanations in the literature that view achievement of specific levels of state capacity related to authority and control as a prerequisite to recognition. Similarly, the control variable indicating United Nations involvement (*un_involvement*) in the secession conflict (either through peacekeeping or mediation) also indicates a positive relationship at the 1% level. I interpret this finding as indicating that the likelihood for great power recognition increases when the United Nations maintains a presence or role in the secessionist conflict. This control variable was important to include and discuss since the conceptualization of recognition in Chapter 2 (pg. 26-28) made reference to the legitimizing effects inherent in collective recognition associated with international institutions.²¹⁹

²¹⁹ Ideally, UN involvement would be accommodated in the model with use of a dependent variable with four discrete values, including UN recognition. However, including this type of measure would decrease the number of available cases by 45%. For this reason the proxy for collective recognition is the UN dummy discussed in the text.

The final domestic material indicator to discuss concerned the presence of lootable resources (petroleum, mineral, or timber) in the seceding territory. I previously argued that this was an important domestic material factor to account for since it relates to the seceding territory's economic sustainability and investment potential. The results from Table 3 show the indicator for lootable resources (lootable) to be statistically significant at the 1% level, but with a negative relationship. This is contrary to predictions regarding this variable. Specifically, I argued that the presence of lootable resources would increase the probability of recognition since this illustrated that the potential new state would not need large amounts of international aid to remain a functioning state in the international system. In addition, I argued that the presence of large deposits of petroleum, minerals, or timber would increase the likelihood of recognition since these economic resources would be attractive to potential foreign investors in existing states. However, the results from Table 3.3 would indicate that the presence of lootable resources in a seceding territory make recognition less likely.

The most likely explanation for the results regarding lootable resources relates to the "greed vs. grievance" debate in the civil war literature. Specifically, many have argued that the presence of lootable or extractable resources affect the occurrence, intensity, or prolongation of civil wars.²²⁰ In short, some incidences of intra-state violence is just large-scale criminal activity centered on mineral or extractable resources. Viewing the results from this context might be an indication that secession

²²⁰ See Blomberg and Hess (2002), Azam (2002), Collier and Hoeffler (2006), Ron (2005), Fearon (2005), Humphreys (2005), and Ross (2006).

attempts from territories where lootable resources are abundant are viewed as less legitimate. This is because existing states in the international system are predisposed to the perception that the violence associated with the secessionist claim is in actuality just a smoke-screen for a bid to control natural and economically valuable resources. This possible interpretation needs further examination since the implications would be that perceptions of legitimacy play a critical role in the state formation process. Another explanation might be that existing states don't want a disruption in the supply of those resources since they have preexisting contracts or arrangements with the incumbent regime, so they have a status quo bias and side with the parent state.

The results from Table 3.3 display the coefficients and standard errors associated with ordered logistic regression, but these do not provide an idea of what substantive impact these variables have on the likelihood of recognition. Figure 3.1 below provides a visual representation of the substantive impact the variables associated with domestic material factors have on the probability of great power recognition.²²¹

²²¹ It should be noted that all predicted probabilities were calculated with the *Clarify* software package for *Stata 10* with the value of x' set to the mean.




Figure 3.1: Predicted Probabilities of Domestic Material Factors

Figure 3.1 shows that, *ceteris paribus*, the substantive impact of the military strength of the secessionist group moving from the lowest level ($x = 1$) to the highest ($x = 3$) increase the probability of recognition by a single great power ($y = 1$) by 12.5%. The chances of recognition increase by another 7.7% when factoring in recognition by more than one great power ($y = 2$). The predicted probabilities for the impact of United Nations involvement show a similar relationship. The results also show that, *ceteris paribus*, the presence of a United Nations peacekeeping or mediation mission increases the chance of recognition by a single great power by 5.3%. The effect of United Nations involvement increases the chances of recognition by approximately 3% more when accounting for more than one great power. Finally, examination of the figures associated with lootable resources indicates that the likelihood of recognition by a

single great power decreases by 6% when large deposits of petroleum, minerals, or timber are abundant in the seceding territory. The probability decreases another 3% when factoring in recognition by more than one great power in determining the impact when lootable resources are present. The predicted probabilities associated with the impact of the military strength of the secessionist group, the presence of lootable resources, and UN involvement provide some understanding of the substantive impact these variables have in relation to the recognition of great powers in the international system.

3.4.2 International Material Factors

This section discusses the statistically significant variables associated with international material factors included in the ordered logistic regression models displayed in Table 3 (highlighted in green). Specifically, I discuss how recognition is influenced by great power involvement and inter-state rivalry. The results in Table 3 indicate that international politics can have a significant impact on the likelihood for great power recognition. The indicator for a secession group trying to break away from a great power (*gp_secession*) is statistically significant at the 1% with a negative relationship. This would indicate that groups trying to achieve their independence against a great power are less likely to be recognized. This finding conforms to actual state behavior in the international system since openly challenging the territorial integrity of a great power can have grave security implications. The indicator associated

with violent secession attempts on the periphery of great powers (*gp_proximity*) was also statistically significant at the 1% level with a positive relationship. This would indicate that the likelihood for great power recognition increases when the attempted secession is contiguous to a great power. This finding, in conjunction with the previously mentioned impact of the indicator for great power secession, would indicate that while existing states are loath to run the risks of recognizing secessionist groups trying to break away from a great power, they may view secession attempts neighboring great powers as an opportunity to gain an advantage in a region where their influence has been restricted.

In addition to the indicators associated with great power involvement, those associated with inter-state rivalry (*rivals*) deserve some discussion. Table 3.3 would indicate that violent secession attempts located within or contiguous to rival pairings are more likely to receive great power recognition. It should be noted that the variable (*rivals*) was statistically significant in models 1-3 included in Table 3.3, but its impact on great power recognition was sensitive to alternative specifications of inter-state rivalry. Specifically, the indicator included in Table 3 was coded based on whether an inter-state conflict or militarized inter-state dispute had occurred in the last five years. However, the statistical significance and predicted substantive impact varied based on whether the temporal period of rivalry increased. In addition, within this alternative specification (where the time period to denote rivalry is greater than five years) the results showed some signs of bias associated with outliers. Specifically, the inclusion of conflicts between India and Pakistan accounted for a majority of the variation.

However, I argue that the results, in Table 3.3, associated with inter-state rivalry have validity for two reasons. First, these results conform to existing findings on the relationship between inter-state rivalry and recognition.²²² Next, the results from Table 3.3 used a different estimation technique than previous studies (ordered logistic regression vs. Cox-Hazard), but the results from the different model estimations were similar. I argue that this provides more confidence in the validity of the results associated with inter-state rivalry from this study since two different coding schemes and estimation procedures have produced very similar results. Nevertheless, while we need to proceed with caution regarding the confirmation of the hypothesis associated with rivalry, further investigation is merited to determine whether support for attempted secessions through the use of proxies is a tool of inter-state rivalry.

As noted previously, the ordered logit coefficients do not provide an illustration of the substantive effect that the explanatory variables associated with international material factors exert on recognition of attempted secession. To address this, the predicted probabilities associated with the relevant indicators are contained in Figure 3.2 below:

²²² Coggins (2011): 459-460.




Figure 3.2: Predicted Probabilities of International Material Factors

Figure 3.2 provides a visual representation of the substantive impact associated with the explanatory variables dealing with great power proximity, secession, and inter-state rivalry. These results indicate that ceteris paribus, the chances of recognition of a single great power is 7.1% less likely if a secessionist movement is trying to break away from a great power. Those chances decrease another 3.6% to be recognized by more than one great power. This would seem to confirm the hypothesis regarding secessionist movements being less likely to be recognized if attempting to secede from a great power. In addition, ceteris paribus, the likelihood for recognition by a single great power increases by approx. 4.6% if a secessionist movement is in a neighboring state contiguous to a great power and increases by another 2.5% when factoring in recognition by more than one great power. The substantive impact of inter-state rivalry

can also be seen in Figure 3.2. The graph would indicate that, *ceteris paribus*, when a secession attempt is within or contiguous to pairings of states that have had hostilities within a five year period (inter-state conflict or militarized inter-state dispute) are 13.6% more likely to attract the recognition of a single great power. The probability increases by another 7.7% when considering recognition by more than one great power.

The confirming results of the ordered logistic regression suggest that great power involvement (either attempts to break away directly from or contiguous to a great power) are casually related to recognition. Previous discussions of the existing literature regarding material factors relevant to recognition tended to concentrate on the domestic level with particular attention given to state capacity. However, the results discussed in this section indicate that the recognition of violent secession attempts has an explicit international dimension. In short, when trying to understand the determinants of recognition we need to account for the geo-political context and not just the domestic perspective.

The impact of great power proximity and inter-state rivalry illustrate another theoretical implication related to the importance of international politics to the context of secessionist conflicts. Specifically, if existing states in the international system use violent secession attempts as proxies to pursue their own security interest than our general understanding of the goals and outcomes associated with secessionist conflict need modification. In particular, we need to accept that recognition of secession is not only a function of the state formation process, but also a tool of security competition. From this perspective, the range of outcomes associated with violent secession include

outcomes associated with inter-state rivalry within the international system, and are not confined to the achievement of independence or autonomy at the domestic level.

3.4.3 Normative Factors

The final results to discuss are the significant normative factors associated with national self-determination and democracy included in the ordered logistic regression (highlighted in blue in Table 3). Specifically, I discuss how recognition is influenced by national self-determination, colonialism, and the utilization of terrorism during a secessionist conflict. Before I discuss these findings, the results for the democratic regime type indicator (*polity_iv*) need some elaboration. This indicator is not significant in any of the models in Table 3.3, but in preliminary testing I first ran the model using a dichotomous measure of democracy.²²³ The results from this specification of the model were as predicted regarding democratic regime type (statistically significant with a negative relationship, indicating that secession attempts from democracies are less likely to be recognized). However, when the same model is run utilizing the continuous measure for democracy (*polity_iv*) the effect is no longer present. I believe that this is an artifact of the data for two reasons; there are no great powers that are considered democratic until the early 20th century and democracies are under-represented in the universe of cases since they have far lower incidences of violent intra-state challengers. If the transmission, perception, and acknowledgement of democratic attributes of other

²²³ Przeworski, et al. (2000).

states is predicated on levels of trust and respect between democracies²²⁴ than we would expect that the under-representation of democratic regimes in the dataset would show this type of effect when utilizing a more continuous measure of democracy. However, given that the statistical significance of the regime type indicator is dependent on a dichotomous conceptualization of democracy, the hypothesis associated with regime type (secessionist movements trying to break away from democracies are less likely to be recognized) cannot be confirmed at this time. Nevertheless, other indicators associated with the norm of democracy (terrorism and colonialism) operating in the context of secession appear to be operating as predicted, which are described below.

The normative factors relevant to this discussion are the indicators for national self-determination, utilization of terrorism by secession groups, and secession attempts from former colonial possessions. The indicator measuring the strength of the norm of national self-determination is statistically significant (1% level) exhibiting a positive relationship with the dependent variable; great power recognition. This would indicate that as the norm of national self-determination becomes more widely accepted in the international system the likelihood of recognition increases. This result confirms existing explanations in the literature regarding the international acceptance of the norm of national self-determination as an important determinant of recognition. It should be noted that the measure for national self-determination included in Table 3.3 represents an effect indicator of this latent concept. This is because the process associated with

²²⁴ Doyle (1996): 10.

how ethno-cultural attributes are synthesized with nationalism to create a national identity cannot be modeled with enough precision to create a constitutive measure of this concept. This necessitates the utilization of the best proxy available to measure the norm of national self-determination, which for this study consisted of the creation of an effect indicator predicated on arguments that norms introduced into the international system grow in strength over time.²²⁵

The indicators associated with democratic characteristics operating in the context of secession were also significant. The measure of whether a secessionist groups utilized terrorism (terrorism) exhibits a negative relationship and is statistically significant at the 1% level. This would seem to be an indication that secessionist groups that employed terrorist campaigns to further secession are less likely to be recognized. This result could be evidence that terrorist groups risk being perceived as illegitimate when they engage in terrorism since norms of liberal democracy advocating respect for human rights and non-targeting of civilians, are prevalent in the international system. In addition, the indicator for colonialism (colonial) is also statistically significant at the 1% level with a positive relationship. This would indicate that secession attempts within former colonial possessions are more likely to be recognized. The substantive effect of

²²⁵ For more information on norm diffusion in the international system see Mona Krook, "Rethinking the Lifecycles of International Norms: The United Nations and the Global Promotion of Gender Equality," *European Journal of International Relations* 18:1 (2012): 103-127, Ian Clark, *International Legitimacy and World Society*, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press (2007), and Wendt (1999). For more information on the use of effect indicators see Kenneth A. Bollen, "Latent Variables in Psychology and the Social Sciences," *Annual Review of Psychology* 53 (2002): 605-634 and Goertz (2006): 15.

these indicators consisting of predicted probabilities associated with great power recognition are displayed in Figure 3.3 below:




Figure 3.3: Predicted Probabilities (Normative Factors)

Figure 3.3 provides a visual representation of the predicted probabilities associated with the explanatory variables dealing with normative factors of national self-determination and liberal democracy. The graph would indicate that *ceteris paribus* the chances of an attempted secession being recognized by a single great power increase by approximately 3.5% when the norm of national self-determination strongest versus when it is not present at all.²²⁶ This likelihood increases by approximately 1.7%

²²⁶ Strongest would be indicated by conflicts occurring after 1990 and not present is denoted by a

when factoring in recognition by more than one great power. This would seem to provide some support for my hypothesis that as the norm of national self-determination strengthens recognition of attempted secession is more likely. In addition, we see support for some of the hypotheses associated with the norm of liberal democracy in the context of secession. Examination of the graph in Figure 3.3 associated with terrorism indicates that *ceteris paribus* the likelihood of recognition by a single great power decreases by approximately 5.3% when a secession movement utilizes terrorism. This drops another 2.7% when factoring in recognition by more than one great power. The graph for colonialism shows that this measure's impact makes recognition more likely. Specifically, we see that secessionist movements associated with former colonies/colonial possessions are approximately 10.4% more likely to be recognized by a single great power and those chances increase by 6.3% when accounting for recognition by more than one great power.

The empirical results of the normative factors associated with secession and recognition identify the norms of national self-determination and liberal democracy playing an important role in great power's motivation to recognize new states forming from violent secession. These findings also point to an important theoretical implication regarding the conceptualization of national self-determination. The results from the analysis would seem to indicate that there are two distinctive normative factors that are relevant to our understanding of recognition. The existing literature has identified the

conflict occurring before 1918.

importance of national self-determination in relation to recognition and acceptance of new states from secession, but the role that norms of liberal democracy have on motivating states to recognize violent secessionists needs further exploration. Two avenues for future research would be of particular interest. First, more focus is needed regarding the conceptualization of national self-determination. This concept is often conflated with elements of democracy that are inherently at odds since secession violates democratic procedures with regards to the majority population in the parent state. Second, more attention needs to be given to examining the impact of the democracy on the context of secession outside the plebiscitary vs. remedial debate regarding legitimate grievances. Specifically, examination of whether adherence/violation of norms of democracy impacts the determinants and preferences associated with sovereignty in the international system. Of particular interest is whether a potential inverse relationship exists between democracy and sovereignty. It is possible that as values associated with the respect for human rights and representative government become more prevalent in the international system there is a corresponding change and erosion of the protections associated with being a sovereign actor in the international system.

3.5 Data Summary and Implications for Qualitative Research

This chapter analyzed the results from the ordered logistic models of three categories of explanatory variables; domestic material, international material, and

normative. A summary of the substantive impact of these variables is contained in Table 3.4 below:

TABLE 3.4:
SUMMARY TABLE (PREDICTED PROBABILITIES OF GREAT POWER RECOGNITION)

Variables/Indicators	Single GP Recognition	Multiple GP Recognition
<i>Domestic Material Factors</i>		
Group Military Strength	12.5%	7.7%
Lootable Resources	-6.0%	-3.0%
UN Involvement	5.3%	2.9%
<i>International Material Factors</i>		
Great Power Secession	-7.1%	-3.6%
Great Power Proximity	4.6%	2.5%
Rivalry	13.6%	8.8%
<i>Normative Factors</i>		
Terrorism	-5.3%	-2.7%
Colonialism	10.4%	6.3%
Self-Determination	3.5%	1.7%

While, as noted in the discussion above, there are some limitations to these analyses, the findings discussed in this chapter do provide strong empirical support for the claims in my argument that international material factors associated with great power involvement and inter-state rivalry as well as normative factors associated with national self-determination and democracy are important components to our understanding of recognition. I argue that we can have confidence in the validity of these findings for three reasons.

First, the findings regarding the strength of the secessionist group, colonialism, and the norm of national self-determination influencing recognition confirm existing claims in the literature. Specifically, explanations associated with attributes of state capacity defined by the Montevideo Convention and wider acceptance of rights towards self-government influences the preferences towards recognition of new states within the context of secessionist conflict. Second, the findings regarding great power involvement and inter-state rivalry being important factors that impact the chances of recognition is also consistent with recent studies regarding how state formation is influenced by processes of social interaction and the political preferences of major actors in the international system.²²⁷ The consistent results between the studies serves as a robustness check since Coggins's findings utilized a different model specification and estimation procedure, but both showed similar results regarding the impact of international politics on the recognition on secession. Third, the impact of the variables associated with my argument (international material factors and norms of liberal democracy) is consistent with known predictors that are prevalent in the literature. Examination of Table 3.4 shows the indicators for secession group military strength and colonialism influence the chances of recognition by approximately 10%. The indicators I have argued need to be included fall within the same impact range (calculated by standard deviation of the population in comparison to the mean). In short, if there was a large deviation between the impact of the known predictors and the explanatory

²²⁷ Coggins (2011).

variables, associated with my argument, than there would be cause for concern that some of the estimates are biased by outliers or model misspecification.

The quantitative findings not only provide empirical support for my arguments, but also serve as the framework for the qualitative portion of this study. Specifically, the qualitative case-study component of the research design follows a nested-analysis approach, utilizing the results from the large-n analysis to influence the qualitative case selection.²²⁸ The rationale in utilizing this research design is to take a systematic approach in the selection of cases that has empirical foundations with the goal of improving the quality of conceptualization and measurement, the analysis of rival explanations, and the overall confidence in central findings. The nested-analysis approach dictates that if the results from the quantitative analysis are robust then the intensive examination of cases should be focused upon testing. Specifically, the focus should be on the causal mechanism and process for the proposed relationship between recognition and the relevant explanatory factors. In addition, this research design allows for verification that cause preceded effect not testable quantitatively, due to temporal limitations in the dataset. From this perspective my case selection is based upon those variables well predicted by the quantitative model and that exhibit the widest variation on the explanatory variables of interest. In the next chapter, I discuss how my case-studies are designed to examine the causal process associated with the different types

²²⁸ Coppedge (1999) and Lieberman (2005).

of explanatory variables contained in Table 3.4; domestic material, international material, and normative.

CHAPTER 4:
THE BREAK-UP OF YUGOSLAVIA: SLOVENIA

4.1 Introduction

This chapter provides an introduction to the qualitative component of my project. The focus of this chapter examines the impact the explanatory variables associated with domestic and international material factors as well as normative factors related to national self-determination and liberal democracy have on recognition. Specifically, I concentrate on whether the results from Chapter 3 that identify indicators associated with three types of factors; domestic, international, and normative are operating and exhibiting the causal dynamics that lead to recognition of violent secession attempts by existing states in the international system. To this end, in this chapter and the following I examine the break-up of the former Yugoslavian Republic from 1991-1995 focusing on the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia.

On a whole, my analysis of the Yugoslavian cases confirms the empirical results from the large-n analysis conducted in Chapter 3 in relation to the identified causal factors; domestic, international, and normative. Examining the role that domestic material factors related to state capacity had on the recognition illustrates that it did not have a significant impact on the international acceptance of the territories

attempting to secede. During their secession attempts Slovenia and Croatia exhibited different levels of authority and control over their respective territories and populations. Specifically, Slovenia illustrated high degrees of control and authority, while Croatia was plagued with barely any control over its territory and its political authority was seriously questioned experienced. In short, the examination of the break-up of Yugoslavia illustrates that domestic material factors related to authority and control did not heavily influence the decision making process of existing states to recognize the independence of the breakaway states of the former Yugoslavia. In fact, we observe the opposite; that recognition was extended to some of the break-away Yugoslav republics despite a serious lack of authority and control over the territories and populations they laid claim to.

In addition, examining the break-up of Yugoslavia confirms my finding and supports my primary argument that international material factors concerning great power involvement and inter-state rivalry greatly influenced the likelihood for recognition. Specifically, my examination of these cases shows that aggressive German foreign policy decisions and preferences by the United States to maintain the integrity of Yugoslavia were important factors in determining whether the independence of the breakaway territories of the former Yugoslavian Republic was formally recognized. Also, my analysis shows that preferences and reactions regarding the end of the Cold War and the new balance of power that would ensue with the collapse of the Soviet Union also greatly influenced the scope and pace of recognition of the breakaway territories. Simply stated, the case of the break-up of Yugoslavia illustrates that recognition of

violent secession attempts contain, not only an important domestic dimension involving the conflict dynamics between parent state and secessionist group. But also has an inherently international dimension exogenous to the secessionist conflict that influences the state formation process since new states entering the international system impact the security preferences and perceptions of the balance of power by existing states.

My examination of the breakup of Yugoslavia also focused on the relevant normative factors from Chapter 3 that identified indicators relating to national self-determination and liberal democracy influencing the likelihood for recognition. In particular, my analysis focused on whether concerns about national self-determination or democracy were an important component to the policy making process regarding recognition. I find that normative considerations regarding liberal democracy heavily influenced the German (and later the European Community) decision to recognize the independence of Slovenia and Croatia. In addition, I find less evidence that claims of national self-determination by secessionist groups or third-parties was taken into account in determining the likelihood of extending recognition to the breakaway territories of the former Yugoslavian Republic. Specifically, I find that national self-determination was explicitly excluded as a criteria for possible recognition because of fears of further incidences of ethnic conflict.

This discussion has presented three elements of the causal mechanism to be explored regarding the recognition of secession; domestic material, international material, and normative factors. However, before I can address the results associated

with these causal factors in more detail some discussion regarding the case selection and its relationship to the overall research design to this study is needed.

4.2 Case Selection and Qualitative Research Design

The qualitative component of this study utilizes a nested analysis research design. This research design advocates the combining of quantitative and qualitative approaches to create a more systemized approach to improve the quality of conceptualization and measurement, the analysis of rival explanations, and the overall confidence in central findings.²²⁹ Specifically, a study utilizing a nested analysis research design harnesses the empirical results from the large-n analysis to inform case selection. Cases are selected based on whether the findings from the quantitative analysis, on a whole, are hypothesis confirming or disconfirming. If the results are not robust (hypothesis disconfirming) than the case selection should focus on theory building. Specifically, the case-study component should focus on building a better theoretical understanding of the concepts and variables under investigation. However, if the results from the quantitative analysis are robust (hypothesis confirming) than the intensive

²²⁹ It should be noted that the Liberman (2005) article is usually attributed to the term “nested analysis,” but it is by no means the only work that touches upon this subject. Related works dealing with mixed-method approaches to research design include; Coppedge (1999), John Gerring, *Case Study Research: Principles and Practices* Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press (2007): Chapters 3 & 5, James Fearon and David Laitin, “Integrating Qualitative and Quantitative Methods,” in *Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology* ed. Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier, Henry E. Brady, and David Collier, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press (2008), and Charles C. Ragin, *Redesigning Social Inquiry: Fuzzy Sets and Beyond* Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press (2008).

examination of cases is focused on the testing the causal mechanism of interest. In particular, the causal mechanism and process for the proposed relationship should be focused upon. Also, rival explanations that exhibit the following factors should be addressed and if possible dismissed:

- Strong hypotheses that could not be considered in the large-n analysis due to lack of data.
- Verification that cause preceded effect due to temporal limitations of many large N datasets.

In addition, case selection is based upon those that are well predicted by the model in the quantitative analysis, and that exhibit the widest variation on the explanatory variables of interest. The diagram in Figure 4.1 provides an overview of the nested-analysis research design.²³⁰

²³⁰ Liberman (2005): 437.




Figure 4.1: Overview of Nested-Analysis Research Design

The inclusion of a qualitative component to my research design can have a number of benefits that can include; accounting for path dependence, elements of strategic interaction, or direct causal process observations.²³¹ However, I argue that utilization of the nested analysis research design provides some very specific benefits for my project. First, the case-selection process is empirically grounded in the statistical findings from Chapter 3. This allows for the triangulation of descriptive and causal

²³¹ Brady and Collier (2004).

inference since explanatory leverage increases when utilizing a broader set of research approaches.²³² Specifically, the large-n analysis focused on variation between cases, but my case-study analysis is focused on causal processes that happen within cases. In short, the inclusion of my case-studies allows for the empirical implications of my findings, (and their relationship to the causal mechanism of interest) to be explored in more detail to determine the degree of validity my argument achieves.

In addition, the utilization of this type of research design is helpful because of the need to evaluate the causal impact of the normative factors associated with national self-determination and liberal democracy. Goertz has noted that the evaluation of latent concepts, like national self-determination and liberal democracy, through statistical means can be fraught with difficulty. This is mainly stems from the difficulty in operationalizing these concepts because of their subjective elements.²³³ Previously in Chapter 2, I argued that the norms of national self-determination and liberal democracy have an impact on the likelihood of recognition, but this process could only be modeled in the statistical analysis with the use of proxy/effect indicators. In short, the statistical analysis indicated that the indicators for national self-determination and liberal democracy do impact the likelihood for recognition, but not the manner or scope it influences existing states regarding extension of recognition and acknowledgement of statehood. If these variables are operating as predicted and influencing recognition

²³² Charles C. Ragin, *The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies*, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press (1987): 69-84.

²³³ Goertz (2004): 13-16 and 55-58.

because existing states take into account normative factors. Than the processes of normative diffusion and internalization associated with national self-determination and liberal democracy is best observed through examination of qualitative case evidence.

Another benefit from utilizing a nested-analysis research design was the flexibility it provided with regards to case-selection. Examination of Figure 4.1 indicates that case-selection is dependent on whether the large-n results generally confirm or reject the stated hypothesis/hypotheses. In this study, the quantitative results were generally hypothesis confirming, so case-selection was geared towards examination of the causal mechanism in more detail. However, my assumptions regarding the impact of international material factors and liberal democracy are not addressed in the literature and those associated with the existing explanations of domestic material factors and national self-determination had not been systematically tested. Given this situation it seemed prudent to utilize a research design that had an element of added and built-in flexibility.

I focus my qualitative analysis on the statistically significant explanatory factors from Chapter 3. Specifically, I am interested in a detailed examination of the causal mechanism that induces recognition of violent secession attempts. To this end, I concentrate on the causal process associated with the following:

- domestic material factors related to authority and control
- international material factors related to great power involvement and rivalry

- normative factors related to national self-determination and liberal democracy

The quantitative indicators for these factors were shown to increase the likelihood of great power recognition for territories attempting to break away from their parent state. These results also provide the starting point for my qualitative analysis, which identifies three distinct causal elements to examine regarding recognition; domestic, international, and normative processes.

The examination of causal processes associated with domestic material factors allows for the examination of existing arguments in the literature concerning recognition being a function of state capacity. Specifically, I examine whether attributes related to authority and control over a given territory and population influence the likelihood for recognition. In order to examine in more detail the domestic material elements of my argument I generate the following focusing questions to determine what impact increasing levels of state capacity had on the probability of recognition. The focusing questions are:

- What level of control did the secessionist group exert over the territory they claimed?
- What military capacity did the secessionist group have to challenge the parent state?
- What was the actual and potential level of political authority exerted by the new state?

In addition to domestic elements, I also examine the role international material factors related to great power involvement and inter-state rivalry has on recognition. This is because secessionist conflicts have explicit international repercussions since recognition leads to the formation of a new state in the international system. Examination of the break-up of the former Yugoslav Republic provides an illustration of the international dimension that influences existing states to extend recognition. The focusing questions for this aspect of the case-study are:

- What preferences did the great powers have regarding secession and recognition?
- What influence did the great powers have on the scope and intensity of the conflict?

I also utilize this qualitative component of my study to examine normative factors related to recognition. Specifically, I determine whether norms associated with national self-determination and liberal democracy increase the likelihood of recognition. Normative factors regarding the right to self-government/rule are commonly used in trying to explain why states created by secession are recognized. However, the process of normative diffusion that impacts state decision making regarding recognition is not fully understood. Also, the norm most widely discussed in the context of secession is national self-determination, but previous discussions have illustrated that other norms need to be accounted for. Specifically, how normative factors associated with liberal democracy impact the decision to extend recognition needs elaboration. The focusing questions that address these causal elements are:

- What role (if any) did normative factors involving national self-determination have in extending recognition?
- What role (if any) did normative factors involving liberal democracy have in extending recognition?

This discussion regarding research design and the focus of the qualitative analysis provides the rationale and focus of the cases included in this study. This and the following chapters harnesses this mixed-method approach to examine the break-up of Yugoslavia and the information it contains regarding the process of recognition of the violent secession attempts in Slovenia and Croatia.

4.3 Break-Up of Yugoslavia: Historical Overview

Armed conflict on the territory of the former Yugoslav Republic between 1991 and 2001 claimed over 200,000 lives and gave rise to atrocities unseen in Europe since the Second World War. Unfolding against the background of the end of cold war bipolarity, the conflicts involving secession from Yugoslavia provided a grim reminder of unsettled ethnic issues from Europe's past, and provided a poignant reminder of the obstacles to greater European integration and development that were unfolding with the formation of the European Community, and later the European Union. After more than a decade of intermittent hostilities the conflicts associated with Slovenia, Bosnia, Croatia, and Kosovo have been contained, but only as a result of the external interventions and the establishment of a series of de facto international protectorates,

patrolled by UN, NATO, and EU sponsored peacekeepers with open-ended mandates. My analysis of the break-up of Yugoslavia concentrates on the conflicts that occurred in the former federal territories of the Yugoslav Republic from 1991 to 1995 with a specific emphasis on the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia.²³⁴

During this period there were four territories of the former Yugoslav Republic that declared their independence; Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia.²³⁵ My analysis of this case and its relationship to recognition concentrates on the first two of these territories since Macedonia's secession did not induce a violent challenge to their independence claims and Bosnia-Herzegovina's was a direct result of actions taken in Slovenia and Croatia. Most analysts of the disintegration of Yugoslavia highlight the role that ethnic identity played in instigating violence. According to this perspective, appeals to ethnic nationalist sentiment by Serbian politicians, like Slobodan Milosevic, fanned the flames of ethnic conflict that engulfed the Balkans. Given this perspective, the root cause of the conflict and eventual recognition of the territories involved was the destruction of the multi-national Yugoslav Federation as a result of the rise of an intolerant and exclusionary nationalism among its constituent republics. This led to demands for inclusion and influence over governance that became increasingly impacted by politics of identity and ethno-nationalism. This in turn abetted the rise of

²³⁴ Elizabeth Pond, *End Game in the Balkans: Regime Change, European Style*, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press (2006): 24-33 and R. Craig Nation, "War in the Balkans: 1991-2002," *Strategic Studies Institute* (August 2003): vii-x.

²³⁵ I should note that I do not include declarations associated with the minority Serb populations in the these territories since they had a irredentist orientation related to Serbia.

political violence based on ethnic grievance, which the local actors proved incapable of managing.²³⁶ One outcome associated with the aftermath of violence was the creation of three new states in the international system; Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. These arguments concerning ethnic conflict highlight the role that varying levels of authority and control over their respective territories and populations as well as national self-determination as the determining factors for recognition of statehood. However, my examination of the cases in the following chapters illustrates that this focus on domestic material factors and national self-determination masks important international elements and normative factors related to liberal democracy that are relevant to acceptance of statehood.

In addition, my analysis of these cases focuses on the recognition policies of the United States, Russia, and the leading members of the European Community – EC (Britain, France, and Germany). The decision to extend recognition by these countries is important since they include the great powers and relevant regional powers that existed in the international system during the conflict.²³⁷ Also, for the purposes of this study Serbia is designated as the parents state that opposed independence from the Yugoslav Federation. This is because Yugoslavia, after the summer of 1991, ceased to exist as a state in the international system and Serbia was the most powerful of the ethnic

²³⁶ Brendan O'Shea, *The Modern Yugoslav Conflict 1991-1995: Perception, Deception, and Dishonesty*, New York, NY: Frank Cass (2005): 3-8.

²³⁷ It should be noted that Britain, France, and Germany ceased being great powers after WWII, but I argue since their diplomacy was being choreographed in the context of the European Community and later the European Union that their inclusion is warranted. See Table 1.

republics with a monopoly over the military resources contained within the Yugoslavian armed forces prior to the break-up.²³⁸ Commenting on the military power and goals of Serbia during the break-up former Croatian Minister of Defence Martin Spegelj noted:

the JNA's (former Yugoslavian Army) task was to ensure that all areas with a Serb majority be thoroughly freed and protected...and to continue the transformation of the JNA throughout the whole of Yugoslavia into the army of the future Yugoslavia, both in regard to internal national and organizational structure and territorial location.²³⁹

From this quote it is clear that the political authorities in Serbia viewed their administration as the proper central authority in the former Yugoslavian Federation, and also as possessing the legitimate monopoly of force within the territorial borders that encompassed the former Yugoslavia. Given this perspective, the designation of Serbia as the parent state involved with the secessionist conflicts of the former Yugoslavian Federation is appropriate. The following sections explore the case of Slovenia and what relationship between the recognition and the causal processes involving domestic material, international material, and normative factors.

²³⁸ Martin Spegelj, "The First Phase, 1990-1992: The JNA Prepares for Aggression and Croatia for Defence," in *The War in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina 1991-1995*, ed. Branka Magas and Ivo Zanic Portland, OR: Frank Cass (2001): 15-22.

²³⁹ Spegelj (2001): 27-28. See also, R.J. Crampton, *The Balkans Since the Second World War*, New York, NY: Longman (2002): 252.

4.4 Slovenia: Domestic Material Factors During the Balkan Wars

This section explores the causal impact that domestic material factors related to authority and control had on the international recognition of Slovenia. Slovenia exhibited the highest degree of control and authority over its claimed territory and population in comparison to the other republics clamoring for independence; Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. My analysis shows that, in general, domestic material factors related to authority and control did not dictate whether recognition was extended to Slovenia. In particular, I find that despite the high degree of territorial control over its borders and political authority it wielded that the decision to recognize Slovenia's sovereignty was not influenced by these domestic material factors. I also find strong support for my argument that international factors associated with great power involvement strongly influenced the likelihood for recognition.

I should note that this does not mean that domestic material factors related to authority and control had no impact on the causal process associated with recognition in Slovenia. Rather, these domestic material factors served a more peripheral role. When the degree of political authority and military control was associated with recognition it was more in the context of providing clearer ethnic delineation and affiliation of contested regions in the territories attempting to secede. In short, authority and control impacted the likelihood for recognition of Slovenia only to the degree that some states were cognizant of the need for possible future negotiation or

arbitration associated with some contested regions because of recent changes in their ethnic composition because of incidences of ethnically motivated violence.²⁴⁰

To understand how varying levels of authority and control impacted recognition during the conflict in Slovenia I concentrate my analysis on the following. First, I examine what level of control did the secessionist groups exert over the territories they claimed? Next, I explore what level of military capacity did the secessionist group possess to challenge the parent state? In short, I am concerned with the military balance between secessionist group and parent state in relation to the level of violence and asymmetric nature of the conflict. The last focusing question examines what was the actual and potential level of political authority exerted by the Slovenian leadership? Simply stated, I am interested in perceptions of legitimacy associated with the exercise of governance in the territories attempting to secede.

4.4.1 Slovenia: Territorial Control

Slovenia's path to acceptance as a new state in the international system began in the early 1991. On February 20, 1991 an act of disassociation was presented to the Slovenian Parliament that started the process for Slovenia's secession, which culminated with Slovenia's declaration of independence on June 25, 1991. Slovenia's declaration of independence was shortly followed by Croatia and Macedonia, and led to

²⁴⁰ Caplan refers to this as a strategy of conditional recognition based on conflict management. See Richard Caplan, *Europe and the Recognition of New States in Yugoslavia*, New York, NY: Cambridge University Press (2005): 4-6.

the disintegration of the crumbling Yugoslavian Republic.²⁴¹ Slovenia's attempts at secession did not go unchallenged, and a short but sharp conflict known as the Ten-Day War was fought between Slovenian territorial forces, and the Yugoslavian Army (JNA)²⁴² from June 26 – July 7, 1991. The resulting civil war, while short in duration, played an important role in determining the degree of control over Slovenian territory, and the balance of military forces between Slovenia and the central authorities in Belgrade. This victory was partially a function of the disorganization and low morale of the JNA forces, but an important factor in the outcome was the surprising competence of the Slovenia's military preparations and actions.²⁴³

Slovenia's military preparations before the Ten-Day War not only contributed to increasing the territorial control of the Slovenian political authorities advocating secession, but also impacted the level of violence in the conflict. The JNA forces trying to prevent Slovenia's secession enjoyed a large numerical advantage with their forces numbering almost 130,000 compared to approximately 35,000 troops that the Slovenians had at their disposal. However, despite these troop numbers the level of violence associated with this conflict was fairly low. Total casualties suffered during this

²⁴¹ Sabrina P. Ramet, *Balkan Babel: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia From the Death of Tito to the Fall of Milosevic*, 4th ed., Boulder, CO: Westview Press (2002): 177.

²⁴² While the forces of JNA had multi-national elements, Tus and Mesic argue that by 1990 that it was largely under the command of Serbian political authorities. See Tus (2001): 44 and Stjepan Mesic, "The Road to War," in *The War in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina 1991-1995*, ed. Branka Magas and Ivo Zanic Portland, OR: Frank Cass (2001): 10.

²⁴³ Louis Sell, *Slobodan Milosevic and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*, Durham, NC: Duke University Press (2002): 145-147.

conflict were as follows; 65 dead (37 – JNA, 12 – Slovenian, 16 – civilians) and 330 wounded.²⁴⁴ This was partially due to the high morale of Slovenian forces fighting for independence, but also was a function of many JNA conscripts being poorly armed and trained.

In addition, Slovenian forces took added preparations that helped to isolate and bog down the more powerful JNA forces, which greatly aided them in securing the borders and key installations in Slovenia. The most important of these actions was the reorganizing of the territorial defense forces into local units to be placed under Slovenian command as well as the refusal to turn over armaments and military material to Belgrade as requested in mid-May 1990.²⁴⁵ These actions allowed for Slovenia to both absorb the initial JNA attack that attempted to seize the Western border crossings and the main airports at Ljubljana and Brnik. As well as repel and isolate the attacking columns since many of the men of fighting age had already been dispersed to local units. The defeat of the JNA forces during the Ten-Day War found Slovenia in full control of its territorial borders and all former Yugoslavian military installations that resided within Slovenia. Most importantly, the Slovenian forces gained control over the border crossings with Austria, Italy, and Hungary preventing isolation from Western Europe.

²⁴⁴ Anton Tus, "The War in Slovenia and Croatia up to Sarajevo Ceasefire," in *The War in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina 1991-1995*, ed. Branka Magas and Ivo Zanic Portland, OR: Frank Cass (2001): 46.

²⁴⁵ Janza argues that the Slovenian forces maintained about 1/3 of the heavy weapons requested. See "Discussion," in *The War in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina 1991-1995*, ed. Branka Magas and Ivo Zanic Portland, OR: Frank Cass (2001): 98[n7].

This was a primary goal of the JNA forces during the war, which is illustrated on the map below:




Figure 4.2: Map of Ten-Day War (JNA Objectives and Slovenian Control)²⁴⁶

Slovenia's national defense posture also improved after the war because of the wide-spread seizure of retreating and captured JNA forces weaponry, which allowed for the Slovenian authorities to consolidate and secure their territorial gains. Former Deputy Chief of Staff for the Bosnian Army (1992-94) Jovan Divjak noted that, "Slovenia's armed forces were greatly strengthened by the results of the [Ten-Day] war

²⁴⁶ "Slovenian War Map," *Maps of the Net*, < <http://mapsof.net/map/slovenian-war-map> > (05/10/2012).

both territorially and materially.”²⁴⁷ However, Slovenia’s capacity to maintain control over its territory was not just a function of their increased military forces, but also because the most likely security threat, the JNA, was in poor shape to challenge Slovenia’s territorial integrity after the war. One reason for this was because of the multi-ethnic character of the JNA forces, which still depended on large-scale mobilization of conscripts from the different constituent ethnic republics. These conscripts were increasingly loathe to fight either their brethren who wished to secede or in service of what was perceived as attempts by Serbia to gobble up territory to create a “Greater Serbia” from the remnant of the Yugoslav Republic. This dissension that roiled the ranks and reduced the capacity of the JNA for military operations can be seen in the discussion on July 5, 1991 between Slobodan Milosevic and Veljko Kadijevic (commander of JNA forces until 1992). Slobodan demanded that he “eliminate all Croats and Slovenes from the army,” which resulted in a general purging of the officer corps of the JNA of any members of Slovenian or Croatian descent.²⁴⁸ As a consequence many units were rendered combat ineffective because of reorganization and lack of manpower.²⁴⁹ Given this situation, the military force that posed the greatest threat to

²⁴⁷ Discussion (2002): 99.

²⁴⁸ Tus (2001): 46.

²⁴⁹ Pond (2006): 17-18 and James Gow, *Serbian Project and Its Adversaries: A Strategy of War Crimes*, Montreal, CAN: McGill-Queen’s University Press (2003): 90-91.

Slovenian territorial control was in no condition to mount an effective military challenge.²⁵⁰

Another contributing factor to Slovenia's secure control over its territory was the absence of large enclaves of Serbs within its population. A fixture of the conflicts to follow in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina was the heterogeneous ethnic inter-mingling of the population, which facilitated the use of ethnic paramilitaries to help clear and hold territory. Pond notes that the JNA forces and their attached Serbian paramilitaries were organized around and conducted their combat operations utilizing a "quasi-medieval" doctrine. She notes the manner in which they gained territory as, "Siege, stand-off bombardment, murder, torture, and the terrorizing and ethnic cleansing of civilians became the chosen means of warfare."²⁵¹ However, the absence of large concentrations of Serbs in Slovenia made this manner of warfare unfeasible and contributed to the ability of Slovenia to secure its internal borders since it did not have to contend with external and internal threats simultaneously. In acknowledging Slovenia's control over its territory Sell notes that Slobodan Milosevic saw attempts at preventing Slovenia from seceding as unfeasible because of its ethnic composition. Milosevic also believed that letting Slovenia go might have distinct advantages since it would facilitate the carving up of other territories with large Serb populations. Sell notes:

²⁵⁰ It should be noted that the increased level of conflict in neighboring Croatia was also a contributing factor in diverting the JNA's attention away from Slovenia.

²⁵¹ Pond (2006): 18.

Milosevic, on the other hand, realized that the secession of ethnically homogeneous Slovenia would give him a freer hand to lop off the Serb-inhabited parts of Croatia. As early as August 1990, Milosevic told the Slovenes he had no objection to Slovenia deciding on independence through referendum.²⁵²

This discussion concerning the ethnic composition of the JNA and Slovenia forces and the military balance illustrate how Slovenia's territorial control was secure, and the threat to that control had receded after July 1991 because of the intensified fighting in Croatia and the lack of means to regain the territory in question from the Slovenes. This leads to the conclusion that both at the outset and in the aftermath of the Ten-Day War Slovenia had considerable control over its territory and possessed the military means to defend its borders and retain control. It should also be noted that between the four republics that gained their independence from the former Yugoslavia (Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia). It was Slovenia that exhibited the highest degree of territorial control and military force levels during the Yugoslavian Civil War period.

4.4.2 Slovenia: Political Authority

However, while this discussion regarding territorial control and military forces provide glimpses into the material attributes of Slovenia at the time of secession. We still need to explore the political authority wielded by the Slovenian leadership striving to achieve recognition of their claim to independence. In short, I examine the degree of perceived legitimacy and governance capacity that the Slovenian authorities possessed.

²⁵² Sell (2002): 115.

To examine these issues, I concentrate on the degree of support from the population the Slovenian secessionist movement claimed, and presence of political institutions as well as the economic means to implement public policy objectives.

There was wide-spread popular support within Slovenia regarding secession and independence. The Slovene Communist party split from the federal party in 1989, and formed the DEMOS coalition to contest the April 1990 elections. After the election results, the DEMOS coalition assumed control of the regional government in Slovenia and quickly declared and implemented a pro-secessionists platform that marched the territory down the path towards independence. The political victory in the April 1990 elections indicated that Slovenia's local governmental authority did not derive from its association with the central authorities in Belgrade or the Yugoslav Communist Party, but rather from a democratic mandate emanating from the publicly contested elections. In addition, a referendum on Slovenia's independence was held in December 1990 with somewhere between 89-94% (on turn out of approximately 94% of eligible voters) in favor of the territory seceding and declaring its independence from the Yugoslav Republic.²⁵³ These examples of the representative processes associated with the Slovenian political leadership illustrate that the population within the territory viewed their political authority and attempts at secession as legitimate.

The presence and continued function of the political institutions within the territory also contributed to an increase of political authority wielded by the Slovenian

²⁵³ Sell (2002): 114 and Crampton (2002): 248.

leadership. The pro-secessionist Slovenian leadership was able to assume control of the preexisting governing apparatus within the territory, which obviated the need to create governing institutions from scratch. As a consequence, the consolidation of political power for pro-secessionist forces in Slovenia was greatly facilitated both in speed and scope. The transformation of previous governing institutions to serve as the foundation of the Slovenia state was made possible because of the ethnic homogeneity of the Slovenian population. The absence of a Serb minority within Slovenia meant that resistance to secession was largely absent, and allowed for the early transformation of local institutions of governance associated with the federal system operating within Yugoslavia at the time. This allowed the newly transformed Slovenian Assembly to issue a proclamation on July 2, 1990 that they would seek a new constitution that would place its laws above those of the federal authorities in Belgrade, provide for their own defense, develop its own foreign policy, and create or amend legal and economic institutions.²⁵⁴ The ability to harness existing political institutions increased the political authority of the Slovenian leadership since actions toward secession gained some legitimacy because of the institutional and representative context from which they were undertaken.

This discussion concerning the representative processes (multi-party elections and referendum) that were followed to initiate secession and the access and transformation of political institutions shows how Slovenia's leadership enjoyed a high

²⁵⁴ Crampton (2002): 247-248.

degree of political authority. This was facilitated by the seeming democratic mandate associated with subsequent secessionist actions as well as the ethnic homogeneity of the Slovenian population. This leads to the observation that Slovenia had not only secured its territory and borders, but also wielded a considerable degree of political authority possessing perceived legitimacy by its population. It should also be noted that between the four republics that gained their independence from the former Yugoslavia (Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia). It was Slovenia that exhibited the highest degree of both territorial control and political authority during its secessionist conflict. However, this begs the question of what impact did these domestic material factors have on Slovenia's eventual recognition?

We would expect that if securing territorial control and possessing political authority over the population were the prerequisites for recognition than it would follow soon after Slovenia's victory in the Ten-Day War. In fact, Slovenia diplomats used the factors of authority and control as prime elements of their argument for recognition. Zvonimir Separovic, then Croatia's foreign minister, noted:

I was told in Budapest and also in China that the foreign minister of Slovenia was arguing against the recognition of Croatia. That is, arguing against rushing to recognize Croatia straight away because Croatia was not in full control of its territory, which was true, not a peaceful state, [and therefore] not ready to be recognized.²⁵⁵

However, international recognition of Slovenia did not first occur until December 19, 1991 with Germany's declaration of support. Some of the other relevant great

²⁵⁵ Caplan (2005): 104.

powers and regional powers (US, USSR, UK, and France) did not extend recognition until April 1992, and even then only under conditional circumstances. If Slovenia's victory during the Ten-Days War and subsequent securing of its territory and political authority were prerequisites for recognition of statehood than we would expect that recognition would have happened sooner without conditional status. However, in later sections I show how the powers that be held different views regarding Slovenia's secession and opposed it in order to promote other international/diplomatic objectives. Specifically, maintaining the territorial integrity of the Yugoslav Republic and negotiating leverage with the Serbian political leadership. Given that domestic material factors related to authority and control did not have a large impact on recognition the next section explores the possibility that normative factors influenced the recognition of Slovenia.

4.5 Slovenia: Normative Factors During the Balkan Civil War

This section explores the causal impact that normative factors relating to national self-determination and liberal democracy had on the international recognition of Slovenia. Slovenia exhibited the highest degree of democratic development and liberalization of politics and economics than the other former Yugoslavian Republics examined. My examination of normative factors shows that, in general, considerations regarding national self-determination did not dictate whether recognition was extended to Slovenia. In addition, I find that while policy makers did consider democratization and respect for human rights important issues they were subordinated to more pressing

international imperatives involving the maintaining the viability of Yugoslavia as a state and preventing the conflict from spreading to other territories.

I should note that this does not mean that normative factors related to national self-determination or liberal democracy had no impact on the causal process associated with recognition in Slovenia. Slovenian diplomats fervently tried to make a case for international recognition based on rights to self-determination. In addition, I find that many key foreign policy leaders found Slovenia's democratic development, before and after secession, impressive and in need of nurturing. However, despite much rhetorical and private support for Slovenia's democratic gains and trajectory for further liberalization most of the relevant great and regional powers refused to extend recognition despite Slovenia's impressive democratic credentials and a strong claim to national self-determination.

To understand how normative factors impacted recognition during the conflict in Slovenia, I concentrate my analysis on the following. First, I examine what role that the norm of national self-determination had on decisions regarding recognition? Next, I explore whether factors related to the norm of liberal democracy had any influence on whether recognition was granted? In short, I am concerned with the degree that norms were taken into account in the decisions regarding recognition of Slovenia. The following sections examine the relevant normative factors related to recognition.

4.5.1 Slovenia: National Self-Determination

Normative factors related to national self-determination had little impact on the decisions to grant Slovenia recognition. This is despite the fact that Slovenia's claim to independence contained two elements that strengthened their attempts to secede and be recognized based on this norm. The first of these has already been discussed, and relates to the ethnic homogeneity of the population of Slovenia. Slovenia did not contain any large enclaves of Serbs, so there were no internal squabbles regarding irredentism with Serbia, internal boundaries, or refusal to join a new state of Slovenia. This feature of the intermingling of the population became a fixture of the later conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. This situation during these conflicts led both sides (Serb and non-Serb) to claim to be exercising their natural rights to national self-determination, and greatly exacerbated the problems in trying to adjudicate these claims. Given that Slovenia did not contain this element of internal dissent than its exercising of the right to secession and its acceptance based on the norm of national self-determination would seem to be more forthcoming.

In addition to ethnic homogeneity, Slovenia also had a solid case for recognition based on national self-determination because of rights guaranteed in the 1974 Federal Constitution of Yugoslavia. It stated, "the nations of Yugoslavia, proceeding from the

right of every nation to self-determination, including the right to secession.”²⁵⁶ Article 1 and 3 from the 1974 constitution went on to state, “that [Slovenia] was part of a federal state having the form of a state community of voluntary united nations and their socialist republics...the socialist republics are states founded on the sovereignty of the people.”²⁵⁷ The text from the 1974 Constitution and the 88% who voted in favor of the independence during the referendum would seem to satisfy the requirements listed in Yugoslavia’s federal constitution for Slovenia to legally and legitimately secede from the Yugoslav Federation. However, this was not how the relevant great and regional powers viewed the situation. Specifically, there was an overwhelming consensus to not use claims to national self-determination to evaluate the merits of recognition because of the fear of conflict contagion in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Gianni De Michelis, then Italian foreign minister, summed up this view cogently by stating, “The principles of self-determination is important, but it must be related to other principles, of which the principle of inviolability of borders is the most important.”²⁵⁸ The United States echoed this position, which is seen in the following declaration on the matter from Al Gore, then a U.S. senator from Tennessee. He stated:

Yugoslavia was created in response to the Wilsonian principle of self-determination. It was valued by us as a barrier to Soviet aggression. It [Yugoslavia and its constituent republics] no longer reflects the concept of self-determination, but rather the reappearance of imperialism with all of its

²⁵⁶ Quoted in Glaurdic (2011): 56.

²⁵⁷ Ibid

²⁵⁸ Quoted in Glaurdic (2011): 123.

arrogance. It no longer serves any geostrategic purpose for us. On the contrary, it is now the breeding ground for the troubles that will plague the United States of America for another generation, unless we take measures now to deal with the situation.²⁵⁹

This discussion indicates Slovenia had a strong claim to independence based on normative factors relating to national self-determination. Both its ethnic homogeneity and the codification of the rights to secede from the Yugoslav Federation in the 1974 constitution provided a robust foundation to recognize their independence based on national self-determination. However, the powers that be were more concerned with the international ramifications of recognition based on national self-determination. Mainly, they were concerned with the spreading of the conflict and the inability of adjudicating the legitimacy of possible future attempts at secession in the international system.

4.5.2 Slovenia: Liberal Democracy

Normative factors related to liberal democracy also did not heavily influence Slovenia's international recognition. This is despite the fact that Slovenia had experienced the most democratic development of all the former Yugoslav Republics attempting to secede. The logic associated with the causal process related to recognition and the norm of liberal democracy would predict that secessionist movements with robust democratic credentials should benefit from international

²⁵⁹ United States Senate, "Senate Resolution 210: Relative to Violence in Yugoslavia," *Congressional Record* vol. 137 (October 28, 1991): S15235.

recognition since they are more apt to be trusted and respected by other states (especially other democracies). However, the examination of the normative factors related to liberal democracy operating during Slovenia's secession illustrates that this was not the case. Specifically, while some states did think the level of democratic adherence and development was important. These same states found that preferences operating at the international level concerning conflict management and the balance of power trumped any concerns regarding the norm of liberal democracy. This section examines the political, economic, and social facets of Slovenia's democratic development and shows how they took a back seat to other more pressing geo-political considerations.

Previously, I discussed Slovenia's harnessing of the existing government apparatus associated with the organs of the federal government in Belgrade to enhance its political authority and advance its case for secession. Left unsaid was that in addition to repurposing these political institutions. Slovenia also operated them in a more liberal fashion. In September of 1989 the Slovenian assembly made constitutional changes to their republic's charter to usher in the first multi-party elections in Yugoslavia prior to WWII.²⁶⁰ In addition, a series of amendments were adopted that increased the rights of Slovenia's citizens. These expanded freedoms included; freedom of assembly, prohibition of the death sentence and torture, freedom of movement, freedom of religion, the right to privacy, freedom of private ownership, and freedom for organized

²⁶⁰ Crampton (2002): 247-248.

participation in politics.²⁶¹ This last freedom is especially important since it freed Slovenia from one-party rule associated with the League of Communists that was the basis for all political contestation in the rest of Yugoslavia.

These moves towards political liberalism in Slovenia were partly a reflection of historic and geographic trends because of its proximity to Western Europe since Slovenia shares a border with Italy and Austria. However, ongoing development of the European Community and later the European Union also played a strong role in keeping Slovenia on the trajectory of democratic development. In comments made to Warren Zimmerman, then U.S. Ambassador to Yugoslavia, about Milosevic's actions in revoking Kosovo's autonomy in 1990. Milan Kucan, then Slovenia's foreign minister, stated:

[Milosevic] is a demagogue with a gangster attitude. He's destroying everything good that Yugoslavia has stood for, especially the tolerant attitude that has made it possible for us to coexist...We're moving towards democracy, and Milosevic is moving away from it, toward a kind of "Serbo-slavia." ... How are we going to get into the European Community or the Council of Europe with this Kosovo albatross around our neck? If we have to go through Belgrade to join Europe, we'll never make it.²⁶²

This quote illustrates that Slovenia's democratic development was both proceeding apace and deepening, but that its policy of political liberalization also had a practical aspect. Specifically, the Slovenians wanted to burnish their democratic

²⁶¹ Glaurdic (2011): 54-55.

²⁶² Quoted in Warren Zimmerman, *Origins of a Catastrophe: Yugoslavia and Its Destroyers – America's Last Ambassador Tells What Happened and Why*, New York, NY: Times Books (1996): 31.

credentials in order to meet the requirements for future accession to the European Community and later the EU.

Slovenia's democratic developments were not just confined to the political sphere. Slovenia had also made progress towards economic liberalization. Though Slovenia only contained approximately 8% of the population of the Yugoslavian Republic it accounted for more than 20% of Yugoslavia's GDP as well as ¼ of all exports.²⁶³ This made Slovenia arguably the most economically productive republic in Yugoslavia's federal system. However, economic liberalization was not just a result of the drive for secession and independence, but had started prior to the break-up in the mid-1980's. Slovenia was the primary advocate of Yugoslavia following a more market oriented development model after Tito's death in 1980. This was partially because at the time Yugoslavia was undergoing a massive hyperinflationary period, but also reflected the desire to enter the western European market, which was now beginning to move towards integration and the elimination of tariff barriers.²⁶⁴ To this end the period from the mid-1980's until the declaration of Slovenia's independence was marked by significant liberal economic reforms. The most significant of these reforms was the dismantling of the centralized aspects of economic planning, privatization of state enterprises, and the opening of a private stock exchange.²⁶⁵

²⁶³ Christopher Cviic, "Slovene and Croat Perspectives," in *International Perspectives on the Yugoslav Conflict*, ed. Alex Danchev and Thomas Halverson, New York, NY: St. Martin's Press (1996): 121.

²⁶⁴ Ramet (2006): 283.

²⁶⁵ Crampton (2002): 248 and Ramet (2006): 284.

In conjunction with its political and economic liberalization, Slovenia also embraced liberal social policies reflective of its democratic development and trajectory. Slovenia was the first republic of the former Yugoslavia to codify minority rights into its constitution. During this period most of the Yugoslav republics were in the process of discriminating against ethnic minorities residing within their borders. However, Slovenia took a more enlightened approach. Specifically, the Slovenian constitution provided for special protections of the Hungarian, Italian, and Romany communities. These protections included specific representation for Italians and Hungarians at the parliamentary level and all three groups endowed with special representatives for local and regional government.²⁶⁶ In addition, Slovenia also had vibrant civil society organizations that help facilitate and promote liberalization in social policy and attitudes. Ramet notes that Slovenia's political environment and authorities actively encouraged the emergence of civil society groups with a particular emphasis on issues that related to social justice. She states:

It is fashionable to in some quarters to attribute Slovenia's smoother [democratic] transition variously to the country's high degree of ethnic homogeneity or its greater prosperity...[but] the fact is liberal political culture was planting its seeds in the 1980's, if not before. Indeed, the activities of pacifist, environmentalist, punk, and lesbian and gay associations at the time helped lay the foundations for a tolerant liberal culture in Slovenia, at a time when Serbia was sinking ever deeper into a thoroughly nationalist culture.²⁶⁷

²⁶⁶ Jonathan Paquin, *A Stability-Seeking Power: U.S. Foreign Policy and Secessionist Conflicts*, Montreal, CAN: McGill-Queen's University Press (2010): 64-65 and Ramet (2006): 556-557.

²⁶⁷ Ramet (2006): 554-555.

The following discussion has illustrated that evaluation of Slovenia's political, economic, and social policies reveal a steady progress and strong commitment towards democratic development and respect for human rights. However, despite Slovenia's impressive democratic progress, international recognition was not forthcoming even though their secession had legitimate claim based on normative factors associated either with liberal democracy or national self-determination. In addition, Slovenia's democratic achievements occurred around the same time as a general shift in attitudes by the United States regarding democratic development being a prime policy goal in Yugoslavia. Sell notes that the appointment of Warren Zimmerman as U.S. ambassador to Yugoslavia served as a fundamental shift in U.S. policy since it now included an explicit reference to democratic development and processes in dealing with the Yugoslavian situation.²⁶⁸

The Germans also placed a high premium on democratic development when weighing the decision to recognize Slovenia. Helmut Kohl, then Germany's chancellor, noted, "It was clear that Slovenia was part of the Western cultural circle but the problem was what to do with the rest of Yugoslavia. We can understand [Slovenia's] intention but we don't want to ignite the powder keg."²⁶⁹ The attitudes of the American and German governments illustrates that if normative factors associated with liberal democracy heavily influenced the recognition policies of other actors than we would

²⁶⁸ Sell (2002): 142-143.

²⁶⁹ Remarks between Helmut Kohl and Lojze Peterle, then Slovenia's prime minister. Quoted in Caplan (2005): 98.

expect that the United States and Germany should have offered recognition to Slovenia earlier than April 1992 and December 1991 respectively. The Germans in particular were heavily influenced by Slovenia's democratic development and achievements, but this preference for fostering democracy in the Balkans was not strong enough to outweigh more pressing international material factors that dictated withholding recognition of Slovenia. In the next section we explore the most relevant international material factors that dictated Slovenia's recognition.

4.6 Slovenia: International Material Factors

This section explores the influence that international material factors had on Slovenia's international recognition. Specifically, I draw attention to the role great powers involvement has on the recognition and the acceptance of statehood. The Balkans has been an object of international political competition dating back to the mid-19th century and Ottoman administration. The end of the Cold War made these traditional perceptions of interest more acute since the collapse of the Soviet Union reconfigured the balance of power and provided other states political and security opportunities in a region that until recently was in the Soviet sphere of influence. One implication of my examination concerning the importance of international factors in the breakup of Yugoslavia is that, from the outset, the Balkan secessionist conflicts was shaped by great power intervention whether in support of local allies or with an eye to the long-term benefits to be derived from geopolitical realignment in what was still

regarded as a strategically relevant world region. The following sections explore two overriding preferences the relevant great and regional powers had in relation to Slovenia's secession; maintaining the integrity of Yugoslavia and avoidance of spreading ethnic conflict.

I previously discussed how domestic material and normative factors did not have a large impact on the recognition of Slovenia. This was because the potential for recognition was being driven by international political imperatives. Specifically, almost all of the great and regional powers had a preference for maintaining the integrity of the Yugoslavian state. For some of these countries, the United States in particular, this was because the consequences of recognition could lead to further unilateral declarations of independence, which in turn would widen the conflict. The United States maintained a consistent, but detached position regarding Slovenia's secession. James Baker, then the US Secretary of State, explicitly told Milan Kucan (Slovenia's leader) that under no circumstances would the United States or its European allies recognize Slovenia's independence.²⁷⁰ Baker's concern was Slovenia's secession would trigger wide-scale ethnic violence in Croatia, and that the best solution was the denying the secession attempts of the constituent republics of Yugoslavia to maintain its territorial and political integrity.²⁷¹

²⁷⁰ Wayne Bert, *The Reluctant Superpower: United States Policy in Bosnia, 1991-1995*, New York, NY: St. Martin's Press (1997): 137 and Norman Kempster and Carol J. Williams, "Yugoslav Unity Avoids Baker in Belgrade," *Los Angeles Times* (June 22, 1991) < http://articles.latimes.com/1991-06-22/news/mn-901_1_federal-government > (Accessed – 5/20/2012).

²⁷¹ Matjaz Klemencic, "The International Community and the FRY/Belligerents, 1989-1997" in

It should be noted that the United States' position was not just a reflection of the preferences regarding Yugoslavia's political and territorial disposition, but also a function of the United States' detachment from this situation. From Baker's perspective, the United States had two other more important foreign policy challenges to deal with; wrapping up the Desert Shield/Storm conflict in Iraq and devising a strategy to handle the Soviet Union's decline and breakup. So while the United States supported the status quo of keeping Yugoslavia together it also largely viewed this situation as a purely "European" problem. This is illustrated by James Baker noting that "We [the United States] got no dog in this fight," when leaving Belgrade after his failing to dissuade Slovenia and Croatia from seceding.²⁷²

Other relevant countries held the same preferences as the United States regarding Slovenia's secession and maintaining Yugoslavia's unity, but for different reasons. The Soviet Union saw Western European sympathies for the secessionists in Slovenia (and the Balkans in general) as a cynical ploy to try to reestablish influence that was lost during the Cold War.²⁷³ The British and French opposition to Slovenia's secession and recognition was primarily concerned with conflict management. Both the British and French wanted to avoid further bloodshed in Europe and felt that

Confronting the Yugoslav Controversies: A Scholars Initiative, ed. Charles Ingrao and Thomas A. Emmert West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press (2009): 161-163.

²⁷² Quoted in Robert L. Hutchings, *American Diplomacy and the End of the Cold War: An Insider's Account of U.S. Policy in Europe, 1989-1992*, Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press (1997): 312.

²⁷³ James Headley, *Russia and the Balkans: Foreign Policy From Yeltsin to Putin*, New York, NY: Columbia University Press (2008): 90-91 and Klemencic (2009): 157.

recognition of Slovenia would encourage Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia to seek independence and widen the conflict. Douglas Hurd, then British Foreign Secretary verbalized these sentiments by stating, “We [the British Government] had no strategic interest in the Balkans, no commercial interest, no selfish interest at all. We simply wished that quiet should return.”²⁷⁴ These sentiments were echoed by the French when Hans van den Broek, then Dutch foreign minister, said “The French position, in a certain sense backed up by the UK, was that in fact Belgrade had all the rights to secure the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia.”²⁷⁵

Other countries, like Germany, that supported Slovenia’s secession bid also saw recognition as a tool of conflict management. German officials believed that the threat of recognition of Slovenia and the other Balkan republics would prevent the JNA from using violence to oppose their independence. Michael Libal, then a German foreign ministry official in its Southeastern European section, noted that the German government tried to use the threat of recognition only as a method of pressure on the Serbs of Croatia and the Yugoslav government to end the fighting.²⁷⁶

The attitudes of the countries just discussed was especially surprising since after the Slovenian victory in the Ten-Day War there was no Serbian opposition to Slovenia’s secession and independence. Milosevic had accepted Slovenia’s independence as an

²⁷⁴ Quoted in Josip Glaurdic, *The Hour of Europe: Western Powers and the Breakup of Yugoslavia*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press (2011): 181.

²⁷⁵ Ibid.

²⁷⁶ Klemencic (2009): 156.

acceptable price to be able to concentrate military forces on preventing Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina from seceding.²⁷⁷ In short, non-recognition of Slovenia did not make sense because the two sides in the conflict had agreed on an amicable split. A CIA intelligence report dated July 19, 1991 confirmed this situation by declaring that Milosevic's decision was a "de facto recognition of Slovenian independence."²⁷⁸ Since there was no further opposition to Slovenia's secession and there was actual acceptance of its independence by its parent state than we would expect that reluctance of the relevant great and regional powers would dissipate. However, the opposite occurred and the relevant international actors (except Germany) opposed international recognition because they believed it interfered with their goals of maintaining the integrity of Yugoslavia or managing the spread of ethnic violence.

4.7 Slovenia: Conclusion

This discussion has illustrated that countries who were opposed or favorably disposed to secession did not heavily weigh Slovenia's capacity to wield political authority or control its territory in their decisions regarding recognition. Nor did normative factors related to national self-determination or liberal democracy heavily influence the likelihood of Slovenia's recognition. This is despite Slovenia showing the

²⁷⁷ Glaurdic (2011): 178.

²⁷⁸ Ibid: 190-191.

highest degree of political authority and territorial control, which was achieved through the efficient operation of its political institutions, expulsion of JNA military forces, and securing of its border and customs posts. Slovenia's impressive democratic developments in the political, economic, and social spheres were also insufficient to secure recognition based on normative factors associated with liberal democracy. Having a strong claim to secession based on normative factors related to national self-determination based on the rights granted Slovenia under the 1974 Constitution and its ethnic homogeneity also had no sway in inducing international recognition for Slovenia.

Rather it was the involvement of the great and regional powers and their preferences regarding the future of Yugoslavia that dictated Slovenia's acceptance as a state. Most of the great and regional powers preferred the territorial status quo. Specifically, the United States and Soviet Union wanted to maintain the status quo because of disinterest and a focus on more pressing international matters. Others, like the United Kingdom, France, and Germany were more focused on avoiding the possible enlargement of the conflict and the diplomatic implications for future European Union foreign policy objectives. It was not until the preferences of the relevant international actors changed did they eventually recognize Slovenia. I should note that this does not mean that domestic material and normative factors had absolutely no influence. My discussion regarding the norm of liberal democracy showed that the United States and Germany were both sensitive and positively inclined towards democracy promotion in Yugoslavia. However, their geo-political preferences and priorities subordinated any

favorable disposition regarding recognition based on normative factors associated with liberal democracy.

The next chapter will explore these same three causal processes involving domestic material, international material, and normative factors within the context of Croatia's attempt at secession and international recognition. One difference of note in the analysis between the cases of Slovenia and Croatia is the gradual evolution of the preferences of the great and regional powers. Specifically, the analysis in Chapter 5 provides a glimpse of the relevant international actors moving away from maintaining the integrity of Yugoslavia, while slowly beginning to warm to the eventual secession and independence for some of the Yugoslavian Republics. This development would heavily impact the likelihood of recognition for Croatia.

CHAPTER 5:
THE BREAK-UP OF YUGOSLAVIA: CROATIA

5.1 Introduction

This chapter examines the international recognition of Croatia. The bulk of the violence associated with Croatia's secessionist conflict occurred after Slovenia's declaration of independence on June 25, 1991. On that same day and after a referendum that saw 80% in favor of independence, Croatia also officially severed its ties with the Yugoslav Federation and actively sought international recognition for its secession claim. Like Slovenia, Croatia did not initially receive recognition of its secession, nor was international support forthcoming as conflict with the JNA and Serbian paramilitaries intensified in late 1991. The focus of this chapter examines the impact the explanatory variables associated with domestic and international material factors as well as normative factors related to national self-determination and liberal democracy have on recognition within the context of Croatia's secession. Specifically, I concentrate on whether the quantitative results from Chapter 3 and the case-study evidence from Chapter 4 that identify indicators associated with the aforementioned causal factors (domestic, international, and normative) are operating and exhibiting the

causal dynamics that lead to recognition of violent secession attempts by existing states in the international system.

The case-selection of Croatia is consistent with the nested analysis research design presented in Chapter 4. Specifically, Croatia represents an on-line the case that is well predicted by my theory that international material factors related to great power involvement and normative factors related to liberal democracy influence the likelihood for international recognition of violent secession attempts. In addition, examination of Croatia allows for further evaluation of the validity of my argument. This is because the key explanatory variables (domestic material, international material, and normative factors) exhibit different levels of strength in comparison to the previous case examined (Slovenia). As previously discussed, Slovenia had established control of its territory and authority over its population shortly after secession. In addition, Slovenia exhibited a high degree of democratization and liberalization in the political, economic, and social arenas and had a strong claim to independence based on national self-determination. From a domestic material and normative standpoint Slovenia exhibits secure authority and control over its territory and population as well as democratic governance of an ethnically distinct population.

In comparison, Croatia presents a different picture with respect to the factors leading to recognition. Unlike Slovenia, Croatia did not have secure control or authority over its territory and population. In fact, until the spring of 1994 over 30% of Croatian territory was occupied by hostile forces, and the Croatian military was outclassed in

armaments, material, and manpower.²⁷⁹ The democratic credentials and orientation of the political authorities associated with Croatia's secession were also seriously questioned. Specifically, it was widely suspected that Croatian authorities were complicit in some ethnically motivated human rights violations. In short, Croatia and Slovenia represent on-line the cases that exhibit differing values associated with possible alternative hypotheses. Specifically, they represented polar opposites with respect to the inherent domestic material and normative factors associated with their secession attempts. However, despite these differences both cases exhibit similarities with respect to international material factors exerting the most influence on the likelihood for recognition.

Croatia was recognized by the United States, Soviet Union, Britain, France, and Germany between December 19, 1991 and April 6, 1992.²⁸⁰ Broadly, I find that international material factors related to the breakup of the Soviet Union and the unification of Germany strongly influenced the likelihood of Croatia's international recognition. In particular, the United States and other European powers were concerned that recognition of Croatia would induce instability with respect to ongoing dissolution of the Soviet Union and lead to further instances of ethnic conflict in the Balkans and Caucus regions. In addition, British and French fears of a resurgent Germany played a role in influencing the likelihood of Croatia's recognition. Specifically, British and French

²⁷⁹ Paquin (2010): 65.

²⁸⁰ Lucarelli (1995): 19-23.

authorities were concerned that Germany's unification was the harbinger for an era of German political and economic dominance of Europe. They viewed Germany's position of strongly favoring Croatia's independence as a threat towards efforts aimed at European integration, and possible disruption to the political status quo within Europe. It was this linkage to future European integration that was the decisive factor in determining the German, British, and French positions on recognizing Croatia.

These international material factors were not the only relevant causal factors that led to Croatia's international recognition. Normative factors related to liberal democracy also exhibited some influence on the likelihood of recognition. I find this factor to have been influential after the Brioni Agreement was signed in July of 1991, ending the fighting in Slovenia. The relevant great and regional powers placed more emphasis on issues regarding the perpetration of ethnically motivated atrocities and the respect for human rights with regards to Croatia's secessionist conflict and bid for recognition. This was partly in response to actual and perceived deficiencies regarding the democratic character of the Croatian political authorities. However, it was also a function of the continued reports of "ethnic cleansing" and the escalation of other human rights violations taking place by both Serbs and Croats as a backdrop to the conflict. In short, evaluations of democratic behavior by the combatants involved in Croatia's secessionist conflict began to gain more attention from some international actors, but did not ultimately influence decisions regarding Croatian recognition as heavily as the international material factors already mentioned.

To illustrate how domestic material factors, international material factors, and normative factors influenced Croatia's recognition I first provide a brief historical background to Croatia's path towards secession and eventual recognition as well as provide some discussion about important political developments in the region that influenced Croatia's recognition. Specifically, I describe how Slovenia's attempted secession influenced the prospects for ethnic conflict in Croatia. Next, I examine domestic material factors related to the authority and control that Croatia exhibited during the conflict and after recognition. In particular, I discuss how Croatia's lack of territorial control and military forces fell far short of the usual standards for recognition related to statehood in the international system as stated in the Montevideo Convention and other relevant international treaties.

I also address the role normative factors related to national self-determination and liberal democracy played in Croatia's eventual recognition. I give particular attention to discussions regarding the reluctance of some international actors to extend recognition due to the authoritarian tendencies of the Croatian political authorities. In addition, I discuss how the escalation of ethnic violence changed attitudes within the foreign ministries of Europe towards recognizing Croatia's independence in early 1992. Then, I examine how international material factors dealing with the breakup of the Soviet Union and German unification exerted the most influence over Croatia's eventual recognition. Specifically, I describe how fears of secessionist conflicts breaking out in parts of the former Soviet empire heavily influenced the decision of the United States with regards to Croatia's recognition. In addition, I show that British and French policies

regarding Croatia's recognition were heavily influenced by Germany's recent unification and attendant fears associated with German political and economic ascendance. I conclude the chapter with a brief summary of the case findings and possible theoretical implications with regards to comparisons with the previous case-study of Slovenia.

5.2 Croatia: Historical Background

Before I discuss the causal factors that led to Croatia's recognition some discussion about Croatia's political history in regards to self-government is needed. The people and territory that make up Croatia have a long and rich history when it comes to conflicts over self-government. Historic examples of Croatian attempts at self-government date back to the Dark Ages, and include a number of different protagonists. Some of the earliest known conflicts of the Croatian people involved trying to maintain an independent Croatian kingdom against the Hungarians around 1000-1100 A.D. This struggle would continue over two hundred years later against the Ottoman Empire with numerous attempts to breakaway lasting until the mid-19th Century. After the Ottomans, Croatia experienced numerous attempts at rebellion against the Austro-Hungarian Hapsburg Empire. Croatia's incorporation into the Hapsburg Empire would ultimately shape its contemporary journey towards independence and recognition. After the defeat of the Austro-Hungarians in WWI, Croatia was then incorporated into the new state of Yugoslavia.²⁸¹

²⁸¹ Marcus Tanner, *Croatia: A Nation Forged in War*, 3rd ed. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press
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After WWI, Croatia continued to experience conflict over self-government. This included sporadic separatist violence associated with attempts to reform the Yugoslav Federation during the 1930's.²⁸² During WWII, Croatia actually achieved a measure of self-government with the establishment of the Independent State of Croatia (NDH) in 1941. However, this political entity was short-lived since it was associated with the Nazi occupation of Yugoslavia. The creation of the NDH was also important because historic resentments regarding its fascist ideology would come to influence Croatia's secession at the end of the Cold War.²⁸³

Croatia's attempts at secession and self-government continued after the end of the Cold War. This process culminated with Croatia's declaration of independence on June 25, 1991, which initiated a secessionist conflict lasting for over three years and led to an outbreak and intensity of violence not seen in Europe since WWII.²⁸⁴ Croatia's descent into secessionist conflict was not a surprise to many observers at the time. As Strobe Talbott, a U.S. State Department official at the time, pointed out:

History and Geography have conspired to make [Croatia] the most explosive powder keg on the continent of Europe. The Drina River...traces one of the world's most treacherous fault lines...If warfare among them [Yugoslav Republics] breaks out anew and continues unabated, it might extend to several points of the compass, drawing in nations to the north, south, and

(2010): 15-40.

²⁸² Ramet (2006): 100-102.

²⁸³ Ramet (2006): 113-116.

²⁸⁴ Sonia Lucarelli, "The International Community and the Yugoslav Crisis: A Chronology of Events," *European University Institute Working Papers* 95/8 (1995): 5.

east. [This is] the catastrophe that has befallen that troubled and troublesome neighborhood of the global village.²⁸⁵

Like Slovenia, Croatia's declaration of independence was immediately followed by an armed reaction by the JNA and Serbs within Croatia. However, despite this similarity, the conflicts in Slovenia and Croatia differed markedly in important aspects that would impact the likelihood for Croatia's recognition. One such difference was that the duration and intensity of the violence in Croatia reached much higher levels than in Slovenia. This can be seen in the casualty rates in the table below:

TABLE 5.1:

COMPARISON OF SECESSIONIST CONFLICTS IN SLOVENIA AND CROATIA²⁸⁶

Country	Killed	Wounded	Duration
Slovenia	65	330	10 Days
Croatia	6,000	23,000	189 Days

One direct consequence of the higher levels of violence and longer duration of the fighting was that the instances of ethnically motivated atrocities and reprisals were dramatically higher than what was seen during Slovenia's secessionist conflict. In

²⁸⁵ Strobe Talbott, "Remarks at State Department Town Meeting," *United States Department of State Dispatch*, 6:45 Washington, DC: Bureau of Public Affairs (November 1, 1995): 811-812.

²⁸⁶ For Slovenian figures see Tus (2001): 46. Croatian figures calculate duration based on the EC Recognition of January 1992, but fighting continued until July of 1995. See Saadia Touval, *Mediation in the Yugoslav Wars: The Critical Years, 1990-95*, New York, NY: Palgrave (2002): 89.

addition, the nature of the conflict also changed the manner in which the conflict was fought. Specifically, the wide utilization of paramilitary forces based around ethnic lines became a hallmark of this conflict. These forces engaged in tactics that included the forced expulsions of civilian populations, strategically targeted human rights violations, and the use of human shields.²⁸⁷ In short, the brutality of Croatia's secessionist conflict as well as the manner in which it was fought distinguished it from the conflict in Slovenia. The effect this brutality had on the prospects for Croatia's recognition is discussed in more detail in the section 5.4 below that addresses normative factors related to national self-determination and liberal democracy during the Croatian conflict.

Another distinguishing feature of the conflict in Croatia was the opaqueness of the political goals the Croatian leadership was trying to achieve through fighting. Unlike in Slovenia, it was not clear whether the Croatian political leadership actually wanted outright independence. This was because the Croatian political leadership, headed by Franjo Tudjman, also placed the achievement of a "Greater Croatia" as a primary political aim to achieve by the secessionist conflict with the JNA. He was indifferent to whether this could be achieved through independence or remaining within the existing Yugoslav Federation.²⁸⁸ This aspiration for a "Greater Croatia" complicated Croatia's

²⁸⁷ V. P. Gagnon Jr., *The Myth of Ethnic War: Serbia and Croatia in the 1990's*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press (2004): 152-153.

²⁸⁸ Branka Magas, "The War in Croatia," in *War and Change in the Balkans: Nationalism, Conflict, and Cooperation*, ed. Brad K. Blitz New York, NY: Cambridge University Press (2006): 120-121 and Geert-Hinrich Ahrens, *Diplomacy on the Edge: Containment of Ethnic Conflict and the Minorities Working Group*

secession and recognition since it required the annexation of Bosnian territory, which could only be achieved through political accommodation with Slobodan Milosevic and the JNA. In short, unlike the Slovenian conflict, the political goals associated with the attempt at secession were highly complicated. Achieving the leadership's political goals required changing Yugoslavia's internal boundaries as well as modifying the soon to be determined external boundaries of the new Croatian state to satisfy their independence and irredentist aspirations respectively. Discussions in sections 5.3 and 5.5 dealing with domestic and international material factors respectively and their influence on Croatia's recognition highlight how these sometime conflicting goals impacted the likelihood for international acceptance of its claim to independence.

The Slovenian and Croatian conflicts also differed with respect to the combatants involved in the fighting. During the Slovenian conflict the bulk of the fighting was done by regular forces of the Yugoslav army (JNA) against Slovenian Territorial Defense Forces. At this time, the composition of the JNA still contained a significant heterogeneous mixing of Croats, Slovenians, Bosnians, and Serbs. However, due to the poor performance of some units with heavy representations of non-Serbs during the fighting in Slovenia the JNA began to become more readily dominated by Serbs and Serbian political interests. This markedly changed the international actors' perspective on the conflict. Richard Holbrooke, then a United States State Department Special Envoy, noted:

of the Conferences on Yugoslavia, Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press (2007): 122-123.

In the brief war in Slovenia the Yugoslav Army [JNA] seemed to be defending the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia; when that same army went to war only a few weeks later against Croatia, it had become a Serb army fighting for Serbs inside Croatia.²⁸⁹

This quote illustrates that perceptions of the conflict began to change after the summer of 1991 because of the increased Serb affiliation with and loyalty to the JNA. The conflict in Slovenia was characterized by most international actors as a legitimate attempt by the JNA to prevent unilateral secession from the Yugoslav Federation. However, the Croatian conflict came to be more readily seen as wide-scale ethnic conflict between two distinct peoples (Serbs and Croats), a view which would later heavily influence the relevant great and regional powers in their preferences regarding the unity of the Yugoslav Federation and Croatia's eventual recognition.

This discussion regarding the differences between the Slovenian and Croatian secession conflicts illustrates the marked differences between their respective secession attempts. Elements including duration, intensity of violence, and political goals related to independence highlight the disparity between the conflicts. Nevertheless, despite these differences, analysis of these conflicts exhibits evidence that both share important similarities. Mainly, both the Slovenian and Croatian secessionist conflicts provide strong examples for my argument that international material factors related to great power involvement and security preferences heavily influence the likelihood of the international recognition. The sections that follow explore the decisions that led to

²⁸⁹ Richard Holbrooke, *To End a War*, New York, NY: The Modern Library (1998): 29-30.

Croatia's international recognition between December 19, 1991 and April 1992 with particular attention given to the three relevant types of causal factors; domestic material, international material, and normative.

5.3 Croatia: Domestic Material Factors During the Balkan Wars

This section explores the causal impact that domestic material factors related to authority and control had on the international recognition of Croatia. Croatia exhibited lower levels of control and authority over its claimed territory and population in comparison to Slovenia. My analysis shows that, in general, domestic material factors related to authority and control did not dictate whether recognition was extended to Croatia. In fact, for the first three years of its existence approximately $\frac{1}{3}$ of its territory was either occupied or not under its direct control. This situation was explicitly stated in Croatia's initial rejection for recognition by the Badinter Commission in late 1991, and the European Community's criteria for recognition.²⁹⁰ Despite this predicament Croatia was recognized by the United States, Soviet Union (and then later the Commonwealth of Independent States – CIS), United Kingdom, France, and Germany between December 19, 1991 and April 1992.²⁹¹

²⁹⁰ Brendan O'Shea, *The Modern Yugoslav Conflict 1991-1995: Perception, Deception, and Dishonesty* New York, NY: Frank Cass (2005): 25-27.

²⁹¹ Lucarelli (1995): 19-23.

In general, I find that the Croatia's degree of political authority and control over its territory did not heavily influence the likelihood for international recognition. My evaluation of the influence of perceptions of control and authority indicates that international material factors exerted more influence on Croatia's acceptance as a new state in the international system. I should note that this does not mean that domestic material factors related to authority and control had no impact on the causal process associated with recognition in Croatia. Criteria regarding recognition set forth by the relevant international actors explicitly mentioned prerequisites related to territorial control and political authority. In addition, foreign ministry officials in the capitals of Europe were specifically asked to weigh issues of full control and stability when rendering decisions of Croatia and Slovenia's recognition. However, the analysis of territorial control and political authority in the next sections illustrates that the likelihood of Croatia's recognition was not based on domestic material factors.

To illustrate why domestic material factors did not heavily influence Croatia's recognition I ask what level of control the secessionist group exerted over the territories it claimed. Next, I explore what level of military capacity the secessionist group possessed to challenge the parent state. In short, I am concerned with the military balance between secessionist group and parent state in relation to the level of violence and asymmetric nature of the conflict. Finally, I ask what actual and potential level of political authority was exerted by the Croatian leadership. Simply stated, I am interested in perceptions of legitimacy associated with the exercise of governance in the territory encompassing the claim associated with a Croatian state.

5.3.1 Croatia: Territorial Control

Croatia did not exhibit a high degree of control over its territory during its secessionist conflict. In fact, Croatia did not establish full control over its territory until the summer of 1995.²⁹² Croatia's path towards international recognition and independence officially began with the declaration of independence issued by the Croatian Sabor (parliament) on June 25, 1991. Croatia's declaration of independence coincided with the secession attempt of Slovenia, and like Slovenia, Croatia's bid for secession and independence served as a flashpoint to initiate hostilities with the JNA.²⁹³ The conflict in Croatia lasted longer and was deadlier than the previous secessionist violence in Slovenia. By January 1992, Croatia had suffered over 6,000 killed and 20,000 wounded. In addition, the economic costs of the war were just as high. Approximately 40% of Croatia's factories and industrial facilities were destroyed with the cost of rebuilding estimated in excess of \$18.7 billion.²⁹⁴ The resulting civil war played an important role in determining the degree of control over territory, and the balance of military forces between Croatia and the central authorities in Belgrade. The degree of control Croatia enjoyed over its territory was partially a function of the superiority in manpower and material the JNA forces had over Croatian defense forces. However,

²⁹² Ian Oliver, *War and Peace in the Balkans: The Diplomacy of Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia*, New York, NY: I.B. Tauris (2005): 9-10.

²⁹³ Ramet (2002): 177.

²⁹⁴ Touval (2002): 89 and Ramet (2002): 67.

Croatia's inability to control its territory was also due to internal challenges associated with its Serb minority as well as a lack of adequate military preparations by Croatian authorities.

Croatia's defense forces were outnumbered and overmatched by the JNA for most of the conflict. Even after their defeat in Slovenia the JNA was still a formidable military organization. For the operation in Croatia it could muster 138,000 active-duty troops with another 400,000 in reserve. The JNA also possessed 1,850 main-battle tanks, over 2,000 artillery pieces, and 500 armored personal carriers. In addition, the JNA had the services of a modern air force with over 450 combat aircraft and 32,000 personnel.²⁹⁵ In contrast, at the onset of the conflict Croatia could only muster approximately 65,000 troops that were ill-equipped with arms and war material. This was because prior to the conflict the JNA collection effort with regards to arms and military equipment from Croatian territorial forces was more thorough than the attempt conducted in Slovenia. Martin Spigelj, then Croatian defense minister, estimated that only approximately 3 – 4% of the rifles were salvaged for later use by the Croatian armed forces during the war, which seriously interfered with the later attempts to arm and equip reserve forces.²⁹⁶

The Croatian armed forces were so bereft of arms and material that they had to rely on many irregular sources for supply. Most of the modern assault rifles, mines,

²⁹⁵ Ramet (2002): 65.

²⁹⁶ "Discussion" (2001): 98-99.

rocket-propelled grenades, and anti-aircraft systems for the initial battles in the summer and autumn of 1991 were supplied from smuggled shipments from Hungary.²⁹⁷ The Croatian forces lack of weaponry became so acute in the autumn of 1991 that all possible sources of supply were utilized. Ramet notes:

Croatia in military terms [was] the more desperate...So short of arms were the Croats that when the war came to Croatia, the Croatian armed forces ransacked museums and film studios for old weaponry from World War II. Some of the weapons obtained this way had originally been parachuted to Tito's Partisans fifty years earlier.²⁹⁸

Another factor exacerbating the disparity in military forces was the large presence of armed Serbs within Croatia's borders that presented an additional internal threat to territorial control. Over a year before the conflict began the JNA had begun arming enclaves within the regions of Eastern Slavonia and Krajina, which were predominately populated by Serbs.²⁹⁹ The arming of Serb enclaves within Croatia served to undermine its territorial control, but also provided the JNA a pretext to interfere with Croatian attempts to further secure its independence. Before large-scale hostilities broke out there were numerous instances of the JNA undermining the territorial control of the Croatian authorities utilizing Serbian enclaves. The protecting of rioting Serbs in Knin in response to attempts by Croatian authorities to quell the widespread looting of

²⁹⁷ Adam LeBor, *Milosevic: A Biography*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press (2004): 167-168 and Gilaurdic (2011): 129-130.

²⁹⁸ Ramet (2002): 65.

²⁹⁹ These events are sometimes referred to as the "Revolution of Logs" on account of the Serb use of roadblocks made from felled trees. See Mieczyslaw P. Boduszynski, *Regime Change in the Yugoslav Successor States: Divergent Paths Toward a New Europe*, Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press (2010): 82-83 and Tus (2001): 41-42.

weapons from police stations in July of 1990 was a prime example of Croatia's problems with regards to securing its territorial borders.³⁰⁰

The balance of military forces did not favor Croatia's securing its territory both in regards to the strength of the JNA and the presence of organized resistance of ethnic Serbs. However, decisions made by the political leadership also contributed to Croatia's lack of territorial control. Specifically, the Croatian political leadership failed to take adequate military preparations before the conflict, and made decisions during the conflict that directly contributed to the Croatian forces inability to secure its territory. This was because, at the time, the Croatian political leadership was undecided with regards towards pursuit of secession and independence. Franjo Tudjman, then Croatia's president, viewed the main goal of a conflict with the JNA as the achievement of a "Greater Croatia." He was agnostic about whether this could be achieved through independence or the existing Yugoslav Federation, but was aware that territory would have to be annexed from Bosnia-Herzegovina to achieve a "Greater Croatia." Tudjman believed that secret negotiations with Milosevic were the best possible means to achieve Croatia's war aims.³⁰¹

Tudjman's dream of achieving a "Greater Croatia" led to serious military blunders that contributed to the Croatian forces inability to secure their territory. Specifically, Tudjman negotiated a secret agreement to abandon the Slovenes when the

³⁰⁰ Tanner (2010): 232-234 and Ramet (2002): 57-58.

³⁰¹ Magas (2006): 120-121.

JNA attacked them during the Ten-Day War. This would have serious consequences since the Slovenes would allow the JNA to withdraw and redeploy their heavy weapons to attack Croatia a few weeks later.³⁰² In addition, Tudjman ignored sound military advice to preemptively attack the JNA forces stationed in Croatia prior to the onset of hostilities.³⁰³ Many have argued that much bloodshed could have been avoided if Croatian forces took decisive action against the Serb paramilitaries and JNA, while they were still vulnerable.³⁰⁴ In short, Tudjman's political calculations exacerbated the disparity in military forces, and greatly contributed to Croatia's inability to control its territory.

This discussion concerning the balance of military forces between the JNA and Croatian forces as well as the political calculations of Tudjman regarding the creation of a "Greater Croatia" illustrate how Croatia's territorial control was in question for the majority of the conflict. After the ceasefire of December 1991, Croatia only controlled approximately $\frac{2}{3}$ of its territory and it was not until the summer of 1995 that Croatia had the military capacity to retake and secure the occupied portions of the country. This leads to the conclusion that both at the outset and in the aftermath of the initial fighting Croatia did not exhibit firm control over its territory, nor did the Croatian forces possess the military means to recapture the territory that was occupied. The next section

³⁰² Glaurdic (2011): 199-202 and Gagnon (2004): 144-146.

³⁰³ Spegelj (2001): 39-40.

³⁰⁴ Norman Cigar, "Croatia's War of Independence: The Parameters of War Termination," *Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 10:2 (June 1997): 54-55 and Ramet (2002): 66-67.

examines the level of political authority wielded by the Croatian leadership with regards to secession.

5.3.2 Croatia: Political Authority

This discussion regarding territorial control and military forces provide glimpses into the material attributes of Croatia at the time of secession. However, we still need to explore the political authority wielded by the Croatian leadership striving to achieve recognition of their claim to independence. In short, I examine the degree of perceived legitimacy and governance capacity that the Croatian authorities possessed. To examine these issues, I concentrate on the degree of support from the population the Croatian secessionist movement claimed, and presence of political institutions to help with the transition to independence and governance.

The Croatian leadership's political authority was questioned by some significant elements within the population. This was partly because of the results of the 1990 multi-party elections, but also was a function of the mistrust of the minority Serb population in Croatia. The elections of 1990 were important with regards to establishing political authority because they would determine whether Croatia would follow a secessionist path and declare independence or remain within the Yugoslav Federation. The political party that garnered the most votes in that election was the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), which had a decidedly pro-secessionist platform. However, unlike the DEMOS coalition in Slovenia, the HDZ secessionist platform barely scrapped

together an electoral majority and did not enjoy wide-spread support. In fact, the ability of the HDZ to formulate a government and enact its proposals towards secession was a product of the peculiar electoral system associated with the former communist political system rather than a mandate of popular support.³⁰⁵ The table below provides the results of 1990 elections, and illustrates that HDZ support varied considerably.

TABLE 5.2:

RESULTS FROM CROATIAN MULTI-PARTY ELECTIONS, 1990³⁰⁶

<i>Political Party</i>	<i>% of Votes</i>	<i># of Seats</i>	<i>% of Seats</i>
Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ)	41.9%	205	57.6%
League of Communists and allies (SKH - SDP)	35.0%	107	30.1%
Coalition of National Accord (KNS)	15.3%	21	5.9%
Serb Democratic Party (SDS)	1.6%	5	1.4%
Others	6.2%	18	5.1%
Total	100.0%	356	100.1%

In addition, it was unclear whether a majority of the population within Croatia supported secession, which also served to question the political authority of the Croatian leadership. Gagnon notes that in a referendum held a few months prior to the 1990 elections only 15% of the Croatian population supported full independence, while 64% favored maintaining ties to the Yugoslav Federation based on a loose confederation. Even during the run-up to the election, which was characterized by

³⁰⁵ Boduszynski (2010): 80-82.

³⁰⁶ Glaurdic (2011): 87.

marked periods of ethnic violence this sentiment did not change. A survey conducted immediately before the election showed that only 37% of respondents favored full independence.³⁰⁷ This discussion of the electoral results and public sentiments toward secession illustrate that, unlike the Slovenians, the Croatian leadership lacked a strong democratic mandate for their secessionist actions, which negatively affected their perceived political authority.

The lack of participation of Croatia's Serb population in the secession process also undermined the political authority of the Croatian leadership. At the time of secession Croatia possessed 600,000 Serbs that accounted for approximately 12% of the total population.³⁰⁸ However, after the HDZ electoral victory and elevation of Franjo Tudjman to lead Croatia's political establishment, the Serbian population made concerted efforts to remove themselves from Croatian political affairs and increasingly looked to themselves for political leadership and authority. This culminated with the establishment of no less than four Serbian dominated regions that declared their independence from Croatian central authorities in Zagreb between February 28, 1991 and February 26, 1992.³⁰⁹ As a direct result, Croatian moves to further their attempts at secession were perceived as lacking legitimacy since a large segment of the population

³⁰⁷ Gagnon (2010): 135-136.

³⁰⁸ Crampton (2002): 241-244.

³⁰⁹ The Serb Autonomous Regions (SAO) were SAO Krajina, SAO Western Slavonia, SAO Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem, and the Dubrovnik Republic. The largest of these Serb breakaway regions in Croatia was SAO Krajina. See Ahrens (2007): 110.

was opposed, which further questioned the degree of political authority Croatia's leadership had acquired.

This discussion concerning the lack of a clear democratic mandate for the HDZ secessionist platform and participation of the Serbs in the Croatian political process shows how the Croatian leadership did not enjoy a significant degree of political authority. This was especially clear in comparison to the previous case of Slovenia. This leads to the observation that Croatia did not have secure control over its territory, nor were its leaders perceived to possess unquestioned political authority over the population it claimed. However, this begs the question: what impact did these domestic material factors have on Croatia's eventual recognition?

Existing explanations regarding recognition discussed in Chapter 2 highlight the role that domestic material factor related to authority and control have in determining whether existing states recognize seceding territories. We would expect that if securing territorial control and possessing political authority over the population were the prerequisites for recognition, it would follow that Croatia should not have been recognized before the summer of 1995 since that was when it regained secure control over its territory and population. In fact, at the time Zvonimir Separovic, then Croatia's foreign minister, noted that from late 1990 until summer of 1991 many of the objections to Croatia's secession involved issues regarding territorial control and political authority.³¹⁰ However, despite Croatia's lack of territorial control and political

³¹⁰ Caplan (2005): 104.

authority, the relevant great and regional powers did grant international recognition. Germany's declaration of support in December 1991 and the subsequent recognition by the United States, U.S.S.R., Britain, and France that followed shortly would indicate that domestic material factors did not have a heavy influence on Croatia's acceptance as a new state in the international system. If attributes regarding territorial control and political authority were prerequisites for recognition than we would expect that Croatia's deficiencies in this regard would have precluded recognition of Croatia's independence by these international actors. Elena Gus'kova, a prominent Russian commentator on European affairs, noted at the time how domestic material factors did not factor into the decision making process regarding recognition of Croatia. She noted:

After the adoption of the EC Declaration, Croatia was hastily recognized, although it violated at least four of the five EC [European Community] conditions, but recognition of Macedonia was put off, although it violated none. Meanwhile, the independence of war-torn Bosnia and Herzegovina was supported, a territory with an unstable internal situation, with undefined political structure, and with relations between peoples living there unclear.³¹¹

This quote illustrates that evaluations of the importance of domestic material factors related to authority and control in territories attempting to secede from the Yugoslav Federation were inconsistent. Given this inconsistency the obtainment of territorial control and political authority cannot adequately explain Croatia's international recognition. In the following sections I explore the influence of normative

³¹¹ Translated and quoted in James Headley, *Russia and the Balkans: Foreign Policy from Yeltsin to Putin*, New York, NY: Columbia University Press (2008): 91.

and international material factors on the likelihood of the international acceptance of Croatia's secession.

5.4 Croatia: Normative Factors During the Balkan Civil War

This section explores the causal impact that normative factors relating to national self-determination and liberal democracy had on the likelihood of Croatia's recognition. Croatia exhibited a much lower degree of democratic development and liberalization of politics and the economy in comparison to Slovenia. My examination of normative factors shows that, in general, considerations regarding national self-determination did not dictate whether recognition was extended to Croatia. This is consistent with the findings in Chapter 4 with respect to Slovenia since international actors consciously understood that evaluating claims of national self-determination in the context of the Balkans was fraught with difficulty. In addition, I find that while policy makers did consider democratization and respect for human rights important issues they were subordinated to more pressing international imperatives involving the possibility of secession in former territories of the Soviet Union, future role of a unified Germany in European affairs, and preventing the conflict from spreading to Bosnia-Herzegovina.

I should note that this does not mean that normative factors related to national self-determination or liberal democracy had no impact on the causal process associated with recognition in Croatia. Croatia's political leadership desperately attempted to have

their secession attempt recognized (both internationally and domestically by the Yugoslavian authorities) based on rights to self-determination. In addition, I find that many key foreign policy leaders elevated the importance of democratic values with respect to Croatia's recognition. This was partly a function of the increased number of reports received concerning JNA and Serbian paramilitary forces committing wide-scale human rights abuses against Croats. This was also due to the Croatian political leadership's authoritarian tendencies and duplicity in "ethnic cleansing" operations against portions of their Serb population. However, despite the strong preference some international actors held regarding Croatia's compliance with the rule of law and respect for human rights most of the relevant great and regional powers extended recognition.

To understand how normative factors impacted recognition during the conflict in Croatia, I concentrate my analysis on the following. First, I examine what role that the norm of national self-determination had on decisions regarding recognition. Next, I explore whether factors related to the norm of liberal democracy had any influence on the likelihood of Croatia's international recognition. Simply stated, I am concerned with the degree that norms were taken into account in the decisions regarding recognition of Croatia. The following sections examine the relevant normative factors related to national self-determination and liberal democracy with regards to Croatia's recognition.

5.4.1 Croatia: National Self-Determination

Normative factors related to national self-determination had little impact or influence on the decisions to grant Croatia recognition. This is despite the fact that, like Slovenia, Croatia's claim to independence was enshrined in rights granted to the republic as part of the 1974 Yugoslav Federal Constitution. The text from the 1974 Constitution³¹² and the 94% who voted (on turnout of 83%) in favor of the independence during the referendum of May 1991 would seem to satisfy the requirements listed in Yugoslavia's federal constitution for Croatia to legally and legitimately secede from the Yugoslav Federation.³¹³ However, as previously stated in Chapter 4, the great and relevant regional powers did not view the situation this way and refused to grant recognition to any former Yugoslav Republic on the basis of a claim of national self-determination. There was an overwhelming consensus that recognition granted to Croatia on the basis of national self-determination would make conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina a likely outcome with dire consequences.³¹⁴ Helmut Kohl, then Germany's chancellor, noted this consensus when he stated, "[that it was] unacceptable that suddenly the right of self-determination should no longer play a role."³¹⁵

³¹² Glaurdic (2011): 56.

³¹³ Boduszynski (2010): 82-83 and Klemencic (2009): 161.

³¹⁴ Glaurdic (2011): 123.

³¹⁵ Quoted in Daniele Conversi, "Germany: the Recognition of Slovenia and Croatia," in *War and Change in the Balkans: Nationalism, Conflict, and Cooperation*, ed. Brad K. Blitz New York, NY: Cambridge

In addition, the validity of the referendum was called into question because of the absence of participation by the Serbian minority within Croatia. Complications arose since the lack of participation was largely due to the majority of Serbian inhabitants of Croatia had already voted in a referendum held in August of 1990 that overwhelmingly supported breaking off from Croatia in the case of secession.³¹⁶ This situation of two apparently legitimate but conflicting democratic outcomes associated with Croatia's secession illustrated the difficulty international actors faced in evaluating claims of national self-determination during Croatia's secessionist conflict.

The ethnic composition of Croatia's population also weakened the case for recognition based on national self-determination. This is because, unlike Slovenia, Croatia contained a significant Serbian minority population that was becoming increasingly hostile to Croatian attempts to secede and declare independence. The figure below provides a comparison of the ethnic compositions of Croatia and Slovenia immediately before secession:

University Press (2006): 68.

³¹⁶ Lebor (2004): 149-150.




Figure 5.1: Comparison of Populations (Ethnic Composition), 1991³¹⁷

³¹⁷ Ahrens (2007): 29.

These figures show that Croatia contained a significant minority of Serbians that opposed secession, which greatly complicated Croatian secession preparations and subsequent attempts to attract international recognition. In addition, the Serbian minority within Croatia varied in density. Over 60% of the approximately 600,000 Serbs were spread across the country, but there were also sizable concentrations. In Zagreb alone there were almost 50,000 Serbs³¹⁸ This situation not only complicated any hope of recognition based on national self-determination due to the hostility of the Serbian minority and difficulty in disentangling the ethnic mixing of the population within Croatia, but also contributed to increased incidences of “ethnic cleansing.” The presence of ethnic enclaves or islands provided target rich environments for ethnic violence and reprisals by both sides during the conflict. Given this situation Croatia’s recognition by international actors was not influenced by normative factors associated with national self-determination.

5.4.2 Croatia: Liberal Democracy

Normative factors related to liberal democracy also did not heavily influence Croatia’s international recognition. This is despite the fact that international actors were becoming more concerned over the democratic attributes of the Croatian and JNA forces involved in the conflict. This was partly because of the growing number of reports concerning wide-scale human rights abuses committed by Serbian and Croatian regular

³¹⁸ Ahrens (2007): 110-111.

and paramilitary forces. However, it was also a function of questions concerning Croatia's lack of democratic development. Croatia's political leaders adopted a virulent expression of ethno-nationalism to mobilize popular support, and also exhibited authoritarian tendencies regarding political participation, the rule of law, and other areas of governance. The logic associated with the causal process related to recognition and the norm of liberal democracy would predict that secessionist movements with robust democratic credentials should benefit from international recognition since they are more apt to be trusted and respected by other states. In particular, democratic states would view adherence to democratic principles as important. However, the examination of the normative factors related to liberal democracy operating during Croatia's secession illustrates that this was not the case.

While some international actors did view adherence to democratic principles as important, these same states found that preferences operating at the international level concerning conflict management and security preferences trumped any concerns regarding the norm of liberal democracy. This section examines the political and social facets of Croatia's lack of democratic development and illustrates how despite growing concern and linking of democratization with recognition. Normative factors related to liberal democracy took a back seat to other more pressing geo-political considerations in regards to Croatia's international recognition.

At first glance Croatia's democratization efforts with respect to politics and social life seem impressive. In April of 1990, Croatia held the first multi-party elections since

World War II.³¹⁹ In addition, by December of 1990 Croatia had adopted a new constitution that attempted to differentiate itself from the previous communist political system by dropping the word “socialist” from the official title of the country as well as creating the executive office of the presidency with constitutionally vested powers.³²⁰ In short, Croatia’s democratic development was geared towards simulating a Western liberal democratic regime.³²¹ However, closer inspection of political and social life in Croatia revealed something different entirely.

Croatia’s political leaders were convinced that it was important to maintain the appearance of adherence to democratic principles, but in actuality were active participants in the subversion of democracy and the promotion of authoritarian policies with respect to political and social life.³²² In particular, the Croatian authorities did not adhere to democratic principles or practice with respect to political contestation. Croatia’s political leadership, using the HDZ party apparatus, actively engaged in electoral manipulation. This manifested itself as electoral fraud with the over-weighting of the diaspora vote of Croatians abroad and the gerrymandering of rural districts friendly to the HDZ.³²³ In addition, the electoral calendar was purposefully manipulated

³¹⁹ Sell (2002): 114-115.

³²⁰ Mile Bjelajac and Ozren Zunec, “The War in Croatia, 1991-1995,” in *Confronting the Yugoslav Controversies: A Scholar’s Initiative*, ed. Charles Ingrao and Thomas A. Emmert, West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press (2009): 236 and Crampton (2002): 242.

³²¹ Boduszynski (2010): 78-79.

³²² Ahrens (2007): 129-130.

³²³ Boduszynski (2010): 77.

to call snap elections at times that disadvantaged the opposition from mobilizing its voters or to campaign effectively.³²⁴

The Croatian authorities' lack of democratic adherence also manifested itself in the relationship between the state and different social institutions within Croatia. In particular, the separation of religion and state started to erode as the Croatian authorities adopted a pro-catholic conservative attitude towards social policies. Specifically, curbs on contraception, abortion, and religious freedom appeared through new policies enacted by the government. In addition, compulsory Catholic religious instruction was introduced into the Croatian education system.³²⁵ The result of the erosion of protections associated with religion-state separation was that approximately 24% of Croatia's non-Catholic population was being actively discriminated against.³²⁶ This overt sectarian bias is illustrated in remarks made by Franjo Tudjman, then Croatia's president. On the campaign trail in March 1990, he remarked, "Thank God my wife is not a Jew or a Serb."³²⁷

The Croatian political leadership's authoritarian and discriminatory tendencies were also clear in dealings with the media. Specifically, the freedom of the press was seriously curtailed in Croatia. This was a reflection of conscious and concerted efforts by the Croatian government to foster ethnic-Croat dominated media sources that

³²⁴ Ibid: 77-79.

³²⁵ Ramet (2006): 587, 591-592 and Ramet (2002): 94.

³²⁶ Ibid: 591.

³²⁷ Quoted in Tanner (2010): 228.

increasingly came to be seen as mouth-pieces for the state and party.³²⁸ In addition, the harassment of opposition and Serbian journalists as well as the use of the tax and civil code to silence media critics was a mainstay of the Croatian political leadership.³²⁹ The media was used not only to silence critics, but also to actively discriminate against segments of the Croatian population. In scenes reminiscent of the genocide in Rwanda, Croatian authorities used the media to mobilize extremists to commit human rights abuses against Serbian elements of the population during its secessionist conflict and the later conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina.³³⁰

The Croatian political leadership also exhibited its lack of adherence to democratic principles in the manner by which it interacted with civil society. This was partly illustrated by the adoption of symbolism associated with the Independent State of Croatia (NDH), established in 1941 under Nazi occupation, by the Croatian political authorities. The restoration of the kuna as the currency of Croatia, adoption of the Ustasa coat of arms for Croatia's flag, and the naming of streets and public buildings after prominent Ustasa figures was perceived as deeply offensive by the Serbian population and other moderate Croats.³³¹ The elevation and adoption of these symbols represented a glorification of atrocities committed by Croatian Nazi collaborators during World War II.

³²⁸ Ramet (2002): 38-40.

³²⁹ Boduszynski (2010): 78.

³³⁰ Ramet (2002): 277-278.

³³¹ Sell (2002): 115-116, Lebor (2004): 145-146, and Ramet (2006): 585-586.

Croatia's undemocratic practices regarding the interaction between the state and civil society was not just confined to symbolism, but was also readily apparent in practice. After the election of Tudjman in April 1990 restrictions on civil society groups and other non-governmental organizations associated with social justice increased dramatically. Groups were targeted for government harassment through bureaucratic obstacles designed specifically to limit their scope of operation, levying unfair tax penalties to limit their ability to operate, and labeling them as foreign lackeys to discredit them.³³² Civil society groups dealing with issues of gender equality and gay rights were especially targeted since their policy preferences ran directly contrary to the conservative support base of the Croatian political leadership.³³³

In addition to the authoritarian and illiberal behavior already mentioned, the Croatian leadership's lack of adherence to democratic principles was most egregious in relation to its treatment of the Serbian minority within Croatia. After the elections of the April of 1990, the Croatian authorities proceeded to implement policies that deliberately excluded ethnic-Serbs from most political and legal institutions or agencies associated with the state. This resulted in constitutional guarantees regarding protection of Serbian minority rights being revoked, and the requirement for all ethnic-Serbs serving in a public capacity to take an oath of loyalty to the new Croatian state.³³⁴

³³² Boduszynski (2010): 79-80.

³³³ Ramet (2006): 589-591.

³³⁴ Crampton (2002): 243.

This was also followed by a ban on all Serbian associations and cultural institutions as well as restrictions on the use of the Serbian language in official government business.³³⁵

The Croatian authorities also proceeded to expel most Serbians from positions within the police force and legal institutions. This greatly alarmed the Serbians within Croatia since the heavy presence of Serbs within the police force was viewed as protection against the ethno-nationalistic tendencies of the Croatian leadership.³³⁶ A CIA report from the time noted this action greatly exacerbated ethnic tensions within Croatia and contributed to the outbreak of wide-scale violence. The report noted:

The crux of the dispute centered on Croatian efforts to alter the size and character of the republic's police force by building additional Croat-majority police stations and reducing the number of ethnic Serbs in the existing force. By bringing additional ethnic Croats into the regular force, the Croatian Government clearly hoped to decrease both absolute and percentage terms, as well as move Croatian personnel into police stations in Serb territory. But the Croats heavy-handed efforts to dominate the police force poured salt on an open wound and enraged ethnic Serbs everywhere.³³⁷

More important than the discrimination and expulsion of Serbs from jobs in the judiciary and law enforcement, the Croatian authorities egregiously violated democratic norms by condoning and at times engaging in human rights abuses against its own

³³⁵ Snezana Trifunovska, *Former Yugoslavia Through Documents: From Dissolution to the Peace Settlement*, Boston, MA: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers (1999): 35.

³³⁶ Tanner (2010): 231-232.

³³⁷ United States Central Intelligence Agency, *Balkan Battlefields: A Military History of the Yugoslav Conflict, 1990-1995*, Washington, DC: CIA Office of Public Affairs (2002): 83.

Serbian population.³³⁸ Carla Del Ponte, former United Nations Chief Prosecutor for the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, noted:

...that if evidence that was uncovered in 1999 was known earlier than Tudjman [Croatia's president during its secessionist conflict] would have found his name on the list of persons indicted for war crimes by the International War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague.³³⁹

The following discussion has illustrated that international recognition of Croatia was not strongly influenced by evaluations of normative factors related to national self-determination and liberal democracy. Unlike Slovenia, Croatia's claim to independence based on these norms was weak. The heterogeneity of its population and lack of adherence to democratic principles with regards to political competition, civil society, and treatment of its ethnic Serb population served to drastically undercut any considerations regarding recognition using normative factors as a basis. However, despite Croatia's dismal democratic credentials international recognition was granted by the most relevant international actors between December 1991 and April 1992.

I should note that this does not mean that normative factors played no role in influencing Croatia's international recognition. At the time we see a general shift in attitudes by the United States regarding democratic development being a prime policy goal in Yugoslavia.³⁴⁰ Before the outbreak of Croatian secessionist conflict James Baker,

³³⁸ Ivo Banac, "The Politics of National Homogeneity," in *War and Change in the Balkans: Nationalism, Conflict, and Cooperation*, ed. Brad K. Blitz New York, NY: Cambridge University Press (2006): 33-34.

³³⁹ Quoted in Ramet (2006): 584.

³⁴⁰ Sell (2002): 142-143.

then United States Secretary of State, warned Serb, Croat, and Yugoslav leaders to avoid bloodshed because “If [they] forced the United States to choose between unity [of the Yugoslavian state] and democracy, we will always choose democracy.”³⁴¹

In addition, the European Community also placed a high premium on democratic development when weighing the decision to recognize Croatia. Below is listed the five criteria any seceding Yugoslav Republic had to attain to meet the requirements for recognition.³⁴²

- Accepted the United Nations Charter and CSCE Helsinki Accords
- Guaranteed the rights of ethnic minorities
- Respected internationally recognized borders
- Upheld arms control and disarmament treaties
- Supported political resolution of disputes

Despite these sentiments, the attitudes of the American and collective European governments illustrates that if normative factors associated with liberal democracy heavily influenced the recognition policies of other actors than we would expect that Croatia would not receive international recognition. From the previous discussion we know that Croatia only adequately satisfied one of these criteria, indicating that even if these normative factors were discussed by the relevant actors, they did not determine

³⁴¹ Quoted in Glaurdic (2011): 168.

³⁴² O’Shea (2005): 26.

the decision to recognize Croatia. In the next section we explore the most relevant international material factors that dictated Croatia's international recognition.

5.5 Croatia: International Material Factors

This section explores the influence that international material factors had on Croatia's international recognition. Specifically, I draw attention to the role great power involvement has on the recognition and the acceptance of statehood. The secessionist conflict in Croatia, and other Yugoslavian Republics concerned a fundamental issue of importance to the international system. International attention to Croatia's conflict was more than concern over the manner in which a multi-ethnic federation unraveled and whether violence is utilized to reorganize it. Rather the implications of recognition decisions with respect to Croatia and the other Yugoslav Republics touched upon a fundamental issue of contestation in the international system; the assertion of sovereignty over a disputed territory. Given this situation, understanding the international dimension of Croatia's secessionist conflict and how it impacted recognition is essential.

The end of the Cold War bi-polar system after 1989 provided new opportunities for international actors to exert their influence on international affairs. The unraveling of Yugoslavia presented itself as an opportunity to enhance the influence of those advocating a greater role for international institutions with respect to conflict prevention. More importantly, those advocating for European integration and greater

European diplomatic influence in world affairs viewed the breakup of Yugoslavia as a perfect opportunity to showcase the capabilities and unity of the emerging European Community/European Union. The Yugoslav crisis also coincided with significant geopolitical change outside of Europe. The United States occupation with other security priorities witnessed in the First Gulf War, and the ongoing collapse of the Soviet Union highlighted that during Croatia's secessionist conflict the most powerful actors as well as the international system as a whole was undergoing a reconfiguration of priorities and power.

One implication of my examination concerning the importance of international factors in Croatia's recognition is that, from the outset, the Balkan secessionist conflicts was shaped by great power intervention whether in support of Yugoslavian unity or with an eye to the long-term benefits to be derived from geopolitical realignment in what was still regarded as a strategically relevant region of the world. The following sections explore two overriding concerns regarding geo-political factors the relevant great and regional powers had in relation to Croatia's secession; the decline of the Soviet Union and the role of a unified Germany in European affairs.

5.5.1 US-Soviet Concerns

The United States and Soviet Union had very similar positions on recognition during Croatia's secessionist conflict. This was because the potential for Croatia's recognition was being driven by international political imperatives tied to the ongoing dissolution of the Soviet Union.³⁴³ Both the United States and Soviets had a preference for maintaining the integrity of the Yugoslavian state. The Soviet Union was particularly keen to uphold Yugoslavia's integrity since it viewed Western sympathies for the secessionists in Yugoslavia as a cynical ploy to try to reestablish influence that was lost during the Cold War.³⁴⁴ Mikhail Gorbachev, then Soviet premier, articulated this position well during a press conference held shortly before the outbreak of hostilities in Croatia.

He noted:

...above all, we [the Soviet Union] are for the integrity of Yugoslavia, for the inviolability of borders [the issue of minority rights and secession] should be decided within the framework of each state on the basis of the constitution and legislation, within the constitutional process.³⁴⁵

More importantly, Soviet authorities were very concerned about the similarities between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union that could lead to the outbreak of secessionist conflicts involving former constituent republics of the Soviet Union. This was because some of the ethnic conflict dynamics that were tearing Yugoslavia apart were also readily present in the Soviet Union. One of these similarities was the presence of an

³⁴³ Bert (1997): 136 and Headley (2008): 70-71.

³⁴⁴ Klemencic (2009): 157 and Headley (2008): 90-91.

³⁴⁵ Headley (2008): 69.

ethnic majority with nationalistic aspirations. Many have commented that the Croatian conflict saw both sides (Serb and Croat) express virulent ethno-nationalism to mobilize their respective supporters. This expression of ethno-nationalism was mirrored in the Soviet Union by those advocating for a “Greater Russia” to emerge from the remnants of the Soviet Empire.³⁴⁶ These calls for ethnic solidarity to be manifested in a predominately ethnic Russian state were very similar to calls by both Milosevic and Tudjman for the establishment of a “Greater Serbia and Croatia” respectively.

In addition, the ethnic composition and its distribution in the Soviet Union was very similar to Yugoslavia. Both Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union had large diaspora populations of a predominant ethnic group (Serbians and Russians, respectively). 25 million ethnic Russians found themselves outside of the Russian Federation when the Soviet Union ceased to exist. Concern for the protection of minority rights and the risks of ethnic violence on Yugoslavia’s scale were voiced in Baltic Republics of Latvia and Lithuania as well as in the Transdniester region encompassing Moldavia.³⁴⁷ Another similarity the Soviet Union shared with Yugoslavia that could lead to the outbreak of secessionist conflict and ethnic violence was the presence of multiple internal minorities. The Soviet Union and later the Russian Federation contained a heterogeneous mix of ethnicities including Latvians, Lithuanians, Ukrainians, Chechens, and many others. However, large concentrations of these ethnic minorities could be

³⁴⁶ Headley (2008): 63-64.

³⁴⁷ Ibid: 61.

found in ethnically designated constituent republics of the former Soviet Union, which mirrored the political conditions in the former Yugoslavia.³⁴⁸ The secessionist conflict still ongoing in Chechnya is a good example of the potential for secessionist violence under these conditions.

All of these factors made the leadership of the Soviet Union (and later the Russian Federation) worry immensely about the parallels between the outbreak of ethnic violence in Yugoslavia, and the potential for it to occur in parts of the former Soviet empire. Arbatova noted:

It goes without saying that the Yugoslav experience had a strong repercussion on the foreign policy of Russia both in the near abroad and in the far abroad. The mirror effect of the Yugoslav conflict was in general positive: in [the] bloodshed, destruction, and in an atmosphere of hatred and mistrust Russia saw its own probable future and shivered with horror.³⁴⁹

In conjunction with the Soviet leadership, the United States also held the position that developments regarding secession from Yugoslavia, especially recognition of Croatia, would greatly impact the stability of the Soviet Union. Like the Soviets, the United States before the outbreak of the Croatian conflict preferred maintaining the integrity and unity of the Yugoslav federation. James Baker, then the US Secretary of State, explicitly told Franjo Tudjman (Croatia's leader) that under no circumstances would the United States recognize the independence of any of the territories seceding

³⁴⁸ Ibid: 62-63.

³⁴⁹ N. Arbatova, "Horror Mirror: Russian Perception of the Yugoslav Conflict," paper presented at the Consensus Building Institute Conference on "Russian and American Perspectives: Ethnic Conflicts in the Former Soviet Union," Harvard University, October 25-26, 1994: 35.

from Yugoslavia.³⁵⁰ One of Baker's concerns was that recognition of any of the Yugoslavian Republics would trigger a wider conflict that would include Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia. From his perspective, the most attractive and expedient solution to avoid this predicament was denying international recognition to the secession attempts of the constituent republics of Yugoslavia.³⁵¹

It should be noted that the United States' position was not just a reflection of the preferences regarding Yugoslavia's political and territorial disposition, but also a function of the United States' detachment from this situation. At the time, the United States was still involved in a large conflict in the Middle East associated with the Desert Shield/Storm operations in Iraq. More importantly and mirroring the Soviets, the sole concern of the United States regarding Yugoslavia was what influence Croatian recognition would have on the likelihood of secessionist conflicts breaking out in the former constituent republics of the Soviet Union.³⁵²

At the beginning of 1991 and before the outbreak of hostilities, the fifteen constituent republics of the Soviet Union had already declared sovereignty and were in the midst of negotiating a new union treaty, (which would eventually become the Commonwealth of Independent States - CIS). The United States maintained its opposition to Croatian recognition since it was gravely concerned about the security

³⁵⁰ Bert (1997): 137 and Kempster and Williams (1991).

³⁵¹ Klemencic (2009): 161-163.

³⁵² Boduszynski (2010): 37.

ramifications if secessionist violence occurred in the Soviet Union. Banac notes, “The Bush administration was obsessed with the dangers of Soviet collapse and the nuclear threat supposedly implicit in the break-up of the Soviet Federation.”³⁵³ The United States actively wanted to discourage secession attempts from the Soviet Union because they also saw direct parallels with the violence unfolding in Croatia. George H. W. Bush, then U.S. President, tried to link the Soviet and Yugoslavian situations to dissuade Soviet Republics with secessionist aspirations and bolster the stability of the Soviet central authorities. In an address to the Ukrainian Parliament in Kiev on August 1, 1991 he stated:

Freedom is not the same as independence. Americans will not support those who seek independence in order to replace a far-off tyranny with a local despotism. They will not aid those who promote a suicidal nationalism based on ethnic hatred.³⁵⁴

In addition to prioritizing the stability of the Soviet Union, the United States’ position on Croatia’s international recognition was also influenced by other international material factors. Specifically, the United States wanted to evaluate the diplomatic and military capacity of its European allies given that the end of the Cold War presented new realities in the international system. This was partly because some in Washington wanted to evaluate whether the decades long processes involving European integration had fostered any unity regarding diplomatic and political policy making. James Baker, then U.S. Secretary of State, recalled:

³⁵³ Banac (2006): 39 and Headley (2008): 68.

³⁵⁴ Quoted in Glaurdic (2011): 204.

[There] was an undercurrent in Washington, often felt but seldom spoken, that it was time to make the Europeans step up to the plate and show they could act as a unified power. Yugoslavia was as good a first test as any.³⁵⁵

However, others had less than noble motives with regards to Europe taking the lead in Yugoslavia. Some at the State Department were influenced by a desire to get payback against the Europeans for marginalizing the United States' diplomatic position on Croatia and the Yugoslavian conflict in general.³⁵⁶ The comments of Jacques Poos's, Luxembourg's foreign minister at the time, illustrates why some American officials held these sentiments. He stated:

This is the hour of Europe – not the hour of the Americans...If one problem can be solved by the Europeans, it is the Yugoslav problem. This is a European country and it is not up to the Americans. It is not up to anyone else.³⁵⁷

Europe's exclusionary attitude impacted the American position on Croatia's recognition since many U.S. State Department officials advocated maintaining the status quo with regards to recognition since they believed that Europe would "screw it up."³⁵⁸

This discussion illustrates that both the Americans and Soviets maintained similar positions regarding Croatia's recognition. Both saw similarities between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union regarding potential triggers for secessionist and ethnic

³⁵⁵ James Addison Baker with Thomas M. DeFrank, *The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War, and Peace, 1989-1992*, New York, NY: Putnam's (1995): 636-637.

³⁵⁶ Sell (2002): 146-147.

³⁵⁷ Glaurdic (2011): 183.

³⁵⁸ Remarks by Lawrence Eagleburger, U.S. State Department Official, quoted in Glaurdic (2011): 182.

violence. Also, both were concerned that extension of recognition would negatively impact the situation regarding secession in the former Soviet Republics. As a result, both the American and Soviet position regarding secession was fairly stable; both opposed recognition until December 1991 and then both changed their position soon after (April 6 and February 17 of 1992, respectively). The reason for this change was that by December of 1991 the primary concern of both the Americans and Soviets, the stability and peaceful transition for the Soviet Union, was no longer relevant. The Ukrainian, Russian, and Belarusian republics agreed to a deal that replaced the old Soviet system with the Commonwealth of Independent States, eliminating the prospect of large-scale secessionist conflict in the former territories of the Soviet Union.³⁵⁹ In the next section we also see that pressing international concerns were the primary influence of other international actors' regarding preferences on Croatia's recognition.

5.5.2 European Community Concerns: Germany, Britain, and France

The relevant European powers (Germany, Britain, and France) held different views on Croatia's recognition during most of the conflict. Germany, for the most part, was consistently in favor of Croatia's recognition, while Britain and France were opposed.³⁶⁰ Germany's stance on Croatian recognition was partly a function of

³⁵⁹ Paquin (2010): 48-49 and Headley (2008): 78-79.

³⁶⁰ Roger D. Petersen, *Western Intervention in the Balkans: The Strategic Use of Emotion in Conflict*, New York, NY: Cambridge University Press (2011): 119-120.

resentment regarding opposition to German unification. From the German perspective, European opposition to Croatia's recognition echoed recent negative reactions to Germany's unification.³⁶¹ The hostility on both sides of the unification issue lingered over the attempts to deal with the Yugoslav crisis, leading some in the German foreign ministry to remark "that we [Germany] did not only have friends among our allies."³⁶²

More importantly, Germany believed that granting Croatia recognition was the best and most realistically attainable solution to prevent further bloodshed. Germany believed this was the only credible way to pressure the JNA and their Serbian paramilitaries to stop the violence. On August 24, 1991 (not long after the conflict broke out in Croatia) Hans-Dietrich Genscher, then German foreign minister, sent a telegram to the authorities in Belgrade that stipulated this point. The communiqué stated:

If the bloodshed [in Croatia] continues and the policy of faits accomplis by force supported by the Yugoslav army is not halted immediately, the Federal Government [of Germany] must seriously examine the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia in their given frontiers. It will also commit itself to a corresponding examination within the European Community.³⁶³

This quote and the previous discussion illustrates that the basis of Germany's position on Croatia's recognition rested on concerns regarding lingering resentment

³⁶¹ Glaurdic (2011): 77.

³⁶² Frank Elbe and Richard Kiessler, *A Round Table with Sharp Corners: The Diplomatic Path to German Unity*, Baden-Baden, GER: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft (1996): 63.

³⁶³ Michael Libal, *Limits of Persuasion: Germany and the Yugoslav Crisis, 1991-1992*, Westport, CT: Praeger (1997): 39.

related to German unification and preferences regarding conflict termination. However, Germany's European allies held vastly different views on Croatia's recognition.

The British and French did not support Germany's position and opposed Croatia's international recognition. Similar to Germany, the main issues influencing their position was conflict management and concerns regarding German unification. Both the British and French wanted to avoid further bloodshed in Europe, but, unlike Germany, they felt that recognition of Croatia would only serve to widen the conflict. Also, the British and French read the situation much differently with regards to the JNA and Serbian authorities. Specifically, unlike Germany, the British and French were reluctant to pressure the Serbs over the Conflict in Croatia.³⁶⁴ This was because they believed that maintaining negotiating leverage with the Serbians offered better chances at stopping the violence. Lord Carrington, the European Community special representative and head of negotiations, remarked:

The point was that Serbia, being infinitely the biggest of republics, was clearly the most important, and unless you somehow managed to keep Serbia onside, there wasn't very much chance of getting an agreement...[the Yugoslavs were] all impossible people...all as bad as each other, and there are just more Serbs.³⁶⁵

I should note that it was not just the British and French who held this position, but also the Serbian authorities. Simply stated, the leaders in the JNA and their Serbian

³⁶⁴ Glaurdic (2011): 181.

³⁶⁵ Quoted in Brendan Simms, *Unfinest Hour: Britain and the Destruction of Bosnia*, New York, NY: Penguin Books (2001): 12, 17.

supporters clearly understood the British and French position and tried exploiting it.³⁶⁶

Milivoje Maksic, a Serbian politician and then Yugoslavia's deputy foreign minister, remarked on the Serbs understanding of the British and French position. He remarked:

The advantage [in the Croatian conflict] would not be given a priori [by the European states] to the smallest side in the war or to the side that was the most successful in presenting itself as a victim of the aggression of others. The advantage would be given to those forces which were able to offer the broadest formula most acceptable to all- a formula of a future Yugoslavia that could live and survive as a coherent state unit.³⁶⁷

In addition, similar to Germany, the British and French position on Croatia's recognition was influenced by lingering issues associated with German unification. This was partly a function of lingering fears associated with Germany's past. Douglas Hurd, then British foreign secretary, noted that Margaret Thatcher was obsessed with the references to Germany's aggressive past. He stated, "[at the time, I] was hearing at Number Ten [the office of the British Prime Minister] about the parallels with the years 1904-14, when the British, French, and Russians had joined in an entente to check German ambitions."³⁶⁸ It should be noted that while many of the warnings concerning German unification seemed alarmist, Germany's diplomatic position on Croatia contributed to some of these sentiments. It was supporting the recognition of a state with dubious democratic credentials, which was in the process of adopting fascist

³⁶⁶ This was especially the case with regards to the establishment of UN peacekeeping zones within Croatia that served to protect territory gained by Serbia during the conflict. See Caplan (2005): 111-112.

³⁶⁷ Quoted in Glaurdic (2011): 172.

³⁶⁸ Douglas Hurd, *Memoirs*, London, UK: Little, Brown (2003): 383.

symbolism associated with Nazi collaboration during WWII, and was widely suspected to be complicit in human rights abuses against portions of its own population. Given this perspective, it is understandable that this did not help alleviate the fears of Germany's revival.

More importantly, German unification affected the British and French position on Croatia's recognition because of fears of German dominance of European political and economic affairs. After unification, Germany contained Europe's largest population at 80 million people and also the continent's strongest economy.³⁶⁹ This was seen in both Britain and France as a threat to their political authority in European affairs. It threatened their positions of power and influence, as these two countries were the diplomatic leaders of Western Europe during the Cold War. In addition, the British and French were alarmed at the implications for West European integration since Germany's position on Croatian recognition was perceived as a shift in its policies in Eastern Europe.³⁷⁰ Lucarelli illustrates this point well when she states:

[Britain and France] behaved like little citadels of privilege, frightened that a united Germany would threaten their perceived prominence in Europe and their privileged position at the UN Security Council that they had enjoyed since 1945.³⁷¹

³⁶⁹ Glaurdic (2011): 77.

³⁷⁰ Christopher Coker, "Britain and the New World Order: The Special Relationship in the 1990's," *International Affairs* 68:3 (1992): 411-412

³⁷¹ Sonia Lucarelli, *Europe and the Breakup of Yugoslavia: A Political Failure in Search of Scholarly Explanation*, The Hague, NTH: Kluwer Law International (2000): 115.

This discussion illustrates that the Germans, British, and French held different positions regarding Croatia's recognition, but their positions were influenced by similar factors. All of their preferences regarding recognition (whether supportive or opposed to Croatia's recognition) were influenced by desires to manage the conflict and issues associated with German unification. As a result, the leading states in the European Community were at odds with each other regarding the proper course of action with respect to Croatia's recognition. However, despite disagreement the British and French eventually came to support Germany's position and extend recognition to Croatia on January 15, 1992.³⁷² This is because, like their previous opposition, pressing international concerns dictated the change to supporting Croatia's recognition. Specifically, the difference in opinion exposed a dangerous lack of European unity, which jeopardized the viability of European integration project as a whole. Roland Dumas, then France's foreign minister, noted this issue when informing French President Mitterrand of the need to accommodate Germany's position in December of 1991. He stated:

For the Twelve, and especially for France and Germany, to split over the Balkans seems to me to be much more dangerous than the risk of hastening conflagration in former Yugoslavia. For Yugoslavia to split up is tragic, for the [European] Community to do so would be catastrophic.³⁷³

³⁷² Lucarelli (1995): 20.

³⁷³ Quoted in Simon J. Nuttall, *European Foreign Policy*, New York, NY: Oxford University Press (2000): 222.

In addition to altruistic motives regarding European unity, the British and French agreement to now support Croatia's recognition was also influenced by alliance politics. Namely, Germany had linked its position on Croatian recognition to cooperation with respect to the Maastricht Treaty that created the European Union.³⁷⁴ In an attempt to pressure the British and French to switch positions to support recognition, Germany's foreign minister noted:

That his country had accommodated others at Maastricht and that the German government could not renege on its public commitment to a recognition [of Croatia] before Christmas [1991].³⁷⁵

Douglas Hurd, then British foreign secretary, described securing approval from Prime Minister Thatcher to switch to supporting Croatian recognition as a function of Germany calling in its Maastricht debts.³⁷⁶ It was this linkage of the European integration to Croatian recognition that was the decisive factor in determining the German, British, and French positions.

³⁷⁴ Stanley Hoffmann, "Yugoslavia: Implications for Europe and for European Institutions," in *The World and Yugoslavia's Wars*, ed. Richard H. Ullman, New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations (1996): 111 and Touval (2002): 62-63.

³⁷⁵ Quoted in Norbert Both, *From Indifference to Entrapment: The Netherlands and the Yugoslav Crisis, 1990-1995*, Amsterdam, NTH: Amsterdam University Press (2000): 135.

³⁷⁶ Hurd (2003): 450-451 and Glaurdic (2011): 268.

5.6 Croatia: Conclusion

The discussion in the previous sections of this chapter has illustrated that countries who were opposed or favorably disposed to secession did not heavily weigh Croatia's capacity to wield political authority or control its territory in their decisions regarding recognition. Nor did normative factors related to national self-determination or liberal democracy heavily influence the likelihood of international acceptance of Croatia's secession. Rather it was the involvement of the great and regional powers and their preferences regarding Croatia's secession that determined the likelihood of recognition. Most of the great and regional powers preferred the territorial status quo. Specifically, the United States and Soviet Union wanted to maintain the status quo because of worries that changes would induce secessionist conflict in the former constituent republics of the Soviet Union. Others, like the United Kingdom, France, and Germany were more focused on trying to prevent the conflict from spreading and the diplomatic implications for the future of the European Union project. I should note that this does not mean that domestic material and normative factors had absolutely no influence. My discussion regarding the norm of liberal democracy showed that the United States was especially sensitive towards democracy promotion and adherence to democratic principles during Croatia's secessionist conflict. However, the geo-political priorities already mentioned served to subordinate any favorable disposition regarding recognition based on normative factors associated with liberal democracy. This would support my argument that international material factors related to great power

involvement exert a heavy influence on the international recognition of violent secession attempts.

In addition, further support for my argument can be found in the comparison of results from the two cases. The previous discussion of Slovenia in chapter 4 also examined the three causal factors of interest; domestic material, international material, and normative. The findings from the analysis of Slovenia's secession also indicated that international material factors were the driving influence on the likelihood of Slovenia's recognition. Also, comparing the results from the Slovenian and Croatian cases provides added validity to my findings in both the qualitative and quantitative portions of this study. This is partly because possible confounding factors can be accounted for since both Slovenia and Croatia experienced the same opponent, were located in the same geographic region, and desired the recognition of the same international actors. More importantly, a comparison of the results from the two cases allows for greater confidence in the elimination of alternative explanations based on domestic material or normative factors. This is because Croatia showed significant variation in regards to territorial control, political authority, and democratic behavior. Given the difference in values, this allows for more confidence regarding the main element of my argument. Specifically, that international material factors related to great power involvement exerted the most influence on the likelihood for the international recognition of both Slovenia and Croatia.

The next chapter will provide a summary of this study as well as discuss the theoretical and policy implications of my argument and findings associated with it. I

conclude the next chapter and study with some brief comments concerning future research avenues dealing with secession and state formation in the international system.

CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION

6.1 Overview of Study

This study addressed the topic of state formation in the international system. I asked why some cases of seceding territories receive international recognition and acceptance as new states in the international system while others never receive such acknowledgement. Chapters 1-2 provided the theoretical framework for the study by presenting existing explanations for recognition based on domestic material and normative factors related to authority and control and national self-determination respectively. In addition, I challenged our assumptions regarding the defining characteristics and attributes of states in the international system, suggesting they are not as clear or developed as commonly held and that recognition is the most important determinant of statehood in the international system. I also argued that our analysis of relevant factors related to international recognition of seceding territories needs to expand. Specifically, international material factors related to great power involvement and normative factors related to liberal democracy need to be included in any evaluation of this relationship.

Chapter 3 continued this line of inquiry by testing hypotheses based on my argument regarding international material factors and liberal democracy as well as those related to rival hypotheses associated with authority, control, and national self-determination. The empirical test utilized a dataset containing 121 secessionist conflicts from 1815-2010. The estimator used for this analysis was an ordered logit and the regression analysis was reported with clustered standard errors with random effects and a lagged dependent variable added to account for issues involving post-regression diagnostics. In general, I find strong empirical support for my argument that international material factors and norms of democracy increase the likelihood that great powers will recognize cases of secession. Specifically, the direct involvement of a great power during the secession attempt is an important influence on the likelihood of recognition. In addition, the findings also support the claim that evaluations of adherence to democratic principles can impact preferences regarding recognition.

Chapters 4 and 5 consisted of the qualitative portion of this study. The inclusion of case-studies that examined Slovenia's and Croatia's international recognition reinforced the quantitative findings by providing a more detailed examination of the causal processes associated with the three types of explanatory factors; domestic material, international material, and normative. The discussion in these chapters indicated that my argument concerning international material factors impacting recognition holds under different conditions. In addition, it provided a clearer understanding of how normative factors related to liberal democracy can influence the acceptance of secession in the international system.

The rest of this chapter is devoted to providing answers to three important and related issues in regards to secession and state formation in the international system. First, I detail how my project has enhanced our understanding of the process of international recognition by existing states in the international system. Next, I discuss the possible theoretical and policy implications associated with the findings of this project. Finally, I describe how this study serves as a foundation to embark on other avenues of future research that have the possibility of enhancing our understanding of state formation and state behavior in the international system.

6.2 Recognition: A Clearer Understanding

In this section I address the empirical findings in the context of advancing our knowledge with respect to international recognition. Previously, I discussed how the commonly accepted explanations regarding the international recognition of seceding territories involved both authority and control within the territory, or national self-determination. The findings from the regression analysis confirmed that these factors do influence the likelihood of secession. However, when we examined the results from the case-studies of Slovenia and Croatia a more nuanced picture emerges. Some of the relevant international actors did bring up issues regarding the establishment of political authority and territorial control as criteria for recognition. However, despite this, none of the international actors in those cases based their decisions on these domestic material factors. Neither Slovenia's secure territorial control and perceived legitimacy

regarding political authority, nor did Croatia's lack of control increase the likelihood of recognition. In fact, if we were to examine the recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina this trend would hold since this state was occupied by two different opposition forces during its secessionist conflict. Given this new perspective, we need to be cautious in attributing international recognition of violent secessions to domestic material factors related to the attainment of political authority and territorial control.

In addition, our understanding of the impact that claims to national self-determination have on the likelihood of recognition has also been enhanced. As with domestic material factors, the findings from Chapter 3 confirmed that normative factors associated with national self-determination also impact the recognition of violent secession attempts. Again, a closer examination of the cases of Slovenia and Croatia provide some skepticism as to whether claims to national self-determination significantly impact decisions relating to international recognition. The discussion in Chapter 4 showed that Slovenia had a good claim to recognition on the basis of national self-determination. The homogeneous ethnic composition of its population, and the right to secession bestowed in the 1974 Yugoslavian Constitution made Slovenia a textbook case for national self-determination. Conversely, Croatia represented a bad case for national self-determination because of the presence of a large Serb minority, and the government's increasing hostility towards them. However, despite the difference between Slovenia and Croatia the relevant international actors converged on a position of refusing to extend recognition based on this norm. It should be noted that this was not just in hope of confining the conflict within the former Yugoslavia, but was

also cognizant awareness that recognition on the basis of national self-determination would have grave implications on future secession attempts. This leads to the conclusion that, like domestic material factors, explanations of international recognition based on claims to nation self-determination need to be examined closely.

The biggest contribution this project has made to our understanding of the relationship between secessionist conflicts and international recognition is to elevate the importance of the international dimension associated with these conflicts as well as adherence to norms and principles of liberal democracy. The quantitative results from Chapter 3 highlighted two types of international material factors important to the likelihood of international recognition of violent secession attempts; great power involvement and inter-state rivalry. The examination of both Slovenia and Croatia, in Chapters 4 and 5 respectively, confirms these results. Slovenia's attempts to gain recognition were buffeted by the conflicting needs of the American, Soviet, and European powers to satisfy their preferences with respect to either maintaining the unity and viability of Yugoslavia or controlling negotiations regarding conflict management. Croatia exhibits similar dynamics with respect to the importance of international material factors. During the Croatian conflict fears of secessionist conflict and ethnic violence breaking out in the Soviet Union greatly influenced the American and Soviet positions with respect to Croatian recognition. The European powers of Germany, France, and Britain were also preoccupied with international concerns. The deciding factor in these countries acceptance of Croatian secession and recognition was the elevation of one international concern over another. Specifically, the British and

French preference to marginalize Germany and maintain their influence and power in Europe clashed with the need to garner German economic and political support for the European Union and continued integration. This case demonstrates that these international priorities took precedence and necessitated the switch by the British and French to support Croatian recognition.

In addition to showing the importance of international material factors, this study has also brought needed attention to the role that normative factors related to liberal democracy have on the recognition of violent secession attempts. The results from Chapter 3 also suggested that democratic evaluations of the opposing sides during a secessionist conflict influence the probability of the international recognition. However, examination of the case-studies illustrated a more complicated picture regarding the influence that adherence to democratic principles have on the likelihood of international recognition. Specifically, while strong attention was placed on evaluating the democratic credentials of both the Slovenian and Croatian authorities, any concern, whether positive or negative, was subordinated to the international concerns previously mentioned. It is possible that this is a result of international actors possessing a hierarchy of priorities regarding international material and normative factors when evaluating the merits of international recognition. This could also be a function of the difficulty of evaluating democratic behavior in a context where human rights abuses are the norm, as exemplified in the Croatian conflict. Simply stated, while this study brought needed attention to the impact adherence to democratic principles has on international recognition of secessionist conflicts. However, the exact process

and mechanisms that governs the relevance of liberal democracy needs further refinement.

This discussion illustrates that this study has made two major contributions to the state of knowledge regarding the factors that influence the likelihood of international recognition. I have shown that existing explanations that relied on domestic material related to authority and control needed further refinement since they do not capture the importance of the international dimension that influences the likelihood of recognition. In addition, I showed that explanations regarding normative factors that are relevant to recognition needed to account for, not only national self-determination, but also adherence to principles relating to liberal democracy.

6.3 Theoretical Implications

This section explores the theoretical and policy implications associated with this study's findings. The findings regarding national self-determination and the influence of international material factors have implication for theories regarding norm diffusion and state formation in the international system respectively. The findings associated with national self-determination suggest two issues that need further attention. One concerns theories of norm diffusion in the international system. Prominent theories regarding the impact of norms in the international system predict that over time, norms like national self-determination increase in strength. However, the empirical evidence associated with this study calls this assumption into question, since claims to national

self-determination were explicitly rejected in the two cases detailed. This may indicate an important element related to the processes involved with norm diffusion.

Specifically, that the diffusion of norms, like national self-determination, may be regulated by the possession of material factors that impact the security of other states.

In addition, these findings also point to the need to address issues related to conceptualization of national self-determination. The discussion of national self-determination in Chapter 2 mentioned some of the issues associated with this concept. This included discussion about conceptual stretching, since national self-determination is prone to application in a wide range of political contexts. This elasticity is largely due to the differing use of the term to reflect political outcomes that are far removed from attaining one's own independent state. Some of these outcomes include; securing cultural rights related to language, achievement of federal or consociational arrangements, or granting of a large-degree of autonomy over political and economic affairs. Also, the results showing that normative factors relating to liberal democracy influences international recognition illustrate another conceptual issue associated with national self-determination. Previous discussion in Chapter 2 touched upon the tendency to conceptualize national self-determination as having embedded principles of democracy as one of its constitutive factors. This implied that national self-determination is commonly conceptualized as multi-dimensional with reference to the nation and democracy as its constitutive components. However, given the support for my argument that normative factors related to liberal democracy exerting an

independent influence on international recognition, the commonly accepted conceptualization of national self-determination needs further refinement.

In addition to the implications for theories concerning norm diffusion and internalization, this study's findings also impact theories related to state formation in the international system. Commonly held assumptions regarding state formation view the most important formative processes operating at the domestic level. Specifically, political actors establish a centralized coercive and extractive apparatus, which becomes the basis for political authority over a given territory and population. However, the findings in this study would seem to contradict this view. Pressing concerns of international actors may dictate or prevent the establishment of a new state in the international system regardless of the domestic attributes of the aspiring state. As a consequence, the evaluation of material and normative factors relating to international recognition may exhibit variation in different contexts or regions of the world. Examples abound of the apparent inconsistencies when it comes to statehood in the international system. Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Regions, areas outside of Mogadishu (Capital of Somalia), large swaths of Southern Yemen, and the regions of Paraguay near the shared border with Argentina and Brazil are good examples of stateless regions where the central authorities have little or no control.³⁷⁷ This would seem to be an indicator that, with respect to material factors, the criteria for statehood varies

³⁷⁷ David H. Gray and Kristina LaTour, "Terrorist Black Holes: Global Regions Shrouded in Lawlessness," *Global Security Studies*, 1:3 (Fall 2010): 157-161.

according to the political concerns of powerful international actors and realistic assessments of state capacity associated with specific regions.

Another possible implication for theories of state formation is the manner in which international actors try to enhance their security and political position utilizing secessionist movements. The political self-interest of existing states may induce the recognition of seceding territories because the newly emerging state can alter the security environment by providing possible alliance partners or provide sanctuary to domestic challengers that undermine the security of a neighboring state. Byman notes that existing states sometimes utilize secessionist movements to achieve specific security goals such as destabilizing neighbors, increasing regional influence, or promoting regime change.³⁷⁸ If international actors utilize secessionist conflicts to address their external security concerns, then many secessionist movements that were viewed as legitimate aspirations for self-government or national self-determination may in fact be the product of a neighbors security concerns.

The findings of this study also indicate that the relationship between recognition and normative factors related to perceived legitimacy and adherence to democratic principles may also be influenced by international political concerns and regional variation. Douglas Hurd, then British Foreign Secretary, saw the secession in Yugoslavia as:

³⁷⁸ Byman, (2001): 23-34.

[primitive instincts] asserting themselves...to drive people of a different tribe out of your village...[secession in Yugoslavia was] a chaos, fighting, a number of small statelets, all bankrupt, all relying on the West in one way or another, trying to involve other countries in their fighting.³⁷⁹

Hurd's assessment was shared by many Western diplomats at the time.

However, Croatia was eventually recognized by these same policymakers despite these sentiments and clear knowledge that the acknowledgement of Croatia's secession would lead to further human rights abuses at the hands of the Tadjman regime. This would seem to indicate that Croatia's deficiencies in regards to respect for human rights and perceived legitimacy were acceptable for acknowledgement of statehood given the context of the breakup of Yugoslavia. Further evidence for possible regional or context variation regarding perceptions of legitimacy and adherence to democratic principles can be found in the numerous reports of international election monitors. Many of these reports provide a context specific, rather than an objective, determination as to whether the polls conducted were "free and fair." This observation would seem to bolster the notion that evaluation of democratic behavior may not be uniform but rather subject to perceptions based on factors such as legacies of authoritarian repression or civil conflict instability.

³⁷⁹ Quoted in Glaurdic (2011): 176.

6.4 Policy Implications

The findings of this study also have important policy implications. Specifically, the findings of this study provide a better understanding in regards to recognition policies of seceding territories and regimes undergoing democratic transition. Currently, there are a number of simmering secessionist conflicts in the international system that carry the possibility of violent outburst. The 2008 South Ossetia War between Russian backed separatists and Georgia, the ongoing dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabagh, and current conflict in Mali between al-Qaida backed extremists and Tuareg rebels trying to establish Azwad are prime examples of some of the policy challenges Western diplomats and policy makers are facing in today's international system. A better understanding of how these secessionist movements' aspirations for recognition interact with the political preferences of relevant regional and international actors is the basis for better policies that minimize conflict and promote regional stability.

In addition, this understanding can help with policies not directly related to secession but to recognition in general. The example of ongoing tensions between the United States and China over Taiwan is another example of the policy implications of my study. Given that China views American interest in maintaining Taiwan's security as supporting an illegal attempt at secession by a renegade province, the nature of the US-Taiwanese relationship is clearly an important element in Taiwan's potential recognition. This is because US-Taiwan relations not only determines the nature of

Taiwan's future political development, but also provides leverage and tension in the Sino-American security relationship.

The findings of this study also have policy implications with respect to regimes undergoing democratic transitions. This is because the evaluation of adherence to democratic principles that happens in the context of secession also occurs in situations where the legitimacy of the incumbent regime is called into question. The recent events of the Arab Spring would seem to support this conclusion. Specifically, despite the authoritarian nature of the incumbent regimes, American policy makers expressed hesitation to support democratizing protestors in both Libya and Egypt because of fears that these opposition movements were dominated by radical Islamists. This would seem to indicate that the switching of recognition from an incumbent to a new regime during democratic transitions is dependent on perceived sharing of democratic values. In short, it would seem appearances as well as intentions matter to gain the support of international actors to abandon incumbent authoritarian regimes during democratic transitions.

Also, the findings of this study provide useful policy prescriptions regarding authoritarian regimes that engage in wide-scale repression to thwart democratic transitions. Specifically, the finding that powerful international actors are useful allies to secure recognition during secession is readily transferable to regimes trying to withstand international pressure when engaging in human rights abuses during democratic upheaval. The ongoing repression in Syria is a prime example of the importance of the international dimension in these contexts since many commentators

have noted that Russian and Chinese support have proved invaluable in maintaining the regime's grip on power. If American policy makers are truly interested in stopping the bloodshed in Syria then appeals and linkage to unrelated matters of importance to these countries (missile defense and Taiwan respectively are good examples) would seem to be more promising than appeals or shaming based on normative concerns regarding respect for human rights.

6.5 Future Research and Concluding Thoughts

The findings from this study also provide some useful avenues for future research. Future expansion of this study will examine the causal processes associated with international material and normative factors outside the Yugoslavian context. Specifically, I am interested in determining whether my argument concerning great power involvement and liberal democracy is operating as predicted in a different regional and conflict environment. If examination of a different set of secessionist conflicts exhibit similar results than we can be more confident in the validity of my argument that accounting for the international dimension of these conflicts is essential to understanding the dynamics associated with the international recognition of secession.

Another future research project associated with this study regards the use of proxies during secession to undermine the security of other states. Specifically, I am interested in determining whether a lack of military capacity leads some states to

support a secessionist movement in a neighboring or adversarial state. In short, I want to investigate whether the support of a secessionist movement is a remedy to achieve security objectives under conditions of material deprivation. In particular, if this is true than we should see regional variation associated with the outbreak of secessionist conflicts and the use of proxies that coincides with known measures of state capacity.

One other possible area of research associated with this study is examination of other contexts where material and normative factors interact with regards to legitimacy. This study has shown that international material factors related to great power involvement and normative factors related to liberal democracy influenced the likelihood of international recognition of violent secession attempts. Given this, I am also interested in other contexts where material and normative factors interact to influence state behavior in the international system. Specifically, I would be interested in seeing if my argument applied to the context of treaty adherence in the international system. This is because treaty adherence, like secession, is heavily influenced by perceptions of legitimacy since existing actors in the international system make evaluations of the likelihood of defection. In short, I am interested in whether the same material and normative factors that determine the acceptance of new states in the international system also largely determine the degree of cooperation that occurs as well.

The discussion in this chapter has provided a summary of this study that addressed the question of why some cases of violent secession receive international recognition. I have also discussed how the findings of this study have made specific

contributions to the state of knowledge regarding the topic of secession and state formation in the international system. In addition, I have provided some useful theoretical and policy implications as well as future avenues of research to pursue in regards to this project. I close this study with the observation that this project has illustrated that topics, like state formation, we sometimes consider solely the domain of domestic politics are frequently buffeted by international forces. Conversely, some topics that we consider solely within the purview of international politics can often have important domestic elements and processes involved. From this perspective, this study's most important contribution is reminding and reiterating that a more holistic understanding of political behavior, that combines the domestic and international levels, often provides the clearest understanding and advancement of knowledge.

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APPENDIX A:

SUMMARY STATISTICS

TABLE A.1:

SUMMARY MEASURES OF ORDERED LOGIT MODELS

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Obs.</i>	<i>Std. Dev.</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Min.</i>	<i>Max</i>
id	1295	648	373.9786	1	1295
year	1295	1967.652	46.25647	1817	2010
recognition3	1295	0.1451737	0.407339	0	2
recognition4	1295	0.2355212	0.639483	0	3
ps_military	1295	1.32973	0.595063	1	3
ps_economy	1295	1.342085	0.59717	1	3
group_military	1295	1.482625	0.632308	1	3
mountain_jungle	1295	0.4826255	0.499891	0	1
urban	1295	0.1737452	0.379037	0	1
lootable	1295	0.3042471	0.460266	0	1
gp_conflict	1295	0.0857805	0.280148	0	1
gp_proximity	1295	0.1181467	0.322907	0	1
gp_secession	1295	0.176834	0.381676	0	1
rivals	1295	0.1320463	0.338672	1	4
self_determination	1295	2.04556	1.012408	0	3
colonial	1295	0.1590734	0.365886	0	1
sub_unit	1295	0.4162162	0.493121	0	1
terrorism	1295	0.376834	0.48478	0	1
polity_iv	1287	0.1383061	7.177021	-10	10
un_involved	1100	0.0636364	0.244215	0	1

APPENDIX B:

SECESSION-GROUP LISTINGS

TABLE B.1:

COMPLETE LISTING OF SECESSIONIST CONFLICTS

Conflict Name	Parent-State	Independent State	Year
Liberation of Chile	Spain	Chile	1817
Liberation of Chile	Spain	Chile	1818
First Bolivar Expedition	Spain	New Granada	1817
First Bolivar Expedition	Spain	New Granada	1818
First Bolivar Expedition	Spain	New Granada	1819
Mexican Independence	Spain	Mexico	1817
Mexican Independence	Spain	Mexico	1818
First Two Sicilies War	Austria-Hungary	Naples	1820
First Two Sicilies War	Austria-Hungary	Naples	1821
Sardinian Revolt	Austria-Hungary	Sardinia	1821
Greek Independence	Ottoman-Empire	Greece	1821
Greek Independence	Ottoman-Empire	Greece	1822
Greek Independence	Ottoman-Empire	Greece	1823
Greek Independence	Ottoman-Empire	Greece	1824
Greek Independence	Ottoman-Empire	Greece	1825
Greek Independence	Ottoman-Empire	Greece	1826
Greek Independence	Ottoman-Empire	Greece	1827
Greek Independence	Ottoman-Empire	Greece	1828
2nd Bolivar Expedition	Spain	New Granada	1821
2nd Bolivar Expedition	Spain	New Granada	1822
Liberation of Peru	Spain	Peru	1824
Liberation of Peru	Spain	Peru	1825
Dutch-Javanese War	Netherlands	Diponegoro	1825

TABLE B.1 (CONTINUED)

Conflict Name	Parent-State	Independent State	Year
Dutch-Javanese War	Netherlands	Diponegoro	1826
Dutch-Javanese War	Netherlands	Diponegoro	1827
Dutch-Javanese War	Netherlands	Diponegoro	1828
Dutch-Javanese War	Netherlands	Diponegoro	1829
Dutch-Javanese War	Netherlands	Diponegoro	1830
First Albanian Revolt	Ottoman-Empire	Albania	1830
First Albanian Revolt	Ottoman-Empire	Albania	1831
Al-Qadir War (Franco-Algerian)	France	Algeria	1832
Al-Qadir War (Franco-Algerian)	France	Algeria	1833
Al-Qadir War (Franco-Algerian)	France	Algeria	1834
Al-Qadir War (Franco-Algerian)	France	Algeria	1835
Al-Qadir War (Franco-Algerian)	France	Algeria	1836
Al-Qadir War (Franco-Algerian)	France	Algeria	1837
Al-Qadir War (Franco-Algerian)	France	Algeria	1838
Al-Qadir War (Franco-Algerian)	France	Algeria	1839
Al-Qadir War (Franco-Algerian)	France	Algeria	1840
Al-Qadir War (Franco-Algerian)	France	Algeria	1841
Al-Qadir War (Franco-Algerian)	France	Algeria	1842
Al-Qadir War (Franco-Algerian)	France	Algeria	1843
Al-Qadir War (Franco-Algerian)	France	Algeria	1844
Al-Qadir War (Franco-Algerian)	France	Algeria	1845
Al-Qadir War (Franco-Algerian)	France	Algeria	1846
Al-Qadir War (Franco-Algerian)	France	Algeria	1847

TABLE B.1 (CONTINUED)

Conflict Name	Parent-State	Independent State	Year
Belgian Independence	Netherlands	Belgium	1830
First Polish War	Russia	Poland	1831
Texan Independence	Mexico	Texas	1835
Texan Independence	Mexico	Texas	1836
Farroupilha War	Brazil	Rio Grande Republic	1835
Farroupilha War	Brazil	Rio Grande Republic	1836
Farroupilha War	Brazil	Rio Grande Republic	1837
Farroupilha War	Brazil	Rio Grande Republic	1838
Farroupilha War	Brazil	Rio Grande Republic	1839
Farroupilha War	Brazil	Rio Grande Republic	1840
Farroupilha War	Brazil	Rio Grande Republic	1841
Farroupilha War	Brazil	Rio Grande Republic	1842
Farroupilha War	Brazil	Rio Grande Republic	1843
Farroupilha War	Brazil	Rio Grande Republic	1844
Farroupilha War	Brazil	Rio Grande Republic	1845
Sabinada Rebellion	Brazil	Bahia	1837
Sabinada Rebellion	Brazil	Bahia	1838
Lebanon Insurgency	Ottoman-Empire (Egypt)	Mount Lebanon	1840
First Colombian War	Colombia	State of Isthmus of Panama (Panama and Veragua)	1840
First Colombian War	Colombia	State of Isthmus of Panama (Panama and Veragua)	1841
First Colombian War	Colombia	State of Isthmus of Panama (Panama and Veragua)	1842
First Haiti-Santo Domingo War	Haiti	Dominican Republic	1844
First Haiti-Santo Domingo War	Haiti	Dominican Republic	1845
Cracow Revolt	Russia, Austria, and Prussia	Poland (Cracow)	1846
First Schleswig-Holstein War	Denmark	Schleswig & Holstein	1848
First Schleswig-Holstein War	Denmark	Schleswig & Holstein	1849
Mayan Caste War (Phase 2)	Mexico	Chan Santa Cruz	1848
Mayan Caste War	Mexico	Chan Santa Cruz	1849

TABLE B.1 (CONTINUED)

Conflict Name	Parent-State	Independent State	Year
(Phase 2)			
Mayan Caste War (Phase 2)	Mexico	Chan Santa Cruz	1850
Mayan Caste War (Phase 2)	Mexico	Chan Santa Cruz	1851
Mayan Caste War (Phase 2)	Mexico	Chan Santa Cruz	1852
Mayan Caste War (Phase 2)	Mexico	Chan Santa Cruz	1853
Mayan Caste War (Phase 2)	Mexico	Chan Santa Cruz	1854
Mayan Caste War (Phase 2)	Mexico	Chan Santa Cruz	1855
Hungarian War	Austria and Russia	Hungary	1848
Hungarian War	Austria and Russia	Hungary	1849
War of the Roman Republic	Two Sicilies, Austria, and France	Roman Republic	1849
Indian Mutiny	Britain	India	1857
Indian Mutiny	Britain	India	1858
Indian Mutiny	Britain	India	1859
Panthay Rebellion (Phase 2)	China	Pingnan Guo	1860
Panthay Rebellion (Phase 2)	China	Pingnan Guo	1861
Panthay Rebellion (Phase 2)	China	Pingnan Guo	1862
Panthay Rebellion (Phase 2)	China	Pingnan Guo	1863
Panthay Rebellion (Phase 2)	China	Pingnan Guo	1864
Panthay Rebellion (Phase 2)	China	Pingnan Guo	1865
Panthay Rebellion (Phase 2)	China	Pingnan Guo	1866
Panthay Rebellion (Phase 2)	China	Pingnan Guo	1867
Panthay Rebellion (Phase 2)	China	Pingnan Guo	1868
Panthay Rebellion	China	Pingnan Guo	1869

TABLE B.1 (CONTINUED)

Conflict Name	Parent-State	Independent State	Year
(Phase 2)			
Panthay Rebellion (Phase 2)	China	Pingnan Guo	1870
Panthay Rebellion (Phase 2)	China	Pingnan Guo	1871
Panthay Rebellion (Phase 2)	China	Pingnan Guo	1872
US Civil War	United States	Confederate States of America	1861
US Civil War	United States	Confederate States of America	1862
US Civil War	United States	Confederate States of America	1863
US Civil War	United States	Confederate States of America	1864
US Civil War	United States	Confederate States of America	1865
Franco-Mexican War	France	Mexico	1862
Franco-Mexican War	France	Mexico	1863
Franco-Mexican War	France	Mexico	1864
Franco-Mexican War	France	Mexico	1865
Franco-Mexican War	France	Mexico	1866
Franco-Mexican War	France	Mexico	1867
Second Polish War	Russia	Poland	1863
Second Polish War	Russia	Poland	1864
First Cretan War	Ottoman-Empire	Crete	1866
First Cretan War	Ottoman-Empire	Crete	1867
First Spanish-Cuban War	Spain	Cuba	1868
First Spanish-Cuban War	Spain	Cuba	1869
First Spanish-Cuban War	Spain	Cuba	1870
First Spanish-Cuban War	Spain	Cuba	1871
First Spanish-Cuban War	Spain	Cuba	1872
First Spanish-Cuban War	Spain	Cuba	1873
First Spanish-Cuban War	Spain	Cuba	1874
First Spanish-Cuban War	Spain	Cuba	1875

TABLE B.1 (CONTINUED)

Conflict Name	Parent-State	Independent State	Year
First Spanish-Cuban War	Spain	Cuba	1876
First Spanish-Cuban War	Spain	Cuba	1877
First Spanish-Cuban War	Spain	Cuba	1878
Bulgarian Revolt	Ottoman-Empire	Bulgaria and Montenegro	1875
Bulgarian Revolt	Ottoman-Empire	Bulgaria and Montenegro	1876
Serbian-Turkish War	Ottoman-Empire	Serbia	1876
Serbian-Turkish War	Ottoman-Empire	Serbia	1877
Austrian-Bosnian War	Austria-Hungary	Bosnia	1878
First Boer War	Britain	Transvaal Republic	1880
First Boer War	Britain	Transvaal Republic	1881
Serbian-Bulgarian War	Serbia	East Rumelia	1885
Second Spanish-Cuban War	Spain	Cuba	1895
Second Spanish-Cuban War	Spain	Cuba	1896
Second Spanish-Cuban War	Spain	Cuba	1897
Second Spanish-Cuban War	Spain	Cuba	1898
Japan-Taiwanese War	Japan	Republic of Formosa	1895
Second Cretan War	Ottoman-Empire	Crete	1896
Second Cretan War	Ottoman-Empire	Crete	1897
Tagalog War (Spanish-Philippine)	Spain	Philippines	1896
Tagalog War (Spanish-Philippine)	Spain	Philippines	1897
Tagalog War (Spanish-Philippine)	Spain	Philippines	1898
Philippine Insurrection	United States	Philippines	1899
Philippine Insurrection	United States	Philippines	1900
Philippine Insurrection	United States	Philippines	1901
Philippine Insurrection	United States	Philippines	1902
Second Boer War	Britain	Transvaal Republic & Orange Free State	1899
Second Boer War	Britain	Transvaal Republic & Orange	1900

TABLE B.1 (CONTINUED)

Conflict Name	Parent-State	Independent State	Year
		Free State	
Second Boer War	Britain	Transvaal Republic & Orange Free State	1901
Second Boer War	Britain	Transvaal Republic & Orange Free State	1902
Somali Rebellion	Britain	Dervish State	1901
Somali Rebellion	Britain	Dervish State	1902
Somali Rebellion	Britain	Dervish State	1903
Somali Rebellion	Britain	Dervish State	1904
Second Albanian Revolt	Ottoman-Empire	Albania	1910
Second Albanian Revolt	Ottoman-Empire	Albania	1911
Second Albanian Revolt	Ottoman-Empire	Albania	1912
First Sino-Tibetan War	China	Tibet	1912
First Sino-Tibetan War	China	Tibet	1913
Moro Rebellion	United States	Sulu (Moros on Mindano)	1913
Southern China Revolt	China	Yunnan Republic	1916
Southern China Revolt	China	Yunnan Republic	1917
Southern China Revolt	China	Yunnan Republic	1918
Western Ukrainian War	Poland	Western Ukrainian Republic	1918
Western Ukrainian War	Poland	Western Ukrainian Republic	1919
Estonian War of Independence	Russia	Estonia	1918
Estonian War of Independence	Russia	Estonia	1919
Estonian War of Independence	Russia	Estonia	1920
Latvian War of Independence	Russia and Germany	Latvia	1918
Latvian War of Independence	Russia and Germany	Latvia	1919
Latvian War of Independence	Russia and Germany	Latvia	1920
Lithuanian-Polish War	Poland	Republic of Central Lithuania	1920

TABLE B.1 (CONTINUED)

Conflict Name	Parent-State	Independent State	Year
Chinese Civil War (Tibet)	China	Tibet	1931
Chinese Civil War (Tibet)	China	Tibet	1932
Chinese Civil War (Tibet)	China	Tibet	1933
Xinjiang Muslim Revolt	China	Xinjiang Sultanate	1932
Xinjiang Muslim Revolt	China	Xinjiang Sultanate	1933
Xinjiang Muslim Revolt	China	Xinjiang Sultanate	1934
Palestinian Revolts (Jews)	Britain	Palestine	1931
Palestinian Revolts (Jews)	Britain	Palestine	1932
Palestinian Revolts (Jews)	Britain	Palestine	1933
Palestinian Revolts (Jews)	Britain	Palestine	1934
Palestinian Revolts (Jews)	Britain	Palestine	1935
Palestinian Revolts (Jews)	Britain	Palestine	1936
Palestinian Revolts (Jews)	Britain	Palestine	1937
Palestinian Revolts (Jews)	Britain	Palestine	1938
Palestinian Revolts (Jews)	Britain	Palestine	1939
Palestinian Revolts (Jews)	Britain	Palestine	1940
Palestinian Revolts (Jews)	Britain	Palestine	1941
Palestinian Revolts (Jews)	Britain	Palestine	1942
Palestinian Revolts (Jews)	Britain	Palestine	1943
Palestinian Revolts (Jews)	Britain	Palestine	1944
Palestinian Revolts (Jews)	Britain	Palestine	1945

TABLE B.1 (CONTINUED)

Conflict Name	Parent-State	Independent State	Year
Palestinian Revolts (Jews)	Britain	Palestine	1946
Palestinian Revolts (Jews)	Britain	Palestine	1947
Lithuanian Resistance	Soviet Union	Lithuania	1945
Lithuanian Resistance	Soviet Union	Lithuania	1946
Lithuanian Resistance	Soviet Union	Lithuania	1947
Lithuanian Resistance	Soviet Union	Lithuania	1948
Lithuanian Resistance	Soviet Union	Lithuania	1949
Lithuanian Resistance	Soviet Union	Lithuania	1950
Lithuanian Resistance	Soviet Union	Lithuania	1951
Lithuanian Resistance	Soviet Union	Lithuania	1952
Ukrainian Resistance	Soviet Union	Ukraine	1945
Ukrainian Resistance	Soviet Union	Ukraine	1946
Ukrainian Resistance	Soviet Union	Ukraine	1947
Ukrainian Resistance	Soviet Union	Ukraine	1948
Ukrainian Resistance	Soviet Union	Ukraine	1949
Ukrainian Resistance	Soviet Union	Ukraine	1950
Ukrainian Resistance	Soviet Union	Ukraine	1951
Ukrainian Resistance	Soviet Union	Ukraine	1952
Ukrainian Resistance	Soviet Union	Ukraine	1953
Ukrainian Resistance	Soviet Union	Ukraine	1954
Malayan Emergency	Britain	Malaysia	1945
Malayan Emergency	Britain	Malaysia	1946
Malayan Emergency	Britain	Malaysia	1947
Malayan Emergency	Britain	Malaysia	1948
Malayan Emergency	Britain	Malaysia	1949
Malayan Emergency	Britain	Malaysia	1950
Malayan Emergency	Britain	Malaysia	1951
Malayan Emergency	Britain	Malaysia	1952
Malayan Emergency	Britain	Malaysia	1953
Malayan Emergency	Britain	Malaysia	1954
Malayan Emergency	Britain	Malaysia	1955
Malayan Emergency	Britain	Malaysia	1956
Malayan Emergency	Britain	Malaysia	1957
Indonesian Independence	Netherlands	Indonesia	1945
Indonesian	Netherlands	Indonesia	1946

TABLE B.1 (CONTINUED)

Conflict Name	Parent-State	Independent State	Year
Independence			
Indonesian Independence	Netherlands	Indonesia	1947
Indonesian Independence	Netherlands	Indonesia	1948
Indonesian Independence	Netherlands	Indonesia	1949
Indo-Sikh Conflict	India	Khalistan	1981
Indo-Sikh Conflict	India	Khalistan	1982
Indo-Sikh Conflict	India	Khalistan	1983
Indo-Sikh Conflict	India	Khalistan	1984
Indo-Sikh Conflict	India	Khalistan	1985
Indo-Sikh Conflict	India	Khalistan	1986
Indo-Sikh Conflict	India	Khalistan	1987
Indo-Sikh Conflict	India	Khalistan	1988
Indo-Sikh Conflict	India	Khalistan	1989
Indo-Sikh Conflict	India	Khalistan	1990
Indo-Sikh Conflict	India	Khalistan	1991
Indo-Sikh Conflict	India	Khalistan	1992
Indo-Sikh Conflict	India	Khalistan	1993
Tripura Insurgency	India	Tripura	1990
Tripura Insurgency	India	Tripura	1991
Tripura Insurgency	India	Tripura	1992
Tripura Insurgency	India	Tripura	1993
Tripura Insurgency	India	Tripura	1994
Tripura Insurgency	India	Tripura	1995
Tripura Insurgency	India	Tripura	1996
Tripura Insurgency	India	Tripura	1997
Tripura Insurgency	India	Tripura	1998
Tripura Insurgency	India	Tripura	1999
Tripura Insurgency	India	Tripura	2000
Meiti Insurgency	India	Manipur	1979
Meiti Insurgency	India	Manipur	1980
Meiti Insurgency	India	Manipur	1981
Meiti Insurgency	India	Manipur	1982
Meiti Insurgency	India	Manipur	1983
Meiti Insurgency	India	Manipur	1984
Meiti Insurgency	India	Manipur	1985

TABLE B.1 (CONTINUED)

Conflict Name	Parent-State	Independent State	Year
Meiti Insurgency	India	Manipur	1986
Meiti Insurgency	India	Manipur	1987
Meiti Insurgency	India	Manipur	1988
Meiti Insurgency	India	Manipur	1989
Meiti Insurgency	India	Manipur	1990
Meiti Insurgency	India	Manipur	1991
Meiti Insurgency	India	Manipur	1992
Meiti Insurgency	India	Manipur	1993
Meiti Insurgency	India	Manipur	1994
Meiti Insurgency	India	Manipur	1995
Meiti Insurgency	India	Manipur	1996
Meiti Insurgency	India	Manipur	1997
Meiti Insurgency	India	Manipur	1998
Meiti Insurgency	India	Manipur	1999
Meiti Insurgency	India	Manipur	2000
Kashmir Insurgency	India	Kashmir	1989
Kashmir Insurgency	India	Kashmir	1990
Kashmir Insurgency	India	Kashmir	1991
Kashmir Insurgency	India	Kashmir	1992
Kashmir Insurgency	India	Kashmir	1993
Kashmir Insurgency	India	Kashmir	1994
Kashmir Insurgency	India	Kashmir	1995
Kashmir Insurgency	India	Kashmir	1996
Kashmir Insurgency	India	Kashmir	1997
Kashmir Insurgency	India	Kashmir	1998
Kashmir Insurgency	India	Kashmir	1999
Kashmir Insurgency	India	Kashmir	2000
Kashmir Insurgency	India	Kashmir	2001
Kashmir Insurgency	India	Kashmir	2002
Kashmir Insurgency	India	Kashmir	2003
Kashmir Insurgency	India	Kashmir	2004
Kashmir Insurgency	India	Kashmir	2005
Kashmir Insurgency	India	Kashmir	2006
Kashmir Insurgency	India	Kashmir	2007
Kashmir Insurgency	India	Kashmir	2008
Kashmir Insurgency	India	Kashmir	2009
Kashmir Insurgency	India	Kashmir	2010

TABLE B.1 (CONTINUED)

Conflict Name	Parent-State	Independent State	Year
Indo-Hyderabad War	India	Hyderabad	1947
Bodo Insurgency	India	Bodoland	1986
Bodo Insurgency	India	Bodoland	1987
Bodo Insurgency	India	Bodoland	1988
Bodo Insurgency	India	Bodoland	1989
Bodo Insurgency	India	Bodoland	1990
Bodo Insurgency	India	Bodoland	1991
Bodo Insurgency	India	Bodoland	1992
Bodo Insurgency	India	Bodoland	1993
Bodo Insurgency	India	Bodoland	1994
Bodo Insurgency	India	Bodoland	1995
Bodo Insurgency	India	Bodoland	1996
Bodo Insurgency	India	Bodoland	1997
Bodo Insurgency	India	Bodoland	1998
Bodo Insurgency	India	Bodoland	1999
Bodo Insurgency	India	Bodoland	2000
Bodo Insurgency	India	Bodoland	2001
Bodo Insurgency	India	Bodoland	2002
Bodo Insurgency	India	Bodoland	2003
Bodo Insurgency	India	Bodoland	2004
Bodo Insurgency	India	Bodoland	2005
Bodo Insurgency	India	Bodoland	2006
Bodo Insurgency	India	Bodoland	2007
Bodo Insurgency	India	Bodoland	2008
Bodo Insurgency	India	Bodoland	2009
Bodo Insurgency	India	Bodoland	2010
Assam Insuregency	India	Assam	1990
Assam Insuregency	India	Assam	1991
Assam Insuregency	India	Assam	1992
Assam Insuregency	India	Assam	1993
Assam Insuregency	India	Assam	1994
Assam Insuregency	India	Assam	1995
Assam Insuregency	India	Assam	1996
Assam Insuregency	India	Assam	1997
Assam Insuregency	India	Assam	1998
Assam Insuregency	India	Assam	1999
Assam Insuregency	India	Assam	2000

TABLE B.1 (CONTINUED)

Conflict Name	Parent-State	Independent State	Year
Assam Insuregency	India	Assam	2001
Assam Insuregency	India	Assam	2002
Assam Insuregency	India	Assam	2003
Assam Insuregency	India	Assam	2004
Assam Insuregency	India	Assam	2005
Assam Insuregency	India	Assam	2006
Assam Insuregency	India	Assam	2007
Assam Insuregency	India	Assam	2008
Assam Insuregency	India	Assam	2009
Assam Insuregency	India	Assam	2010
Puerto Rician Spearatisit Campaign	United States	Puerto Rico	1974
Puerto Rician Spearatisit Campaign	United States	Puerto Rico	1975
Puerto Rician Spearatisit Campaign	United States	Puerto Rico	1976
Puerto Rician Spearatisit Campaign	United States	Puerto Rico	1977
Puerto Rician Spearatisit Campaign	United States	Puerto Rico	1978
Puerto Rician Spearatisit Campaign	United States	Puerto Rico	1979
Puerto Rician Spearatisit Campaign	United States	Puerto Rico	1980
Puerto Rician Spearatisit Campaign	United States	Puerto Rico	1981
Puerto Rician Spearatisit Campaign	United States	Puerto Rico	1982
Puerto Rician Spearatisit Campaign	United States	Puerto Rico	1983
Balkan Wars (Croatian)	Serbia	Croatia	1990
Balkan Wars (Croatian)	Serbia	Croatia	1991
Balkan Wars (Croatian)	Serbia	Croatia	1992
Balkan Wars (Croatian)	Serbia	Croatia	1993
Balkan Wars (Croatian)	Serbia	Croatia	1994
Balkan Wars (Croatian)	Serbia	Croatia	1995
Ten-Day War	Serbia	Slovenia	1990
Ten-Day War	Serbia	Slovenia	1991

TABLE B.1 (CONTINUED)

Conflict Name	Parent-State	Independent State	Year
Balkan Wars (Bosnia)	Serbia	Bosnia	1990
Balkan Wars (Bosnia)	Serbia	Bosnia	1991
Balkan Wars (Bosnia)	Serbia	Bosnia	1992
Balkan Wars (Bosnia)	Serbia	Bosnia	1993
Balkan Wars (Bosnia)	Serbia	Bosnia	1994
Balkan Wars (Bosnia)	Serbia	Bosnia	1995
Kosovo Conflict	Serbia	Kosovo	1996
Kosovo Conflict	Serbia	Kosovo	1997
Kosovo Conflict	Serbia	Kosovo	1998
Kosovo Conflict	Serbia	Kosovo	1999
South Yemen Secession	Yemen	South Yemen	1994
Northern Ireland Conflict	Britain	Northern Ireland	1970
Northern Ireland Conflict	Britain	Northern Ireland	1971
Northern Ireland Conflict	Britain	Northern Ireland	1972
Northern Ireland Conflict	Britain	Northern Ireland	1973
Northern Ireland Conflict	Britain	Northern Ireland	1974
Northern Ireland Conflict	Britain	Northern Ireland	1975
Northern Ireland Conflict	Britain	Northern Ireland	1976
Northern Ireland Conflict	Britain	Northern Ireland	1977
Northern Ireland Conflict	Britain	Northern Ireland	1978
Northern Ireland Conflict	Britain	Northern Ireland	1979
Northern Ireland Conflict	Britain	Northern Ireland	1980
Northern Ireland Conflict	Britain	Northern Ireland	1981
Northern Ireland Conflict	Britain	Northern Ireland	1982

TABLE B.1 (CONTINUED)

Conflict Name	Parent-State	Independent State	Year
Northern Ireland Conflict	Britain	Northern Ireland	1983
Northern Ireland Conflict	Britain	Northern Ireland	1986
Northern Ireland Conflict	Britain	Northern Ireland	1987
Northern Ireland Conflict	Britain	Northern Ireland	1988
Northern Ireland Conflict	Britain	Northern Ireland	1989
Northern Ireland Conflict	Britain	Northern Ireland	1990
Northern Ireland Conflict	Britain	Northern Ireland	1991
Northern Ireland Conflict	Britain	Northern Ireland	1992
Northern Ireland Conflict	Britain	Northern Ireland	1993
Northern Ireland Conflict	Britain	Northern Ireland	1994
Northern Ireland Conflict	Britain	Northern Ireland	1995
Northern Ireland Conflict	Britain	Northern Ireland	1996
Northern Ireland Conflict	Britain	Northern Ireland	1997
Northern Ireland Conflict	Britain	Northern Ireland	1998
Northern Ireland Conflict	Britain	Northern Ireland	1999
Mau Mau Uprising	Britain	Kenya	1952
Mau Mau Uprising	Britain	Kenya	1953
Mau Mau Uprising	Britain	Kenya	1954
Mau Mau Uprising	Britain	Kenya	1955
Mau Mau Uprising	Britain	Kenya	1956
Turkish-Kurdish Conflict	Turkey	Kurdistan	1984
Turkish-Kurdish Conflict	Turkey	Kurdistan	1985

TABLE B.1 (CONTINUED)

Conflict Name	Parent-State	Independent State	Year
Turkish-Kurdish Conflict	Turkey	Kurdistan	1986
Turkish-Kurdish Conflict	Turkey	Kurdistan	1987
Turkish-Kurdish Conflict	Turkey	Kurdistan	1988
Turkish-Kurdish Conflict	Turkey	Kurdistan	1989
Turkish-Kurdish Conflict	Turkey	Kurdistan	1990
Turkish-Kurdish Conflict	Turkey	Kurdistan	1991
Turkish-Kurdish Conflict	Turkey	Kurdistan	1992
Turkish-Kurdish Conflict	Turkey	Kurdistan	1993
Turkish-Kurdish Conflict	Turkey	Kurdistan	1994
Turkish-Kurdish Conflict	Turkey	Kurdistan	1995
Turkish-Kurdish Conflict	Turkey	Kurdistan	1996
Turkish-Kurdish Conflict	Turkey	Kurdistan	1997
Turkish-Kurdish Conflict	Turkey	Kurdistan	1998
Turkish-Kurdish Conflict	Turkey	Kurdistan	1999
Turkish-Kurdish Conflict	Turkey	Kurdistan	2000
Turkish-Kurdish Conflict	Turkey	Kurdistan	2001
Turkish-Kurdish Conflict	Turkey	Kurdistan	2002
Turkish-Kurdish Conflict	Turkey	Kurdistan	2003
Turkish-Kurdish Conflict	Turkey	Kurdistan	2004
Turkish-Kurdish	Turkey	Kurdistan	2005

TABLE B.1 (CONTINUED)

Conflict Name	Parent-State	Independent State	Year
Conflict			
Turkish-Kurdish Conflict	Turkey	Kurdistan	2006
Turkish-Kurdish Conflict	Turkey	Kurdistan	2007
Turkish-Kurdish Conflict	Turkey	Kurdistan	2008
Turkish-Kurdish Conflict	Turkey	Kurdistan	2009
Turkish-Kurdish Conflict	Turkey	Kurdistan	2010
2nd Sudanese Civil War	Sudan	South Sudan	1983
2nd Sudanese Civil War	Sudan	South Sudan	1984
2nd Sudanese Civil War	Sudan	South Sudan	1985
2nd Sudanese Civil War	Sudan	South Sudan	1986
2nd Sudanese Civil War	Sudan	South Sudan	1987
2nd Sudanese Civil War	Sudan	South Sudan	1988
2nd Sudanese Civil War	Sudan	South Sudan	1989
2nd Sudanese Civil War	Sudan	South Sudan	1990
2nd Sudanese Civil War	Sudan	South Sudan	1991
2nd Sudanese Civil War	Sudan	South Sudan	1992
2nd Sudanese Civil War	Sudan	South Sudan	1993
2nd Sudanese Civil War	Sudan	South Sudan	1994
2nd Sudanese Civil War	Sudan	South Sudan	1995
2nd Sudanese Civil War	Sudan	South Sudan	1996

TABLE B.1 (CONTINUED)

Conflict Name	Parent-State	Independent State	Year
2nd Sudanese Civil War	Sudan	South Sudan	1997
2nd Sudanese Civil War	Sudan	South Sudan	1998
2nd Sudanese Civil War	Sudan	South Sudan	1999
2nd Sudanese Civil War	Sudan	South Sudan	2000
2nd Sudanese Civil War	Sudan	South Sudan	2001
2nd Sudanese Civil War	Sudan	South Sudan	2002
2nd Sudanese Civil War	Sudan	South Sudan	2003
2nd Sudanese Civil War	Sudan	South Sudan	2004
2nd Sudanese Civil War	Sudan	South Sudan	2005
Tamil Secessionist Conflict	Sri Lanka	Tamil Homeland	1976
Tamil Secessionist Conflict	Sri Lanka	Tamil Homeland	1977
Tamil Secessionist Conflict	Sri Lanka	Tamil Homeland	1978
Tamil Secessionist Conflict	Sri Lanka	Tamil Homeland	1979
Tamil Secessionist Conflict	Sri Lanka	Tamil Homeland	1980
Tamil Secessionist Conflict	Sri Lanka	Tamil Homeland	1981
Tamil Secessionist Conflict	Sri Lanka	Tamil Homeland	1982
Tamil Secessionist Conflict	Sri Lanka	Tamil Homeland	1983
Tamil Secessionist Conflict	Sri Lanka	Tamil Homeland	1984
Tamil Secessionist Conflict	Sri Lanka	Tamil Homeland	1985
Tamil Secessionist	Sri Lanka	Tamil Homeland	1986

TABLE B.1 (CONTINUED)

Conflict Name	Parent-State	Independent State	Year
Conflict			
Tamil Secessionist Conflict	Sri Lanka	Tamil Homeland	1987
Tamil Secessionist Conflict	Sri Lanka	Tamil Homeland	1988
Tamil Secessionist Conflict	Sri Lanka	Tamil Homeland	1989
Tamil Secessionist Conflict	Sri Lanka	Tamil Homeland	1990
Tamil Secessionist Conflict	Sri Lanka	Tamil Homeland	1991
Tamil Secessionist Conflict	Sri Lanka	Tamil Homeland	1992
Tamil Secessionist Conflict	Sri Lanka	Tamil Homeland	1993
Tamil Secessionist Conflict	Sri Lanka	Tamil Homeland	1994
Tamil Secessionist Conflict	Sri Lanka	Tamil Homeland	1995
Tamil Secessionist Conflict	Sri Lanka	Tamil Homeland	1996
Tamil Secessionist Conflict	Sri Lanka	Tamil Homeland	1997
Tamil Secessionist Conflict	Sri Lanka	Tamil Homeland	1998
Tamil Secessionist Conflict	Sri Lanka	Tamil Homeland	1999
Tamil Secessionist Conflict	Sri Lanka	Tamil Homeland	2000
Tamil Secessionist Conflict	Sri Lanka	Tamil Homeland	2001
Tamil Secessionist Conflict	Sri Lanka	Tamil Homeland	2002
Tamil Secessionist Conflict	Sri Lanka	Tamil Homeland	2003
Tamil Secessionist Conflict	Sri Lanka	Tamil Homeland	2004
Tamil Secessionist Conflict	Sri Lanka	Tamil Homeland	2005

TABLE B.1 (CONTINUED)

Conflict Name	Parent-State	Independent State	Year
Tamil Secessionist Conflict	Sri Lanka	Tamil Homeland	2006
Tamil Secessionist Conflict	Sri Lanka	Tamil Homeland	2007
Tamil Secessionist Conflict	Sri Lanka	Tamil Homeland	2008
Tamil Secessionist Conflict	Sri Lanka	Tamil Homeland	2009
Basque Separatist Conflict	Spain	Basque	1968
Basque Separatist Conflict	Spain	Basque	1969
Basque Separatist Conflict	Spain	Basque	1970
Basque Separatist Conflict	Spain	Basque	1971
Basque Separatist Conflict	Spain	Basque	1972
Basque Separatist Conflict	Spain	Basque	1973
Basque Separatist Conflict	Spain	Basque	1974
Basque Separatist Conflict	Spain	Basque	1975
Basque Separatist Conflict	Spain	Basque	1976
Basque Separatist Conflict	Spain	Basque	1977
Basque Separatist Conflict	Spain	Basque	1978
Basque Separatist Conflict	Spain	Basque	1979
Basque Separatist Conflict	Spain	Basque	1980
Basque Separatist Conflict	Spain	Basque	1981
Basque Separatist Conflict	Spain	Basque	1982
Basque Separatist	Spain	Basque	1983

TABLE B.1 (CONTINUED)

Conflict Name	Parent-State	Independent State	Year
Conflicit			
Basque Separatist Conflicit	Spain	Basque	1984
Basque Separatist Conflicit	Spain	Basque	1985
Basque Separatist Conflicit	Spain	Basque	1986
Basque Separatist Conflicit	Spain	Basque	1987
Basque Separatist Conflicit	Spain	Basque	1988
Basque Separatist Conflicit	Spain	Basque	1989
Basque Separatist Conflicit	Spain	Basque	1990
Basque Separatist Conflicit	Spain	Basque	1991
Basque Separatist Conflicit	Spain	Basque	1992
Basque Separatist Conflicit	Spain	Basque	1993
Basque Separatist Conflicit	Spain	Basque	1994
Basque Separatist Conflicit	Spain	Basque	1995
Basque Separatist Conflicit	Spain	Basque	1996
Basque Separatist Conflicit	Spain	Basque	1997
Basque Separatist Conflicit	Spain	Basque	1998
Basque Separatist Conflicit	Spain	Basque	1999
Basque Separatist Conflicit	Spain	Basque	2000
Basque Separatist Conflicit	Spain	Basque	2001
Basque Separatist Conflicit	Spain	Basque	2002

TABLE B.1 (CONTINUED)

Conflict Name	Parent-State	Independent State	Year
Basque Separatist Conflict	Spain	Basque	2003
Basque Separatist Conflict	Spain	Basque	2004
Basque Separatist Conflict	Spain	Basque	2005
Basque Separatist Conflict	Spain	Basque	2006
Basque Separatist Conflict	Spain	Basque	2007
Basque Separatist Conflict	Spain	Basque	2008
Basque Separatist Conflict	Spain	Basque	2009
Basque Separatist Conflict	Spain	Basque	2010
Caprivi Conflict	Namibia	Caprivi Strip	1994
Caprivi Conflict	Namibia	Caprivi Strip	1995
Caprivi Conflict	Namibia	Caprivi Strip	1996
Caprivi Conflict	Namibia	Caprivi Strip	1997
Caprivi Conflict	Namibia	Caprivi Strip	1998
Caprivi Conflict	Namibia	Caprivi Strip	1999
Solomon Islands Civil War	Papua New Guinea	Bouganville	1990
Solomon Islands Civil War	Papua New Guinea	Bouganville	1991
Solomon Islands Civil War	Papua New Guinea	Bouganville	1992
Solomon Islands Civil War	Papua New Guinea	Bouganville	1993
Solomon Islands Civil War	Papua New Guinea	Bouganville	1994
Solomon Islands Civil War	Papua New Guinea	Bouganville	1995
Solomon Islands Civil War	Papua New Guinea	Bouganville	1996
Solomon Islands Civil War	Papua New Guinea	Bouganville	1997
Solomon Islands Civil War	Papua New Guinea	Bouganville	1998

TABLE B.1 (CONTINUED)

Conflict Name	Parent-State	Independent State	Year
War			
Solomon Islands Civil War	Papua New Guinea	Bouganville	1999
Solomon Islands Civil War	Papua New Guinea	Bouganville	2000
Casamance Conflict	Senegal	Casamance	1983
Casamance Conflict	Senegal	Casamance	1984
Casamance Conflict	Senegal	Casamance	1985
Casamance Conflict	Senegal	Casamance	1986
Casamance Conflict	Senegal	Casamance	1987
Casamance Conflict	Senegal	Casamance	1988
Casamance Conflict	Senegal	Casamance	1989
Casamance Conflict	Senegal	Casamance	1990
Casamance Conflict	Senegal	Casamance	1991
Casamance Conflict	Senegal	Casamance	1992
Casamance Conflict	Senegal	Casamance	1993
Casamance Conflict	Senegal	Casamance	1994
Casamance Conflict	Senegal	Casamance	1995
Casamance Conflict	Senegal	Casamance	1996
Casamance Conflict	Senegal	Casamance	1997
Casamance Conflict	Senegal	Casamance	1998
Casamance Conflict	Senegal	Casamance	1999
Casamance Conflict	Senegal	Casamance	2000
Casamance Conflict	Senegal	Casamance	2001
Casamance Conflict	Senegal	Casamance	2002
Casamance Conflict	Senegal	Casamance	2003
Casamance Conflict	Senegal	Casamance	2004
Casamance Conflict	Senegal	Casamance	2005
Casamance Conflict	Senegal	Casamance	2006
Casamance Conflict	Senegal	Casamance	2007
Casamance Conflict	Senegal	Casamance	2008
Casamance Conflict	Senegal	Casamance	2009
Casamance Conflict	Senegal	Casamance	2010
Dagestan Conflict	Russia	Dagestan	1999
Dagestan Conflict	Russia	Dagestan	2000
Dagestan Conflict	Russia	Dagestan	2001
Dagestan Conflict	Russia	Dagestan	2002

TABLE B.1 (CONTINUED)

Conflict Name	Parent-State	Independent State	Year
Dagestan Conflict	Russia	Dagestan	2003
Dagestan Conflict	Russia	Dagestan	2004
Dagestan Conflict	Russia	Dagestan	2005
Dagestan Conflict	Russia	Dagestan	2006
Dagestan Conflict	Russia	Dagestan	2007
Dagestan Conflict	Russia	Dagestan	2008
Dagestan Conflict	Russia	Dagestan	2009
Dagestan Conflict	Russia	Dagestan	2010
1st Chechnya War	Russia	Chechen Republic of Ichkeria	1991
1st Chechnya War	Russia	Chechen Republic of Ichkeria	1992
1st Chechnya War	Russia	Chechen Republic of Ichkeria	1993
1st Chechnya War	Russia	Chechen Republic of Ichkeria	1994
1st Chechnya War	Russia	Chechen Republic of Ichkeria	1995
1st Chechnya War	Russia	Chechen Republic of Ichkeria	1996
2nd Chechnya War	Russia	Chechen Republic of Ichkeria	1999
2nd Chechnya War	Russia	Chechen Republic of Ichkeria	2000
2nd Chechnya War	Russia	Chechen Republic of Ichkeria	2001
2nd Chechnya War	Russia	Chechen Republic of Ichkeria	2002
2nd Chechnya War	Russia	Chechen Republic of Ichkeria	2003
2nd Chechnya War	Russia	Chechen Republic of Ichkeria	2004
2nd Chechnya War	Russia	Chechen Republic of Ichkeria	2005
2nd Chechnya War	Russia	Chechen Republic of Ichkeria	2006
2nd Chechnya War	Russia	Chechen Republic of Ichkeria	2007
2nd Chechnya War	Russia	Chechen Republic of Ichkeria	2008
2nd Chechnya War	Russia	Chechen Republic of Ichkeria	2009
2nd Chechnya War	Russia	Chechen Republic of Ichkeria	2010
Mozambican War of Independence	Portugal	Mozambique	1964
Mozambican War of Independence	Portugal	Mozambique	1965
Mozambican War of Independence	Portugal	Mozambique	1966
Mozambican War of Independence	Portugal	Mozambique	1967
Mozambican War of Independence	Portugal	Mozambique	1968
Mozambican War of Independence	Portugal	Mozambique	1969

TABLE B.1 (CONTINUED)

Conflict Name	Parent-State	Independent State	Year
Mozambican War of Independence	Portugal	Mozambique	1970
Mozambican War of Independence	Portugal	Mozambique	1971
Mozambican War of Independence	Portugal	Mozambique	1972
Mozambican War of Independence	Portugal	Mozambique	1973
Mozambican War of Independence	Portugal	Mozambique	1974
Mozambican War of Independence	Portugal	Mozambique	1975
Guinea Bissau Independence War	Portugal	Guinea Bissau	1961
Guinea Bissau Independence War	Portugal	Guinea Bissau	1962
Guinea Bissau Independence War	Portugal	Guinea Bissau	1963
Guinea Bissau Independence War	Portugal	Guinea Bissau	1964
Guinea Bissau Independence War	Portugal	Guinea Bissau	1965
Guinea Bissau Independence War	Portugal	Guinea Bissau	1966
Guinea Bissau Independence War	Portugal	Guinea Bissau	1967
Guinea Bissau Independence War	Portugal	Guinea Bissau	1968
Guinea Bissau Independence War	Portugal	Guinea Bissau	1969
Guinea Bissau Independence War	Portugal	Guinea Bissau	1970
Guinea Bissau Independence War	Portugal	Guinea Bissau	1971
Guinea Bissau Independence War	Portugal	Guinea Bissau	1972
Guinea Bissau Independence War	Portugal	Guinea Bissau	1973
Guinea Bissau	Portugal	Guinea Bissau	1974

TABLE B.1 (CONTINUED)

Conflict Name	Parent-State	Independent State	Year
Independece War			
Angolan War	Portugal	Angola	1961
Angolan War	Portugal	Angola	1962
Angolan War	Portugal	Angola	1963
Angolan War	Portugal	Angola	1964
Angolan War	Portugal	Angola	1965
Angolan War	Portugal	Angola	1966
Angolan War	Portugal	Angola	1967
Angolan War	Portugal	Angola	1968
Angolan War	Portugal	Angola	1969
Angolan War	Portugal	Angola	1970
Angolan War	Portugal	Angola	1971
Angolan War	Portugal	Angola	1972
Angolan War	Portugal	Angola	1973
Angolan War	Portugal	Angola	1974
Angolan War	Portugal	Angola	1975
Mindanao Separatist Confclit	Philippines	Mindanao Autonomous Republic	1972
Mindanao Separatist Confclit	Philippines	Mindanao Autonomous Republic	1973
Mindanao Separatist Confclit	Philippines	Mindanao Autonomous Republic	1974
Mindanao Separatist Confclit	Philippines	Mindanao Autonomous Republic	1975
Mindanao Separatist Confclit	Philippines	Mindanao Autonomous Republic	1976
Mindanao Separatist Confclit	Philippines	Mindanao Autonomous Republic	1977
Mindanao Separatist Confclit	Philippines	Mindanao Autonomous Republic	1978
Mindanao Separatist Confclit	Philippines	Mindanao Autonomous Republic	1979
Mindanao Separatist Confclit	Philippines	Mindanao Autonomous Republic	1980
Mindanao Separatist Confclit	Philippines	Mindanao Autonomous Republic	1981
Mindanao Separatist Confclit	Philippines	Mindanao Autonomous Republic	1982

TABLE B.1 (CONTINUED)

Conflict Name	Parent-State	Independent State	Year
Mindanao Separatist Conflicit	Philippines	Mindanao Autonomous Republic	1983
Mindanao Separatist Conflicit	Philippines	Mindanao Autonomous Republic	1984
Mindanao Separatist Conflicit	Philippines	Mindanao Autonomous Republic	1985
Mindanao Separatist Conflicit	Philippines	Mindanao Autonomous Republic	1986
Mindanao Separatist Conflicit	Philippines	Mindanao Autonomous Republic	1987
Mindanao Separatist Conflicit	Philippines	Mindanao Autonomous Republic	1988
Mindanao Separatist Conflicit	Philippines	Mindanao Autonomous Republic	1989
Mindanao Separatist Conflicit	Philippines	Mindanao Autonomous Republic	1990
Mindanao Separatist Conflicit	Philippines	Mindanao Autonomous Republic	1991
Mindanao Separatist Conflicit	Philippines	Mindanao Autonomous Republic	1992
Mindanao Separatist Conflicit	Philippines	Mindanao Autonomous Republic	1993
Mindanao Separatist Conflicit	Philippines	Mindanao Autonomous Republic	1994
Mindanao Separatist Conflicit	Philippines	Mindanao Autonomous Republic	1995
Mindanao Separatist Conflicit	Philippines	Mindanao Autonomous Republic	1996
Mindanao Separatist Conflicit	Philippines	Mindanao Autonomous Republic	1997
Mindanao Separatist Conflicit	Philippines	Mindanao Autonomous Republic	1998
Mindanao Separatist Conflicit	Philippines	Mindanao Autonomous Republic	1999
Mindanao Separatist Conflicit	Philippines	Mindanao Autonomous Republic	2000
Mindanao Separatist Conflicit	Philippines	Mindanao Autonomous Republic	2001
Mindanao Separatist	Philippines	Mindanao Autonomous	2002

TABLE B.1 (CONTINUED)

Conflict Name	Parent-State	Independent State	Year
Conflicit		Republic	
Mindanao Separatist Conflicit	Philippines	Mindanao Autonomous Republic	2003
Mindanao Separatist Conflicit	Philippines	Mindanao Autonomous Republic	2004
Mindanao Separatist Conflicit	Philippines	Mindanao Autonomous Republic	2005
Mindanao Separatist Conflicit	Philippines	Mindanao Autonomous Republic	2006
Mindanao Separatist Conflicit	Philippines	Mindanao Autonomous Republic	2007
Mindanao Separatist Conflicit	Philippines	Mindanao Autonomous Republic	2008
Mindanao Separatist Conflicit	Philippines	Mindanao Autonomous Republic	2009
Mindanao Separatist Conflicit	Philippines	Mindanao Autonomous Republic	2010
Bangladesh Liberation War	Pakistan	Bangladesh	1971
Baluch Insurgency (Part 1)	Pakistan	Baluchistan	1973
Baluch Insurgency (Part 1)	Pakistan	Baluchistan	1974
Baluch Insurgency (Part 1)	Pakistan	Baluchistan	1975
Baluch Insurgency (Part 1)	Pakistan	Baluchistan	1976
Baluch Insurgency (Part 1)	Pakistan	Baluchistan	1977
Baluch Insurgency (Part 2)	Pakistan	Baluchistan	2005
Baluch Insurgency (Part 2)	Pakistan	Baluchistan	2006
Baluch Insurgency (Part 2)	Pakistan	Baluchistan	2007
Baluch Insurgency (Part 2)	Pakistan	Baluchistan	2008
Baluch Insurgency (Part 2)	Pakistan	Baluchistan	2009

TABLE B.1 (CONTINUED)

Conflict Name	Parent-State	Independent State	Year
Baluch Insurgency (Part 2)	Pakistan	Baluchistan	2010
Nigerian Civil War	Nigeria	Republic of Biafra	1967
Nigerian Civil War	Nigeria	Republic of Biafra	1968
Nigerian Civil War	Nigeria	Republic of Biafra	1969
Nigerian Civil War	Nigeria	Republic of Biafra	1970
Western Sahara Conflict	Morocco	Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic	1975
Western Sahara Conflict	Morocco	Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic	1976
Western Sahara Conflict	Morocco	Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic	1977
Western Sahara Conflict	Morocco	Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic	1978
Western Sahara Conflict	Morocco	Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic	1979
Western Sahara Conflict	Morocco	Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic	1980
Western Sahara Conflict	Morocco	Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic	1981
Western Sahara Conflict	Morocco	Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic	1982
Western Sahara Conflict	Morocco	Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic	1983
Western Sahara Conflict	Morocco	Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic	1984
Western Sahara Conflict	Morocco	Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic	1985
Western Sahara Conflict	Morocco	Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic	1986
Western Sahara Conflict	Morocco	Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic	1987
Western Sahara Conflict	Morocco	Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic	1988
Western Sahara Conflict	Morocco	Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic	1989
Western Sahara Conflict	Morocco	Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic	1990
Western Sahara	Morocco	Sahrawi Arab Democratic	1991

TABLE B.1 (CONTINUED)

Conflict Name	Parent-State	Independent State	Year
Conflict		Republic	
Transnistria Conflict	Moldova	Transnistria	1990
Transnistria Conflict	Moldova	Transnistria	1991
Transnistria Conflict	Moldova	Transnistria	1992
Sanusis Uprising	Italy	Cyrenaica	1931
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict	Israel	Palestine	1987
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict	Israel	Palestine	1988
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict	Israel	Palestine	1989
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict	Israel	Palestine	1990
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict	Israel	Palestine	1991
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict	Israel	Palestine	1992
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict	Israel	Palestine	1993
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict	Israel	Palestine	1994
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict	Israel	Palestine	1995
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict	Israel	Palestine	1996
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict	Israel	Palestine	1997
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict	Israel	Palestine	1998
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict	Israel	Palestine	1999
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict	Israel	Palestine	2000
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict	Israel	Palestine	2001
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict	Israel	Palestine	2002
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict	Israel	Palestine	2003

TABLE B.1 (CONTINUED)

Conflict Name	Parent-State	Independent State	Year
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict	Israel	Palestine	2004
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict	Israel	Palestine	2005
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict	Israel	Palestine	2006
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict	Israel	Palestine	2007
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict	Israel	Palestine	2008
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict	Israel	Palestine	2009
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict	Israel	Palestine	2010
Iraqi-Kurdish Conflict	Iraq	Kurdistan	1980
Iraqi-Kurdish Conflict	Iraq	Kurdistan	1981
Iraqi-Kurdish Conflict	Iraq	Kurdistan	1982
Iraqi-Kurdish Conflict	Iraq	Kurdistan	1983
Iraqi-Kurdish Conflict	Iraq	Kurdistan	1984
Iraqi-Kurdish Conflict	Iraq	Kurdistan	1985
Iraqi-Kurdish Conflict	Iraq	Kurdistan	1986
Iraqi-Kurdish Conflict	Iraq	Kurdistan	1987
Iraqi-Kurdish Conflict	Iraq	Kurdistan	1988
Iraqi-Kurdish Conflict	Iraq	Kurdistan	1989
Iraqi-Kurdish Conflict	Iraq	Kurdistan	1990
Iraqi-Kurdish Conflict	Iraq	Kurdistan	1991
Iraqi-Kurdish Conflict	Iraq	Kurdistan	1992
Iraqi-Kurdish Conflict	Iraq	Kurdistan	1993
Iraqi-Kurdish Conflict	Iraq	Kurdistan	1994
Iraqi-Kurdish Conflict	Iraq	Kurdistan	1995
Iraqi-Kurdish Conflict	Iraq	Kurdistan	1996
Iranian-Kurdish Conflict	Iran	Kurdistan	1979
Iranian-Kurdish Conflict	Iran	Kurdistan	1980
Iranian-Kurdish Conflict	Iran	Kurdistan	1981
Iranian-Kurdish	Iran	Kurdistan	1982

TABLE B.1 (CONTINUED)

Conflict Name	Parent-State	Independent State	Year
Conflict			
Iranian-Kurdish Conflict	Iran	Kurdistan	1983
Iranian-Kurdish Conflict	Iran	Kurdistan	1984
Iranian-Kurdish Conflict	Iran	Kurdistan	1985
Iranian-Kurdish Conflict	Iran	Kurdistan	1986
Iranian-Kurdish Conflict	Iran	Kurdistan	1987
Iranian-Kurdish Conflict	Iran	Kurdistan	1988
Iranian-Kurdish Conflict	Iran	Kurdistan	1989
Iranian-Kurdish Conflict	Iran	Kurdistan	1990
Iranian-Kurdish Conflict	Iran	Kurdistan	1991
Iranian-Kurdish Conflict	Iran	Kurdistan	1992
Iranian-Kurdish Conflict	Iran	Kurdistan	1993
Iranian-Kurdish Conflict	Iran	Kurdistan	1994
Iranian-Kurdish Conflict	Iran	Kurdistan	1995
Iranian-Kurdish Conflict	Iran	Kurdistan	1996
Papua Conflict	Indonesia	Republic of West Paupa	1967
Papua Conflict	Indonesia	Republic of West Paupa	1968
Papua Conflict	Indonesia	Republic of West Paupa	1969
Papua Conflict	Indonesia	Republic of West Paupa	1970
Papua Conflict	Indonesia	Republic of West Paupa	1971
Papua Conflict	Indonesia	Republic of West Paupa	1972
Papua Conflict	Indonesia	Republic of West Paupa	1973
Papua Conflict	Indonesia	Republic of West Paupa	1974
Papua Conflict	Indonesia	Republic of West Paupa	1975

TABLE B.1 (CONTINUED)

Conflict Name	Parent-State	Independent State	Year
Papua Conflict	Indonesia	Republic of West Paupa	1976
Papua Conflict	Indonesia	Republic of West Paupa	1977
Papua Conflict	Indonesia	Republic of West Paupa	1978
Papua Conflict	Indonesia	Republic of West Paupa	1979
Papua Conflict	Indonesia	Republic of West Paupa	1980
Papua Conflict	Indonesia	Republic of West Paupa	1981
Papua Conflict	Indonesia	Republic of West Paupa	1982
Papua Conflict	Indonesia	Republic of West Paupa	1983
Papua Conflict	Indonesia	Republic of West Paupa	1984
Papua Conflict	Indonesia	Republic of West Paupa	1985
Papua Conflict	Indonesia	Republic of West Paupa	1986
Papua Conflict	Indonesia	Republic of West Paupa	1987
Papua Conflict	Indonesia	Republic of West Paupa	1988
Papua Conflict	Indonesia	Republic of West Paupa	1989
Papua Conflict	Indonesia	Republic of West Paupa	1990
Papua Conflict	Indonesia	Republic of West Paupa	1991
Papua Conflict	Indonesia	Republic of West Paupa	1992
Papua Conflict	Indonesia	Republic of West Paupa	1993
Papua Conflict	Indonesia	Republic of West Paupa	1994
Papua Conflict	Indonesia	Republic of West Paupa	1995
Papua Conflict	Indonesia	Republic of West Paupa	1996
Papua Conflict	Indonesia	Republic of West Paupa	1997
Papua Conflict	Indonesia	Republic of West Paupa	1998
Papua Conflict	Indonesia	Republic of West Paupa	1999
Papua Conflict	Indonesia	Republic of West Paupa	2000
Papua Conflict	Indonesia	Republic of West Paupa	2001
Papua Conflict	Indonesia	Republic of West Paupa	2002
Papua Conflict	Indonesia	Republic of West Paupa	2003
Papua Conflict	Indonesia	Republic of West Paupa	2004
Papua Conflict	Indonesia	Republic of West Paupa	2005
Papua Conflict	Indonesia	Republic of West Paupa	2006
Papua Conflict	Indonesia	Republic of West Paupa	2007
Papua Conflict	Indonesia	Republic of West Paupa	2008
Papua Conflict	Indonesia	Republic of West Paupa	2009
Papua Conflict	Indonesia	Republic of West Paupa	2010
East Timor Conflict	Indonesia	Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste	1976

TABLE B.1 (CONTINUED)

Conflict Name	Parent-State	Independent State	Year
East Timor Conflict	Indonesia	Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste	1977
East Timor Conflict	Indonesia	Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste	1978
East Timor Conflict	Indonesia	Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste	1980
East Timor Conflict	Indonesia	Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste	1981
East Timor Conflict	Indonesia	Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste	1982
East Timor Conflict	Indonesia	Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste	1983
East Timor Conflict	Indonesia	Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste	1984
East Timor Conflict	Indonesia	Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste	1985
East Timor Conflict	Indonesia	Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste	1986
East Timor Conflict	Indonesia	Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste	1987
East Timor Conflict	Indonesia	Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste	1988
East Timor Conflict	Indonesia	Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste	1989
East Timor Conflict	Indonesia	Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste	1990
East Timor Conflict	Indonesia	Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste	1991
East Timor Conflict	Indonesia	Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste	1992
East Timor Conflict	Indonesia	Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste	1993
East Timor Conflict	Indonesia	Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste	1994
East Timor Conflict	Indonesia	Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste	1995
East Timor Conflict	Indonesia	Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste	1996
East Timor Conflict	Indonesia	Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste	1997

TABLE B.1 (CONTINUED)

Conflict Name	Parent-State	Independent State	Year
		Leste	
East Timor Conflict	Indonesia	Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste	1998
East Timor Conflict	Indonesia	Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste	1999
Ambonese Conflict	Indonesia	Republic of South Maluku	1950
Aceh Conflict	Indonesia	Aceh	1989
Aceh Conflict	Indonesia	Aceh	1990
Aceh Conflict	Indonesia	Aceh	1991
Aceh Conflict	Indonesia	Aceh	1992
Aceh Conflict	Indonesia	Aceh	1993
Aceh Conflict	Indonesia	Aceh	1994
Aceh Conflict	Indonesia	Aceh	1995
Aceh Conflict	Indonesia	Aceh	1996
Aceh Conflict	Indonesia	Aceh	1997
Aceh Conflict	Indonesia	Aceh	1998
Aceh Conflict	Indonesia	Aceh	1999
Aceh Conflict	Indonesia	Aceh	2000
Aceh Conflict	Indonesia	Aceh	2001
Aceh Conflict	Indonesia	Aceh	2002
Aceh Conflict	Indonesia	Aceh	2003
Aceh Conflict	Indonesia	Aceh	2004
Aceh Conflict	Indonesia	Aceh	2005
South Ossentia Conflict	Georgia	South Ossentia	1991
South Ossentia Conflict	Georgia	South Ossentia	1992
South Ossentia Conflict	Georgia	South Ossentia	1993
South Ossentia Conflict	Georgia	South Ossentia	1994
South Ossentia Conflict	Georgia	South Ossentia	1995
South Ossentia Conflict	Georgia	South Ossentia	1996
South Ossentia Conflict	Georgia	South Ossentia	1997
South Ossentia	Georgia	South Ossentia	1998

TABLE B.1 (CONTINUED)

Conflict Name	Parent-State	Independent State	Year
Conflict			
South Ossentia Conflict	Georgia	South Ossentia	1999
South Ossentia Conflict	Georgia	South Ossentia	2000
South Ossentia Conflict	Georgia	South Ossentia	2001
South Ossentia Conflict	Georgia	South Ossentia	2002
South Ossentia Conflict	Georgia	South Ossentia	2003
South Ossentia Conflict	Georgia	South Ossentia	2004
South Ossentia Conflict	Georgia	South Ossentia	2005
South Ossentia Conflict	Georgia	South Ossentia	2006
South Ossentia Conflict	Georgia	South Ossentia	2007
South Ossentia Conflict	Georgia	South Ossentia	2008
South Ossentia Conflict	Georgia	South Ossentia	2009
South Ossentia Conflict	Georgia	South Ossentia	2010
Abkhazia Conflict	Georgia	Abkhazia	1992
Abkhazia Conflict	Georgia	Abkhazia	1993
Abkhazia Conflict	Georgia	Abkhazia	1994
Abkhazia Conflict	Georgia	Abkhazia	1995
Abkhazia Conflict	Georgia	Abkhazia	1996
Abkhazia Conflict	Georgia	Abkhazia	1997
Abkhazia Conflict	Georgia	Abkhazia	1998
Abkhazia Conflict	Georgia	Abkhazia	1999
Abkhazia Conflict	Georgia	Abkhazia	2000
Abkhazia Conflict	Georgia	Abkhazia	2001
Abkhazia Conflict	Georgia	Abkhazia	2002
Abkhazia Conflict	Georgia	Abkhazia	2003
Abkhazia Conflict	Georgia	Abkhazia	2004

TABLE B.1 (CONTINUED)

Conflict Name	Parent-State	Independent State	Year
Abkhazia Conflict	Georgia	Abkhazia	2005
Abkhazia Conflict	Georgia	Abkhazia	2006
Abkhazia Conflict	Georgia	Abkhazia	2007
Abkhazia Conflict	Georgia	Abkhazia	2008
Abkhazia Conflict	Georgia	Abkhazia	2009
Abkhazia Conflict	Georgia	Abkhazia	2010
Tunisian War of Independence	France	Tunisia	1952
Tunisian War of Independence	France	Tunisia	1953
Tunisian War of Independence	France	Tunisia	1954
Tunisian War of Independence	France	Tunisia	1955
Tunisian War of Independence	France	Tunisia	1956
Moroccan Independence War	France	Morocco	1953
Moroccan Independence War	France	Morocco	1954
Moroccan Independence War	France	Morocco	1955
Moroccan Independence War	France	Morocco	1956
Malagasy Uprising	France	Madagascar	1947
Malagasy Uprising	France	Madagascar	1948
French Indochina War	France	Vietnam	1945
French Indochina War	France	Vietnam	1946
French Indochina War	France	Vietnam	1947
French Indochina War	France	Vietnam	1948
French Indochina War	France	Vietnam	1949
French Indochina War	France	Vietnam	1950
French Indochina War	France	Vietnam	1951
French Indochina War	France	Vietnam	1952
French Indochina War	France	Vietnam	1953
French Indochina War	France	Vietnam	1954
Laotian Independence War	France	Laos	1946

TABLE B.1 (CONTINUED)

Conflict Name	Parent-State	Independent State	Year
Laotian Independence War	France	Laos	1947
Laotian Independence War	France	Laos	1948
Laotian Independence War	France	Laos	1949
Laotian Independence War	France	Laos	1950
Laotian Independence War	France	Laos	1951
Laotian Independence War	France	Laos	1952
Laotian Independence War	France	Laos	1953
Laotian Independence War	France	Laos	1954
Algerian Uprising	France	Algeria	1954
Algerian Uprising	France	Algeria	1955
Algerian Uprising	France	Algeria	1956
Algerian Uprising	France	Algeria	1957
Algerian Uprising	France	Algeria	1958
Algerian Uprising	France	Algeria	1959
Algerian Uprising	France	Algeria	1960
Algerian Uprising	France	Algeria	1961
Algerian Uprising	France	Algeria	1962
Ethiopian Civil War	Ethiopia	Tigray	1975
Ethiopian Civil War	Ethiopia	Tigray	1976
Ethiopian Civil War	Ethiopia	Tigray	1977
Ethiopian Civil War	Ethiopia	Tigray	1978
Ethiopian Civil War	Ethiopia	Tigray	1979
Ethiopian Civil War	Ethiopia	Tigray	1980
Ethiopian Civil War	Ethiopia	Tigray	1981
Ethiopian Civil War	Ethiopia	Tigray	1982
Ethiopian Civil War	Ethiopia	Tigray	1983
Ethiopian Civil War	Ethiopia	Tigray	1984
Ethiopian Civil War	Ethiopia	Tigray	1985
Ethiopian Civil War	Ethiopia	Tigray	1986
Ethiopian Civil War	Ethiopia	Tigray	1987

TABLE B.1 (CONTINUED)

Conflict Name	Parent-State	Independent State	Year
Ethiopian Civil War	Ethiopia	Tigray	1988
Ethiopian Civil War	Ethiopia	Tigray	1989
Ethiopian Civil War	Ethiopia	Tigray	1990
Ethiopian Civil War	Ethiopia	Tigray	1991
Ethiopian-Ogaden Conflict	Ethiopia	Ogaden	1976
Ethiopian-Ogaden Conflict	Ethiopia	Ogaden	1977
Ethiopian-Ogaden Conflict	Ethiopia	Ogaden	1978
Ethiopian-Ogaden Conflict	Ethiopia	Ogaden	1979
Ethiopian-Ogaden Conflict	Ethiopia	Ogaden	1980
Ethiopian-Ogaden Conflict	Ethiopia	Ogaden	1981
Ethiopian-Ogaden Conflict	Ethiopia	Ogaden	1982
Ethiopian-Ogaden Conflict	Ethiopia	Ogaden	1983
Ethiopian-Ogaden Conflict	Ethiopia	Ogaden	1984
Ethiopian-Ogaden Conflict	Ethiopia	Ogaden	1985
Ethiopian-Ogaden Conflict	Ethiopia	Ogaden	1986
Ethiopian-Ogaden Conflict	Ethiopia	Ogaden	1987
Ethiopian-Ogaden Conflict	Ethiopia	Ogaden	1988
Ethiopian-Ogaden Conflict	Ethiopia	Ogaden	1989
Ethiopian-Ogaden Conflict	Ethiopia	Ogaden	1990
Ethiopian-Ogaden Conflict	Ethiopia	Ogaden	1991
Ethiopian-Ogaden Conflict	Ethiopia	Ogaden	1992
Ethiopian-Ogaden	Ethiopia	Ogaden	1993

TABLE B.1 (CONTINUED)

Conflict Name	Parent-State	Independent State	Year
Conflict			
Ethiopian-Ogaden Conflict	Ethiopia	Ogaden	1994
Ethiopian-Ogaden Conflict	Ethiopia	Ogaden	1995
Ethiopian-Ogaden Conflict	Ethiopia	Ogaden	1996
Ethiopian-Ogaden Conflict	Ethiopia	Ogaden	1997
Ethiopian-Ogaden Conflict	Ethiopia	Ogaden	1998
Ethiopian-Ogaden Conflict	Ethiopia	Ogaden	1999
Ethiopian-Ogaden Conflict	Ethiopia	Ogaden	2000
Ethiopian-Ogaden Conflict	Ethiopia	Ogaden	2001
Ethiopian-Ogaden Conflict	Ethiopia	Ogaden	2002
Ethiopian-Ogaden Conflict	Ethiopia	Ogaden	2003
Ethiopian-Ogaden Conflict	Ethiopia	Ogaden	2004
Ethiopian-Ogaden Conflict	Ethiopia	Ogaden	2005
Ethiopian-Ogaden Conflict	Ethiopia	Ogaden	2006
Ethiopian-Ogaden Conflict	Ethiopia	Ogaden	2007
Ethiopian-Ogaden Conflict	Ethiopia	Ogaden	2008
Ethiopian-Ogaden Conflict	Ethiopia	Ogaden	2009
Ethiopian-Ogaden Conflict	Ethiopia	Ogaden	2010
Ethiopian-Eritrean Conflict	Ethiopia	Eritrea	1962
Ethiopian-Eritrean Conflict	Ethiopia	Eritrea	1963

TABLE B.1 (CONTINUED)

Conflict Name	Parent-State	Independent State	Year
Ethiopian-Eritrean Conflict	Ethiopia	Eritrea	1964
Ethiopian-Eritrean Conflict	Ethiopia	Eritrea	1965
Ethiopian-Eritrean Conflict	Ethiopia	Eritrea	1966
Ethiopian-Eritrean Conflict	Ethiopia	Eritrea	1967
Ethiopian-Eritrean Conflict	Ethiopia	Eritrea	1968
Ethiopian-Eritrean Conflict	Ethiopia	Eritrea	1969
Ethiopian-Eritrean Conflict	Ethiopia	Eritrea	1970
Ethiopian-Eritrean Conflict	Ethiopia	Eritrea	1971
Ethiopian-Eritrean Conflict	Ethiopia	Eritrea	1972
Ethiopian-Eritrean Conflict	Ethiopia	Eritrea	1973
Ethiopian-Eritrean Conflict	Ethiopia	Eritrea	1974
Ethiopian-Eritrean Conflict	Ethiopia	Eritrea	1975
Ethiopian-Eritrean Conflict	Ethiopia	Eritrea	1976
Ethiopian-Eritrean Conflict	Ethiopia	Eritrea	1977
Ethiopian-Eritrean Conflict	Ethiopia	Eritrea	1978
Ethiopian-Eritrean Conflict	Ethiopia	Eritrea	1979
Ethiopian-Eritrean Conflict	Ethiopia	Eritrea	1980
Ethiopian-Eritrean Conflict	Ethiopia	Eritrea	1981
Ethiopian-Eritrean Conflict	Ethiopia	Eritrea	1982
Ethiopian-Eritrean	Ethiopia	Eritrea	1983

TABLE B.1 (CONTINUED)

Conflict Name	Parent-State	Independent State	Year
Conflict			
Ethiopian-Eritrean Conflict	Ethiopia	Eritrea	1984
Ethiopian-Eritrean Conflict	Ethiopia	Eritrea	1985
Ethiopian-Eritrean Conflict	Ethiopia	Eritrea	1986
Ethiopian-Eritrean Conflict	Ethiopia	Eritrea	1987
Ethiopian-Eritrean Conflict	Ethiopia	Eritrea	1988
Ethiopian-Eritrean Conflict	Ethiopia	Eritrea	1989
Ethiopian-Eritrean Conflict	Ethiopia	Eritrea	1990
Ethiopian-Eritrean Conflict	Ethiopia	Eritrea	1991
Katanga Conflict	Democratic Republic of the Congo	Katanga	1960
Katanga Conflict	Democratic Republic of the Congo	Katanga	1961
Katanga Conflict	Democratic Republic of the Congo	Katanga	1962
Katanga Conflict	Democratic Republic of the Congo	Katanga	1963
Kasai Conflict	Democratic Republic of the Congo	Mining State of South Kasai	1960
Kasai Conflict	Democratic Republic of the Congo	Mining State of South Kasai	1961
Kasai Conflict	Democratic Republic of the Congo	Mining State of South Kasai	1962
Kasai Conflict	Democratic Republic of the Congo	Mining State of South Kasai	1963
Cyprus Invasion	Greece	Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus	1974
Cyprus Invasion	Greece	Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus	1975
Uighur Separatist Conflict	China	Eastern Turkestan	2001

TABLE B.1 (CONTINUED)

Conflict Name	Parent-State	Independent State	Year
Uighur Separatist Conflict	China	Eastern Turkestan	2002
Uighur Separatist Conflict	China	Eastern Turkestan	2003
Uighur Separatist Conflict	China	Eastern Turkestan	2004
Uighur Separatist Conflict	China	Eastern Turkestan	2005
Uighur Separatist Conflict	China	Eastern Turkestan	2006
Uighur Separatist Conflict	China	Eastern Turkestan	2007
Uighur Separatist Conflict	China	Eastern Turkestan	2008
Uighur Separatist Conflict	China	Eastern Turkestan	2009
Uighur Separatist Conflict	China	Eastern Turkestan	2010
3rd Sino-Tibetian War	China	Tibet	1950
3rd Sino-Tibetian War	China	Tibet	1951
3rd Sino-Tibetian War	China	Tibet	1952
3rd Sino-Tibetian War	China	Tibet	1953
3rd Sino-Tibetian War	China	Tibet	1954
3rd Sino-Tibetian War	China	Tibet	1955
3rd Sino-Tibetian War	China	Tibet	1956
3rd Sino-Tibetian War	China	Tibet	1957
3rd Sino-Tibetian War	China	Tibet	1958
3rd Sino-Tibetian War	China	Tibet	1959
3rd Sino-Tibetian War	China	Tibet	1960
3rd Sino-Tibetian War	China	Tibet	1961
Quebec Separatist Campaign	Canada	Quebec	1963
Quebec Separatist Campaign	Canada	Quebec	1964
Quebec Separatist Campaign	Canada	Quebec	1965
Quebec Separatist Campaign	Canada	Quebec	1966

TABLE B.1 (CONTINUED)

Conflict Name	Parent-State	Independent State	Year
Quebec Separatist Campaign	Canada	Quebec	1967
Quebec Separatist Campaign	Canada	Quebec	1968
Quebec Separatist Campaign	Canada	Quebec	1969
Quebec Separatist Campaign	Canada	Quebec	1970
Shan Insurgency	Burma	Federated Shan States	1960
Shan Insurgency	Burma	Federated Shan States	1961
Shan Insurgency	Burma	Federated Shan States	1962
Shan Insurgency	Burma	Federated Shan States	1963
Shan Insurgency	Burma	Federated Shan States	1964
Shan Insurgency	Burma	Federated Shan States	1965
Shan Insurgency	Burma	Federated Shan States	1966
Shan Insurgency	Burma	Federated Shan States	1967
Shan Insurgency	Burma	Federated Shan States	1968
Shan Insurgency	Burma	Federated Shan States	1969
Shan Insurgency	Burma	Federated Shan States	1970
Shan Insurgency	Burma	Federated Shan States	1971
Shan Insurgency	Burma	Federated Shan States	1972
Shan Insurgency	Burma	Federated Shan States	1973
Shan Insurgency	Burma	Federated Shan States	1974
Shan Insurgency	Burma	Federated Shan States	1975
Shan Insurgency	Burma	Federated Shan States	1976
Shan Insurgency	Burma	Federated Shan States	1977
Shan Insurgency	Burma	Federated Shan States	1978
Shan Insurgency	Burma	Federated Shan States	1979
Shan Insurgency	Burma	Federated Shan States	1980
Shan Insurgency	Burma	Federated Shan States	1981
Shan Insurgency	Burma	Federated Shan States	1982
Shan Insurgency	Burma	Federated Shan States	1983
Shan Insurgency	Burma	Federated Shan States	1984
Shan Insurgency	Burma	Federated Shan States	1985
Shan Insurgency	Burma	Federated Shan States	1986
Shan Insurgency	Burma	Federated Shan States	1987
Shan Insurgency	Burma	Federated Shan States	1988
Shan Insurgency	Burma	Federated Shan States	1989

TABLE B.1 (CONTINUED)

Conflict Name	Parent-State	Independent State	Year
Shan Insurgency	Burma	Federated Shan States	1990
Shan Insurgency	Burma	Federated Shan States	1991
Shan Insurgency	Burma	Federated Shan States	1992
Shan Insurgency	Burma	Federated Shan States	1993
Shan Insurgency	Burma	Federated Shan States	1994
Shan Insurgency	Burma	Federated Shan States	1995
Shan Insurgency	Burma	Federated Shan States	1996
Shan Insurgency	Burma	Federated Shan States	1997
Shan Insurgency	Burma	Federated Shan States	1998
Shan Insurgency	Burma	Federated Shan States	1999
Shan Insurgency	Burma	Federated Shan States	2000
Shan Insurgency	Burma	Federated Shan States	2001
Shan Insurgency	Burma	Federated Shan States	2002
Shan Insurgency	Burma	Federated Shan States	2003
Shan Insurgency	Burma	Federated Shan States	2004
Shan Insurgency	Burma	Federated Shan States	2005
Shan Insurgency	Burma	Federated Shan States	2006
Shan Insurgency	Burma	Federated Shan States	2007
Shan Insurgency	Burma	Federated Shan States	2008
Shan Insurgency	Burma	Federated Shan States	2009
Shan Insurgency	Burma	Federated Shan States	2010
Karen Insurgency	Burma	Republic of Kawthoolei	1948
Karen Insurgency	Burma	Republic of Kawthoolei	1949
Karen Insurgency	Burma	Republic of Kawthoolei	1950
Karen Insurgency	Burma	Republic of Kawthoolei	1951
Karen Insurgency	Burma	Republic of Kawthoolei	1952
Karen Insurgency	Burma	Republic of Kawthoolei	1953
Karen Insurgency	Burma	Republic of Kawthoolei	1954
Karen Insurgency	Burma	Republic of Kawthoolei	1955
Karen Insurgency	Burma	Republic of Kawthoolei	1956
Karen Insurgency	Burma	Republic of Kawthoolei	1957
Karen Insurgency	Burma	Republic of Kawthoolei	1958
Karen Insurgency	Burma	Republic of Kawthoolei	1959
Karen Insurgency	Burma	Republic of Kawthoolei	1960
Karen Insurgency	Burma	Republic of Kawthoolei	1961
Karen Insurgency	Burma	Republic of Kawthoolei	1962
Karen Insurgency	Burma	Republic of Kawthoolei	1963

TABLE B.1 (CONTINUED)

Conflict Name	Parent-State	Independent State	Year
Karen Insurgency	Burma	Republic of Kawthoolei	1964
Karen Insurgency	Burma	Republic of Kawthoolei	1965
Karen Insurgency	Burma	Republic of Kawthoolei	1966
Karen Insurgency	Burma	Republic of Kawthoolei	1967
Karen Insurgency	Burma	Republic of Kawthoolei	1968
Karen Insurgency	Burma	Republic of Kawthoolei	1969
Karen Insurgency	Burma	Republic of Kawthoolei	1970
Karen Insurgency	Burma	Republic of Kawthoolei	1971
Karen Insurgency	Burma	Republic of Kawthoolei	1972
Karen Insurgency	Burma	Republic of Kawthoolei	1973
Karen Insurgency	Burma	Republic of Kawthoolei	1974
Karen Insurgency	Burma	Republic of Kawthoolei	1975
Karen Insurgency	Burma	Republic of Kawthoolei	1976
Kachin Insurgency	Burma	Kachinland	1961
Kachin Insurgency	Burma	Kachinland	1962
Kachin Insurgency	Burma	Kachinland	1963
Kachin Insurgency	Burma	Kachinland	1964
Kachin Insurgency	Burma	Kachinland	1965
Kachin Insurgency	Burma	Kachinland	1966
Kachin Insurgency	Burma	Kachinland	1967
Kachin Insurgency	Burma	Kachinland	1968
Kachin Insurgency	Burma	Kachinland	1969
Kachin Insurgency	Burma	Kachinland	1970
Kachin Insurgency	Burma	Kachinland	1971
Kachin Insurgency	Burma	Kachinland	1972
Kachin Insurgency	Burma	Kachinland	1973
Kachin Insurgency	Burma	Kachinland	1974
Kachin Insurgency	Burma	Kachinland	1975
Kachin Insurgency	Burma	Kachinland	1976
Kachin Insurgency	Burma	Kachinland	1977
Kachin Insurgency	Burma	Kachinland	1978
Kachin Insurgency	Burma	Kachinland	1979
Kachin Insurgency	Burma	Kachinland	1980
Kachin Insurgency	Burma	Kachinland	1981
Kachin Insurgency	Burma	Kachinland	1982
Kachin Insurgency	Burma	Kachinland	1983
Kachin Insurgency	Burma	Kachinland	1984

TABLE B.1 (CONTINUED)

Conflict Name	Parent-State	Independent State	Year
Kachin Insurgency	Burma	Kachinland	1985
Kachin Insurgency	Burma	Kachinland	1986
Kachin Insurgency	Burma	Kachinland	1987
Kachin Insurgency	Burma	Kachinland	1988
Kachin Insurgency	Burma	Kachinland	1989
Kachin Insurgency	Burma	Kachinland	1990
Kachin Insurgency	Burma	Kachinland	1991
Kachin Insurgency	Burma	Kachinland	1992
Kachin Insurgency	Burma	Kachinland	1993
Kachin Insurgency	Burma	Kachinland	1994
Arakanese Insurgency	Burma	Arakan Federation	1949
Arakanese Insurgency	Burma	Arakan Federation	1950
Arakanese Insurgency	Burma	Arakan Federation	1951
Arakanese Insurgency	Burma	Arakan Federation	1952
Arakanese Insurgency	Burma	Arakan Federation	1953
Arakanese Insurgency	Burma	Arakan Federation	1954
Arakanese Insurgency	Burma	Arakan Federation	1955
Arakanese Insurgency	Burma	Arakan Federation	1956
Arakanese Insurgency	Burma	Arakan Federation	1957
Arakanese Insurgency	Burma	Arakan Federation	1958
Arakanese Insurgency	Burma	Arakan Federation	1959
Arakanese Insurgency	Burma	Arakan Federation	1960
Arakanese Insurgency	Burma	Arakan Federation	1961
Arakanese Insurgency	Burma	Arakan Federation	1962
Arakanese Insurgency	Burma	Arakan Federation	1963
Arakanese Insurgency	Burma	Arakan Federation	1964
Arakanese Insurgency	Burma	Arakan Federation	1965
Arakanese Insurgency	Burma	Arakan Federation	1966
Arakanese Insurgency	Burma	Arakan Federation	1967
Arakanese Insurgency	Burma	Arakan Federation	1968
Arakanese Insurgency	Burma	Arakan Federation	1969
Arakanese Insurgency	Burma	Arakan Federation	1970
Arakanese Insurgency	Burma	Arakan Federation	1971
Arakanese Insurgency	Burma	Arakan Federation	1972
Arakanese Insurgency	Burma	Arakan Federation	1973
Arakanese Insurgency	Burma	Arakan Federation	1974
Arakanese Insurgency	Burma	Arakan Federation	1975

TABLE B.1 (CONTINUED)

Conflict Name	Parent-State	Independent State	Year
Arakanese Insurgency	Burma	Arakan Federation	1976
Arakanese Insurgency	Burma	Arakan Federation	1977
Arakanese Insurgency	Burma	Arakan Federation	1978
Arakanese Insurgency	Burma	Arakan Federation	1979
Arakanese Insurgency	Burma	Arakan Federation	1980
Arakanese Insurgency	Burma	Arakan Federation	1981
Arakanese Insurgency	Burma	Arakan Federation	1982
Arakanese Insurgency	Burma	Arakan Federation	1983
Arakanese Insurgency	Burma	Arakan Federation	1984
Arakanese Insurgency	Burma	Arakan Federation	1985
Arakanese Insurgency	Burma	Arakan Federation	1986
Arakanese Insurgency	Burma	Arakan Federation	1987
Arakanese Insurgency	Burma	Arakan Federation	1988
Arakanese Insurgency	Burma	Arakan Federation	1989
Arakanese Insurgency	Burma	Arakan Federation	1990
Arakanese Insurgency	Burma	Arakan Federation	1991
Arakanese Insurgency	Burma	Arakan Federation	1992
Arakanese Insurgency	Burma	Arakan Federation	1993
Arakanese Insurgency	Burma	Arakan Federation	1994
Arakanese Insurgency	Burma	Arakan Federation	1995
Arakanese Insurgency	Burma	Arakan Federation	1996
Arakanese Insurgency	Burma	Arakan Federation	1997
Arakanese Insurgency	Burma	Arakan Federation	1998
Arakanese Insurgency	Burma	Arakan Federation	1999
Arakanese Insurgency	Burma	Arakan Federation	2000
Arakanese Insurgency	Burma	Arakan Federation	2001
Arakanese Insurgency	Burma	Arakan Federation	2002
Arakanese Insurgency	Burma	Arakan Federation	2003
Arakanese Insurgency	Burma	Arakan Federation	2004
Arakanese Insurgency	Burma	Arakan Federation	2005
Arakanese Insurgency	Burma	Arakan Federation	2006
Arakanese Insurgency	Burma	Arakan Federation	2007
Arakanese Insurgency	Burma	Arakan Federation	2008
Arakanese Insurgency	Burma	Arakan Federation	2009
Arakanese Insurgency	Burma	Arakan Federation	2010
Chittagong Insurgency	Bangladesh	Jumma Nation	1975
Chittagong Insurgency	Bangladesh	Jumma Nation	1976

TABLE B.1 (CONTINUED)

Conflict Name	Parent-State	Independent State	Year
Chittagong Insurgency	Bangladesh	Jumma Nation	1977
Chittagong Insurgency	Bangladesh	Jumma Nation	1978
Chittagong Insurgency	Bangladesh	Jumma Nation	1979
Chittagong Insurgency	Bangladesh	Jumma Nation	1980
Chittagong Insurgency	Bangladesh	Jumma Nation	1981
Chittagong Insurgency	Bangladesh	Jumma Nation	1982
Chittagong Insurgency	Bangladesh	Jumma Nation	1983
Chittagong Insurgency	Bangladesh	Jumma Nation	1984
Chittagong Insurgency	Bangladesh	Jumma Nation	1985
Chittagong Insurgency	Bangladesh	Jumma Nation	1986
Chittagong Insurgency	Bangladesh	Jumma Nation	1987
Chittagong Insurgency	Bangladesh	Jumma Nation	1988
Chittagong Insurgency	Bangladesh	Jumma Nation	1989
Chittagong Insurgency	Bangladesh	Jumma Nation	1990
Chittagong Insurgency	Bangladesh	Jumma Nation	1991
Chittagong Insurgency	Bangladesh	Jumma Nation	1992
Chittagong Insurgency	Bangladesh	Jumma Nation	1993
Chittagong Insurgency	Bangladesh	Jumma Nation	1994
Chittagong Insurgency	Bangladesh	Jumma Nation	1995
Chittagong Insurgency	Bangladesh	Jumma Nation	1996
Chittagong Insurgency	Bangladesh	Jumma Nation	1997
Nagoro-Karabakh War	Azerbaijan	Nagoro-Karabakh Republic	1991
Nagoro-Karabakh War	Azerbaijan	Nagoro-Karabakh Republic	1992
Nagoro-Karabakh War	Azerbaijan	Nagoro-Karabakh Republic	1993
Nagoro-Karabakh War	Azerbaijan	Nagoro-Karabakh Republic	1994
Cabindan Insurgency	Angola	Cabinda	1991
Cabindan Insurgency	Angola	Cabinda	1992
Cabindan Insurgency	Angola	Cabinda	1993
Cabindan Insurgency	Angola	Cabinda	1994
Cabindan Insurgency	Angola	Cabinda	1995
Cabindan Insurgency	Angola	Cabinda	1996
Cabindan Insurgency	Angola	Cabinda	1997
Cabindan Insurgency	Angola	Cabinda	1998
Cabindan Insurgency	Angola	Cabinda	1999
Cabindan Insurgency	Angola	Cabinda	2000
Cabindan Insurgency	Angola	Cabinda	2001
Cabindan Insurgency	Angola	Cabinda	2002

TABLE B.1 (CONTINUED)

Conflict Name	Parent-State	Independent State	Year
Cabindan Insurgency	Angola	Cabinda	2003
Cabindan Insurgency	Angola	Cabinda	2004
Cabindan Insurgency	Angola	Cabinda	2005
Cabindan Insurgency	Angola	Cabinda	2006
Cabindan Insurgency	Angola	Cabinda	2007
Cabindan Insurgency	Angola	Cabinda	2008
Cabindan Insurgency	Angola	Cabinda	2009
Cabindan Insurgency	Angola	Cabinda	2010